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Abstract 
This thesis presents research that explores some of the issues in colour categorisation. The main 
issues explored are, firstly, the nature of the coding processes involved in representing colour categories 
and making colour judgements and secondly, the role of language in colour categorisation. It is shown that 
colour categories seem to be represented as separate internal codes; the influence of colour categories on 
colour judgements is partly a junction of the task requirements. For both category-identity and physical- 
identity judgements, decisions about colours separated by inter-stimulus delay were more likely to show 
effects of categorisation than decisions about simultaneously presented colours. However, it was found that 
for visual search, category effects could be found with simultaneously presented colours. Evidence from the 
effects of interference on colour judgements suggested that categorical perception (CP) of colour is 
dependent on the availability of category labels and suggests that CP in colour at least, is a direct 
language effect. However, category identity judgements of colour showed no selective effect of verbal 
interference suggesting that a non-verbal category code is involved in making these decisions. Consistent 
with this claim was the finding of no hemispheric advantage for category identity judgements. Comparisons 
on three colour tasks (sorting, triads and visual search) were made between English and Ndonga speakers 
to further test the role of language in colour categorisation. While English has all eleven universal 
categories (Berlin & Kay, 1969), the Ndonga language lacks unique terms for some of these basic 
categories. Effects of this difference were found on all three tasks consistent with language being involved 
in colour category representation although it was unclear whether this was a direct language effect or 
whether there were genuine differences in perception between the two groups acquired as a result of colour 
language. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
General Introduction: 
Categorisation, Colour and Colour language 
1.1. Introduction: Categories and Categorisation 
1.1.1. The categorisation process 
The law of 'cognitive economy' (Bosch, 1978) dictates that it is necessary to organise the 
world into stable units of information based on some principle rather than to treat every 
instance as a new event. The process of ordering the world into categories (i. e. categori- 
sation) is probably one of the most fundamental achievements of the mind. After cate- 
gorisation, things with similar attributes or that perform similar functions, become rep- 
resented as equivalent. Through having a series of organised categories the world be- 
comes greatly simplified: everything encountered does not have do be dealt with as a 
unique event, one need not attend to all aspects of a stimulus but only those relevant for 
classification. Each new instance that we perceive can be classified within the category 
structure. It becomes possible to generate inferences: knowledge acquired through pre- 
vious encounters can be applied to current experience. A fundamental question about 
the categorisation process is of how it emerges. The early Nativist philosophy of Plato 
talked of the world as having natural divisions; for Plato, human categorisation merely 
reflected these divisions, e. g. we "carve nature at its joints" (in Dennett, 1996). It is true 
that particular attributes in the natural world do tend to cluster together to form a natu- 
ral category structure, for instance wings tend to co-occur with beaks more often than 
with fur (Rosch, 1978); however, for basic perceptual categories such as colour, the 
perceptual space constitutes a continuum - the number of possible categorisations avail- 
able is infinite and the mind itself must provide the structure. However, while the 
world itself might not always give us a pre-given structure, it is possible that the brain is 
predisposed to organise perception in a particular fashion. This question of category uni- 
versals is prominent in categorisation research. 
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1.1.2. Perceptual and conceptual categories 
It is necessary to acknowledge a distinction between perceptual and conceptual catego- 
ries (see Medin & Barsalou, 1987). Examples of perceptual categories are colours, 
speech and non-speech sounds, primitive shapes, spatial frequency patterns etc. The bulk 
of work about such categories has been performed in psychophysics. Conceptual or 
knowledge based categories include natural taxonomic categories (e. g. dog, bird, insect), 
artefacts (e. g. furniture, vehicles) and procedural events (e. g. going to restaurants); these 
have tended to be investigated more by those interested in the organisation of memory 
and abstract thought etc. However, there are some considerable similarities between 
perceptual and conceptual categories; for instance, the latter are defined, at least in part, 
by their perceptual features. It is therefore probable that some aspects of categorisation 
are common to both types of category, although conceptual categories almost invariably 
have a more complex structure. Medin and Barsalou also suggest that perceptual catego- 
ries may owe less to learning and more to genetic inheritance than conceptual categories. 
1.1.3. Issues in categorisation 
A debate relevant to categorisation concerns the malleability of low-level perceptual 
processes i. e. whether categorisation is based on a limited set of inherent features or 
whether new perceptual structures can be formed as a result of learning (see Schyns and 
Rodet, 1998). A more fundamental question concerns how much of the structure of our 
categories is predetermined and how much received through experience. That is, 
whether categories are largely inherited or emerge through learning. An issue related to 
this concerns the nature of category representations, the relationship between categories 
and the instances they contain. That is, whether categories are composed of the in- 
stances they contain or of abstract features. A further problem concerns the role played 
by language and cognitive processes in categorisation, whether categorisation is a largely 
perceptual or cognitive activity. While linguistic representations of categories (i. e. verbal 
labels) are an obvious necessity for communication, theories differ in the role given to 
language in learning categories and in the representation of categories themselves. A the- 
ory proposed by Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956) ascribes a central role to language in the 
categorisation process. Whorf, an amateur linguist at MIT engaged in analysing Native 
American languages such as Hopi, was struck by the differences with which European 
and Native American languages seemed to represent the world. Whorf's view was that 
language is the principle mechanism of categorisation and therefore the principle way 
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that we come to understand and order the world. The implication of Whorfianism, or 
Linguistic Relativity as it is often known, is that categorisation systems in different lan- 
guages should vary without constraint since language is conceived to arbitrarily `slice up' 
the world into manageable units. Linguistic relativity as a theory has lost ground to the 
opposing position of universalism (Brown, 1975). In this latter view, many aspects of 
perception and cognition are invariant and language is considered to only reflect, rather 
than determine, these operations. Therefore, for universalists, categories are largely pre- 
determined by certain inherent constraints and consequently differences between lan- 
guage in the way that they organise the world should be largely trivial. For reasons both 
practical and historical, a large proportion of the debate has centred round evidence de- 
rived from colour and colour categorisation. However, the concerns of relativity and 
universalism extend beyond colour categorisation and have implications for the funda- 
mental relationship between language and thought. 
Below, evidence from investigations of the general structure of categories is introduced, 
followed by the presentation of some of the theories of category representation. Fol- 
lowing sections will focus specifically on colour; evidence concerning the categorisation 
of colour and the role of language in this process is given. Particular attention is given to 
evidence from the categorical perception literature and its implications for colour cate- 
gorses. 
1.2. Structure of categories 
Categories are collections of things classified together on the basis of some principle. The 
two theories discussed here, classical and prototype theory, differ in how they describe 
category structure. The former theory considers that categories have critical properties 
that determine category membership; the latter emphasises the role of similarities. 
1.2.1. Classical theory 
The classical theory of categorisation rests on the assumption that features summarily 
define categories. Category membership is considered to be based on a particular combi- 
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nation of equally important features that exclusively determine membership. Every ex- 
emplar is considered to possess the particular set of features necessary for membership. 
One theory strongly in the classical tradition is that of Collins and Quillian (1969). Their 
theory was based on both Al simulation and RT data gathered from participants asked 
to answer simple `yes-no' questions about categories, e. g. "is a canary a bird? " In their 
model, categories are organised in strict hierarchies. At the highest level are the most 
general super-ordinate categories e. g. "animal", with more specific categories such as 
"bird" and "fish" represented at a lower level and the most specific types of category 
(subordinate categories) at the lowest level, e. g. "canary", "shark". Categories at lower 
levels are therefore always members of higher-level categories. The model is economical 
in that common features between different categories tend only to be represented once 
as the hierarchy works on the principle of inheritance. For instance, features common to 
all animals (e. g. "breathes", "has skin") would be represented at the super-ordinate level. 
Categories lower in the hierarchy automatically inherit the properties of those in the tier 
above. 
Despite the simplicity of the classical model, there are some critical failings of it as a 
model of human categorisation. In classical theory, all features are equally important in 
determining membership however, people generally consider some features more impor- 
tant than others; e. g. the fact that a salmon is pink is considered more salient for mem- 
bership to the salmon category than possessing fins. A further problem is found in that 
the model assumes all category members to be equal exemplars. However, some exem- 
plars are more typical than others; e. g. "robin" is rated as a more typical example of the 
category "bird" than "ostrich" (Rosch, 1978). It seems the boundaries between catego- 
ries are not always so sharply defined as the classical view predicts, but often 'fuzzy' and 
subject to variation. A more basic problem comes with the fact that some categories 
simply do not have defining features, Wittgenstein (1958) famously gave the example of 
"game", a familiar category, yet one that incorporate a set of instances with such a di- 
verse collection of attributes no combination of which is sufficient to determine mem- 
bership. Even where defining features do exist for a category, people are often poor at 
explicitly identifying them (Margolis, 1994) 
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1.2.2. Prototype theory 
The classical view is considered problematic because of the issues specified above. There 
have been attempts to rescue the classical approach by modifying it, for instance, by as- 
suming categorisation involves both defining and characteristic features (e. g. Rips et al., 
1973). Prototype theory takes a radical departure from classical theory in abandoning 
the notion that categorisation involves identifying critical properties for category mem- 
bership. Instead, the claim is that categories are organised around prototypes, abstracted 
sets of features or positions on dimensions that are most representative of the instances 
within a category. Therefore, the theory proposes that categories do not have a uniform 
structure. Instances more central to the category (i. e. those possessing more characteris- 
tic features of the category) tend to be rated as better examples of the category. There is 
therefore considered a gradient of typicality between items more central in the category 
and items that possess only few characteristic features or share several characteristic fea- 
tures with other categories. The result is that categorisation is considered a stochastic, 
rather than a deterministic process, boundaries between categories are fluid and there 
are degrees of category membership rather than it being absolute. 
Prototype theory seems to more neatly capture the characteristics of human categorisa- 
tion than classical theory. The theory has particular relevance for colour categories. 
Rosch (1973) argues that colour categories are organised round best example or `focal' 
colours. As will be discussed later, it has been suggested that focal colours have a par- 
ticular salience in colour cognition. Rosch's version of prototype theory (Rosch, Mervis 
& Grey et al., 1976; Rosch, 1978) makes additional claims about the organisation and 
relationship between categories. Like Collins and Quillian, Rosch claims that categories 
exist in a hierarchical arrangement, where Rosch departs from Collins and Quillian is in 
not treating all levels of the hierarchy as equivalent. Rather, Rosch postulates a 'basic' 
level of categorisation that is always in the middle of any hierarchy of categories. For 
example, in the hierarchy "Funiture" -> "Chair" -> "Kitchen-chair", the basic level 
category is "chair"; "Furniture" is the more general super-ordinate category, and 
"kitchen-chair" the more specific subordinate categorisation. 
The claim by Rosch is that objects are always first categorised at the basic level before 
any other level of abstraction. At the basic level, features are common to most (or all) 
members of the category. At the [higher] super-ordinate level, few common features be- 
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tween category instances exist. At the subordinate level there is considerable overlap 
between different categories and between categories at the basic level e. g. "kitchen 
chair" has considerable overlap of features with "living room chair", e. g. a desk chair. 
Therefore, the basic level is where categories are most distinct and most cognitively use- 
ful, and therefore in Rosch's terms has the highest cue validity. While super-ordinate 
categorisations provide too general information about an instance, subordinate catego- 
ries are too specific and offer limited extra information above that provided by the basic 
level. Rosch (1978) argues that the basic level is the most conspicuous level of descrip- 
tion. She claims that the basic level is the highest level at which members are perceptu- 
ally similar while still maintaining an appropriate level of abstraction. Objects in the 
same basic category tend to be visually similar but this similarity is not maintained for 
super-ordinate level categories. For instance, perceptual overlap between representa- 
tions of objects in the same basic category, such as different types of chair, is high com- 
pared to the overlap between different types of furniture. Secondly, there is a common- 
ality in the types of interactions required with objects of the same basic category that is 
not found with super-ordinate categories. For instance, the movements required to sit 
on a chair are essentially the same across all types of chair, the actions required across all 
types of furniture are not the same. 
More controversially, Rosch claims a psychological salience of the basic category level. 
She claims that objects are first processed as members of a basic category with additional 
processing required to identify objects as super or sub-ordinate categories. Evidence 
supporting this is found in the fact that participants usually spontaneously name objects 
using their basic category name and that children usually acquire basic category names 
first in language (Rosch, 1978). However, on this second point Mandler (1997) argues 
that infants sometimes make distinctions between global categories before distinguishing 
basic categories e. g. distinguishing between animals and vehicles before different basic 
classes of animal such as dogs and fish. Similarly, some evidence suggests Alzheimer's 
patients are often better at making broad level, rather than basic categorisations (Flicker 
et al., 1987) suggesting that the basic level may not be as robust as Rosch argues. 
While prototype theory as a theory of category structure, holds better than classical the 
ory in predicting categorisation behaviour, considerable difficulties are met in holding it 
as a theory of all category knowledge. Particularly, prototype theory has difficulty in 
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coping with ad hoc categories, categories where the level of featural similarity across dif- 
ferent exemplars is very small; e. g. the category of "things to rescue from a burning 
house". Categories seem to encode more information than prototype theory can explain 
without invoking additional assumptions. Prototype theory cannot easily explain why 
human categories are sensitive to contextual factors if all that is represented is some ab- 
stracted central tendency. For instance, contrary to what prototype theory predicts, 
given the concept `Bird' in the context of a Christmas dinner, one is more likely to think 
of a turkey than a robin (Medin & Coley, 1998). It has even been questioned whether 
prototype theory is more effective than classical theory. For instance, the principal rea- 
son for the shift towards accepting prototype theory was its ability to explain typicality 
effects. However, typicality effects are still found even in situations where prototypes 
are not operating (see Margolis, 1994, for a critique of the shift from classical to proto- 
type theory). 
1.3. Representation of categories 
A related question about category structure concerns how categories are composed and 
represented, particularly the question of the role of instances in the representation of 
categories. 
1.3.1. Categories as abstract features 
In one view, what are represented are abstract features, i. e. as average positions in a 
geometric featural space (Rosch, Simpson & Miller, 1976), or as collection of most fre- 
quently occurring features (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; see Smith 
and Medin, 1981). In these models, categorisation becomes a simple process of judging 
the overlap of similarity between the feature representations of the prototype and those 
of the instance. With categories defined by a geometric position, categorisation becomes 
a matter of judging the distance between prototype and 'candidate'-instances. With cate- 
gories as collections of features, categorisation becomes a comparison of the two feature 
lists between category and instance. The greater this overlap, the more likely the in- 
stance is rated a member of the category. Such theories therefore neatly account for 
typicality effects: instances more similar to the prototype in their collection of features 
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will be categorised more easily and rated as a better examples of that category than those 
whose feature overlap is lower. 
1.3.2. Categories as assimilations of instances 
Exemplar (instance), theories take a different stance to the above models. In exemplar 
theory, the representation of the category is composed, not of abstractions of features, 
but assimilations of features from particular instances (Smith & Medin, 1981). There- 
fore, the representation of a category retains some elements of the instances within the 
category. Unlike the position given above therefore, instance theory is less easily recon- 
ciled with Nativism. However, in assuming category representations retain aspects of 
instances, some of the problems with prototype theory can be resolved. By retaining 
some trace of specific instances, a much more complex category representation is ob- 
tamed; knowledge of specific instances can be invoked in situations where the prototype 
fails to resolve ambiguity. Indeed, Medin and Coley (1998) argue that it is unnecessary 
for exemplar theories to evoke prototypes; exemplar theories can naturally account for 
prototype effects by themselves. Instances more central to the category will be classified 
faster even if they have not been seen before because they are more similar to other in- 
stances in the category. 
1.3.3. Connectionism 
Connectionist theories (e. g. McCllelland & Rumelhart, 1986) argue that representations 
are non-symbolic. Instead, categories are organised at a sub-symbolic level, as a network 
of nodes. The category may exist, therefore, only as patterns of activation in such a net- 
work. Connectionism does not necessarily constitute a rival to prototype and exemplar 
theories, but rather gives a different way of describing the implementation of category 
knowledge. The relationship between the features or instances of a category can be seen 
as a series of weighted connections in which activation spreads within the category. 
Connectionist models of categorisation combine some of the features of prototype mod- 
els and exemplar theories in showing sensitivity to typicality as well as to exemplar 
similarity (Ross & Makin, 1999). 
1.3.4. Dual code theory 
Paivio (1986) is the principal proponent of dual code theory of representation. Paivio's 
version of the theory rests on two premises. Firstly, that when a stimulus is represented, 
this representation can occur as one or two independent codes: a visual code and a ver- 
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bal code. Secondly, that remembering is more effective when a stimulus is encoded as 
both forms. Dual code theory is therefore consistent with the linguistic relativist's claim 
that the availability of verbal labels in a language affects the representation of that 
stimulus. Stimuli that are not coded differently in a language are more likely to be con- 
fused by speakers of that language. This second assumption, however, does not always 
hold. Instructions to verbally code visually presented stimuli can often detrimentally bias 
the retention of that stimulus by the verbal code 'over-shadowing' the visual (Schooler 
& Engstler-Schooler, 1990). 
Dual code theory has relevance for theories of categorisation. It is consistent with the 
notion that stimuli are represented at different levels of abstraction. A large body of 
work looking at coding in categorisation tasks has come from studies of judgements of 
presented letters (Posner, 1978). Letters constitute one learned form of perceptual cate- 
gory; Posner argues that such stimuli are represented as separable independent codes. He 
claims that the relative influence of different codes in making categorisation judgements 
depends on the particular demands of the task. 
1.4. Colour categorisation 
Colour is the percept associated with portions of the electromagnetic spectrum (400- 
760 nm). It has three perceptual properties, each equating with a physical property of 
the light waveform: hue (dominant wavelength), brightness1 (intensity), and `colourful- 
ness' (purity of dominant wavelength). This means that the perceptual representation of 
colour has a three-dimensional structure. Heimholz, in 1863 (see Wooton and Miller, 
1997), first speculated that the human retina contains three types of colour receptor; 
since then most empirical work has overwhelmingly supported this claim. The receptors 
of colour on the retina are known as cones and are present largely on the fovea. Each 
type of cone contains a pigment that possesses a different spectral sensitivity. Although 
sometimes labelled as red, green and blue cones, they are better considered as long (L), 
' The same property is known as lightness for reflecting surfaces. 
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medium (Al) and short (S) wave receptors2. The reason for this consideration is that in- 
dividual cone-types are actually 'colour-blind', changes in either the intensity or fre- 
quency of a light source produce changes in absorption in a cone - this is known as the 
law of univariance (see Kaiser and Boynton, 1996). The ability to make colour discrimina- 
tions comes only from post retinal comparisons of activation across different cones. It 
was the understanding of this process that resolved one of the principal debates about 
colour vision between the Helmholz theory of three-cone colour vision and the oppo- 
nent theory of Edward Herring in the late 19th century. It was noted by this author that 
there seemed to be four elementary chromatic sensations: blueness, yellowness, green- 
ness, and redness. Since it is not possible to have a 'reddish-green' or a 'yellowish-blue' 
the lack of these mixes must be due to some opponent process in the coding of colour 
(in Wooten & Miller, 1997). 
The understanding of the relationship between the competing accounts of colour vision 
by Helmholz and Herring was provided by the identification of cells in the LGN of a 
macaque monkey that were found to act in an opponent manner to stimulation by 
chromatic light in the cells receptive field (DeValois & Jacobs, 1968; DeValois & De- 
Valois, 1975). Cells were isolated showing excitation to red wavelengths and inhibition 
to green (coined +R-G cells), showed excitation to yellow and inhibition to blue (+Y- 
B), as well as mirror opposite +G-R and +B-Y cells. Further work on opponent theory 
has also elaborated the understanding of the connections of opponent cells to the three 
cones, for instance a +R-G cells receives activation from L cones and inhibition from M 
cones, while +G-R cells have the reverse of this (DeValois & DeValois, 1975; Kaiser & 
Boynton, 1998). A revision of opponent theory was proposed by DeValois and DeValois 
(1993). Here they argued for a further stage of opponency in the cortex, beyond the 
cone opponency of the LGN. They did this to account for discrepancies between cell 
recordings and psychophysical data with short-wavelength colours and to explain how 
luminance and colour information becomes unconfounded by the nervous system (all 
opponent cells in the LGN also show some response to white as well as coloured 
light. 
Processing of colour in the cortex is less well understood than that of the LGN. How- 
2 It has been suggested that more than three cone types may be present on the retina. If this is the case, 
the visual system must combine these cones in such a way that they only function as three independent 
receptors. 
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ever, work has indicated that an area in the visual cortex known as V4 (an area anterior 
to the principle visual areas V1, V2 and V3) plays a significant role in the perception of 
colour (Zeki, 1993). 
1.4.1. Colour categorisation and colour language 
Considerable research has been performed investigating the use of colour language itself; 
that is, the system of naming used to describe colour; i. e. the number of terms used and 
the pattern and structure of their use. While colour constitutes a continuous perceptual 
space, colour-naming studies indicate that colour is treated as being divided into discrete 
categories. For instance, Beare (1963) showed that (English speaking) observers dis- 
cretely and reliably partition the colour spectrum using a limited set of colour names. 
However, analysis of ancient written texts and anthropological surveys of different sys- 
tems of colour language have found that this partitioning by language is not always per- 
formed in the same fashion. This has led to speculation that the underlying perceptual 
categorisation of colour may not be universal. 
Biological relativism 
An early description of differences in colour language is given by Geiger (1867). In Gei- 
ger's analysis, he notes the lack of separate terms for certain hues in a number of ancient 
texts, for instance Vedic scripts of India, the epic poems of Homer from ancient Greece 
and in the Hebrew script of the Bible. He speculated an evolution of the complexity of 
sensation in which the perception of colour had developed relatively recently in human 
history. The first anthropological study, a study of the peoples of the Torres Straits (is- 
lands off the northern coast of Australia), included a survey of colour naming and colour 
perception in the native tribes of the islands (reported in Rivers, 1901). Rivers reports 
that these 'primitive' peoples possessed an 'incomplete' colour language similar to that 
reported by Geiger in earlier civilisations. Importantly, Rivers also found reduced sensi- 
tivity for colours that the 'natives' had no name for. Rivers explained the differences in 
colour language and perception as one of biological genesis, specifically a difference of 
pigmentation in the macula lutea of the eye. 
The position of biological relativity was first challenged by Woodworth (1910) who 
took an early universalist stance on the issue of colour perception. On Geiger's observa- 
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tion of ancient colour language, Woodworth argued, "the absence of a name for a sen- 
sory quality [in itself] does not point to the absence of that quality (p. p. 329)". On Riv- 
ers assumption of the differences found in the people of the Torres Straits being of bio- 
logical origin, Woodworth argues that the late appearance of certain colour terms is too 
widespread to be explained in this fashion. Physiology, as an explanation for differences 
in colour language fell out of favour after this point, although it was more recently re- 
vived in a paper by Bornstein (1973). 
Linguistic relativity 
Linguistic relativity provided a different explanation of the diversity of colour language 
to the biological relativism of Geiger and Rivers. Whorf considered language to be a 
categorical system that ordered the perceptual world. Therefore, language rather than 
biology, was fundamental in the categorisation of colour and other perceptual attributes: 
"we dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native language. The categories and 
types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they 
stare every observer in the face... the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of im- 
pressions which has to be organised... by the linguistic system in our minds" (Whorf, 
1956, p. p. 212-213). 
Therefore, while Plato believed boundaries between categories to be naturally given, 
Whorf argued that they were socially constructed and artificially imposed by language. 
However, Whorf s position is confusing, he is often inconsistent about whether language 
influenced or actually determined thought (Lucy, 1992). Brown (1976) summarises the 
principals of linguistic relativity as two hypotheses. Firstly, that structural difference 
between language systems, where they occur, should be paralleled by non-linguistic cog- 
nitive differences, of an unspecified sort, in native speakers of the two languages. Sec- 
ondly, that the structure of a language determines the world-view of a speaker. 
The fact that colour languages were known to vary in the time of Whorf made it natural 
to cite colour perception as evidence in favour of linguistic relativity. Followers in the 
Whorfian tradition were quick to interpret this evidence in this manner. Ray (1952, 
1953) was one proponent, arguing for a strong relationship between colour language and 
the perception of colour. He states that because the Eskimo language Atka has a single 
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blue-green term, ".. [they] perceive broad bands of blue and green as one colour.. ". Simi- 
laxly, the Sanpoil, with a language possessing a single yellow-orange term, Ray claims 
"perceive[s] orange and yellow to be unitary". Ray argued for the complete arbitrariness 
of colour categorisation by a language, he states "Each culture has taken the spectral 
continuum and has divided it upon a basis which is quite arbitrary" (Ray 1953, p. p. 
104). 
Brown and Lenneberg (1954) attempted to experimentally test the effect of colour lan- 
guage on the memorability for colour in a single language population, namely English. 
They found that the 'codability' of a colour, a factor based on several linguistic and be- 
havioural measures of colour naming, correlated with the short-term recognition mem- 
ory for colour. That is, colours that were highly namable by English speakers in their 
language were also more likely to be remembered correctly than colours that were less 
codable. The obvious difficulty with a correlational study based on a single population is 
in inferring any causal role for language in the process. In fact, a later attempt to per- 
form a cross-cultural replication (Lenneberg & Roberts, 1956), produced, at best, am- 
biguous results. This study looked at colour language and memory for colour in a Native 
American language called Zuni. Detailed investigation of the colour terms in the Zuni 
language showed that it had the same term for both yellow and orange. Consistent with 
linguistic relativism, none of the Zuni managed to correctly recognise either of these 
colours. However, it is not clear, whether the Zuni perceptually confused yellow and 
orange or simply performed more poorly in their recognition memory for yellow. No 
data is presented in support of this and there were problems with both the size and rep- 
resentiveness of the Zuni sample3. 
Stronger evidence in favour of linguistic relativity was obtained by later research using 
communication accuracy, a different nameability measure that took into account the 
particular context in which colour language was used. Lantz and Stefflre (1964) showed 
that this communication accuracy - the efficiency with which a colour could be com- 
municated to another speaker in the context of a particular array - was a better predic- 
tor of colour memory in English speakers than Brown and Lenneberg's codability meas- 
ure. Furthermore, Stefflre et al. (1966), in a cross-cultural replication of Lantz and Stef- 
3 See Lucy (1992) for a critique of the Brown and Lenneberg and Lenneberg and Roberts studies. 
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fire, showed that communication accuracy correlated highest with colour memory 
within a language when comparing these measures in native Spanish and Mayan speak- 
ers. However, a comparison between communication accuracy and colour memory in 
deaf vs. hearing children and adults (Lantz & Lenneberg, 1966), showed less convincing 
evidence of a relationship between the two variables. Patterns of memorability were 
found to be very similar across all groups despite showing significant differences on the 
communication accuracy measure. 
Universalism 
The impact of Berlin and Kay's seminal 1969 work, Basic Color Terms, on the relativity 
vs. universalism debate is difficult to overestimate. The work represents the first at- 
tempt to compare the structure of colour terms across language4. Previous work on col- 
our language, e. g. Ray, had tended to only compare the boundaries between colour 
termsbetween languages. Berlin and Kay also gathered data on the choices of best exam- 
ples or foci of colour terms across languages. Presenting an array of maximally saturated 
Munsell colours, Berlin and Kay asked respondents to choose the best examples of the 
basic colour terms and map their boundaries. From this data, Berlin and Kay were 
struck by the fact that while the boundaries between colour terms differed between 
both individual respondents and between languages, there was considerable agreement 
in the choice of the best examples of terms. Berlin and Kay note that not all foci were 
named in certain languages. In explaining this they argued that the allocation of colour 
terms to colour categories is a dynamic process following a strict evolutionary path. 
Languages having only two colour terms tend to divide colour based on brightness and 
thus only possess terms corresponding to black and white (Stage I); languages with three 
colour terms should have a single chromatic term, red (Stage, II); languages with four 
terms should then add either yellow or green (Stage III). With five terms, whichever 
term did not develop at the previous stage is added (Stage IV). The next term to be 
added is blue (Stage V), followed by brown (Stage VI). Finally, the remaining colour 
terms: orange, pink, purple are added in rapid succession (Stage VII). Grey is considered 
a 'wildcard' term that may appear at any of the seven stages. 
4 However, Brown (1975) acknowledges that Berlin and Kay's method owes something to Lenneberg 
and Robert's study of the Zuni. 
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Therefore, for Berlin and Kay, colour categories are perceptual structures that are nas- 
cent even if a language does not code them. Much research has been produced in testing 
this claim about the nature of colour language structures. Much of this literature, against 
the predictions of linguistic relativity, has supported Berlin and Kay in suggesting that 
colour language is heavily constrained by universal principles. An initial replication of 
Berlin and Kay, by Collier (1976), using a Munsell array that had greater control for 
saturation, was largely confirming. However, Collier, like Berlin and Kay, relied mostly 
on bilingual respondents living in America. Extensive data has since been gathered, using 
more ecologically valid methods, usually from monolingual speakers drawn from their 
native populations. Large-scale projects such as the World Color Survey (Kay, et al, 
1997), and the Meso-American Color survey (MacLaurey, 1997), have been undertaken. 
Again, this work has been largely supportive of the general claims of Berlin and Kay that 
colour language is not arbitrary. However, anomalies contradicting the stronger claims 
of the Berlin and Kay sequence have been found. These include the finding of further 
colour terms beyond the Stage VII of English e. g. in Russian (Corbett & Morgan, 1988) 
and Turkish (Ozgen & Davies, 1998). Further difficulties for the theory have been the 
occasional finding of 'desaturated' terms (Greenfield, 1986) and composite terms in con- 
flict with the sequence, e. g. yellow-green (MacLaurey, 1987). Consequently, the most 
recent published version of the Berlin and Kay theory (Kay, Berlin & Merrifield, 1991) 
has retracted from the stricter claims of the 1969 evolutionary sequence. 
Nonetheless, most work has been generally been supportive. Some difficulty has, how- 
ever, has come with defining exactly what constitutes a Basic Colour Term (BCT) in a 
languages. For Berlin and Kay, indicators of basicness are both linguistic and psychologi- 
cal. Examples of linguistic indicators specified by Berlin and Kay to exclude certain 
terms include: monolexemity, e. g. blue-green; unique signification (not contained within 
another term), e. g. crimson; not having a limited range of use, e. g. 
blond. Examples of 
psychological indicators of basicness include a tendency to occur in the speech of all 
in- 
formants in a language and a tendency for terms to appear early in elicited lists (i. e. lists 
produced by asking informants to name all the colour terms they know). 
A review given 
by Crawford (1982) argued for abandoning much of Berlin and Kay's criteria for basic- 
ness, which are sometimes ambiguous and difficult to apply. Often 
different measures of 
basicness conflict, making the identification of basic terms in a language a largely arbi- 
trary decision (Levinson, 1998). Some authors have been critical of the whole approach 
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of univeralism, e. g Kuschel and Monberg (1974) in their study of the native language of 
Bellona Island in the British Soloman Islands. If basic colour categories are universal, it 
should be the case that colour as an attribute has a salience to all populations. Kuschel 
and Monberg claim that to Bellonese culture, colour is an unimportant attribute. The 
use of colour terms is surprisingly absent from their folk-laws and myths, their language 
lacks any term for 'colour' and they don't seem to separate colour from other aspects of 
culture. Simpson (1991), against Berlin and Kay, argues that their methods fail to take 
into account colour terms in less limited (i. e. more naturalistic) contexts, arguing that 
unique hues occur only rarely in nature. 
Kay and MacDaniel (1978) 
The revision of the Berlin and Kay theory in 1978 by Kay and MacDaniel, drew more 
on the claims of a strong physiological underpinning for focal colours. The theory was 
able to account for the composite terms that proved problematic for Berlin and Kay, 
colour terms that incorporate two or more primary hues (e. g. a "grue" term) that have 
been found in many languages (including Berlin and Kay's original data set) and proved 
problematic for Berlin and Kay. The 1978 theory makes a distinction between 'primary' 
categories, i. e. red, green, blue, yellow, black, white and derived categories, i. e. orange, 
pink, purple, brown and grey. The former are, by Kay and MacDaniel, said to emerge 
directly from the fundamental neural responses (FNRs) of the opponent mechanisms 
identified by DeValois and DeValois (see earlier section). The position of the category 
focus for primary categories is said to be physiologically determined. For derived catego- 
ries, the focus emerges from the intersection between the membership functions of adja- 
cent primaries, for instance, 'orange' emerges from the intersection of 'red' and 
'yellow'. 
For primary and derived categories, colours perceptually more distant from the points of 
maximum membership have increasingly declining membership functions. 
By suggesting that categories have such 'fuzzy' membership properties, 
Kay and McDan- 
iel ally themselves with prototype theory. The 1978 theory, then, presented a possible 
structure for the evolution of colour terms as well as suggesting the possibility of 
how 
colour language might develop in the future. Their claim was that the reason 
for consis- 
tency in colour categorisation across different cultures was biological not pragmatic. 
However, a major problem with this claim is that its foundation in neurophysiology is 
insecure. The responses of opponent cells in the LGN are not neural correlate of psy- 
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chological colour categories. The names given to the cells by DeValois and DeValois are 
misnomers. The maximum excitation of the cells does not correspond closely to the four 
primary hue categories but to intermediate colours Oameson & D'Andrade, 1997). Fur- 
thermore, the distribution of these excitations represents an averaging of the recording 
of many cells and thus doesn't constitute the response of any particular single cell, all 
opponent cells show at least some excitation to achromatic light and the correspondence 
between opponent cell responses and hue perception is somewhat poor. Evidence from 
cell recordings in the visual cortex have shown patterns of responding that correspond 
more closely to colour category sensations (Vautin & Dow, 1985; Yoshioka, Dow & 
Vautin, 1996). Cells in V4 have been found sensitive to particular narrow regions of the 
spectrum (Zeki, 1980). However even here, the responses of such cells do not correlate 
well with perceived colour. The cells do not display colour constancy and are thus sensi- 
tive to changes in the wavelength composition of reflected light (Zeki, 1983). Abramov 
(1997) states that no neurons have been found with responses corresponding unequivo- 
cally to colour sensations. Until more is known about the underlying physiology, Kay 
and McDaniel's claims about colour categorisation remains speculative. 
Dosch 
However, despite the failure to find physiological evidence to substantiate the claims of 
universalism, the position that colour language is heavily constrained is supported by 
evidence from colour naming in most languages studied. This does not necessarily mean, 
however, that one should therefore reject linguistic relativity in its entirety. As Michaels 
(1977) states "If it is the case that semantic universals are acquired in evolutionary 
stages, then Berlin and Kay have discovered a real instance of extreme 
linguistic relativ- 
ity. Language systems which have not yet evolved their full complement of semantic 
colour universals colour severely limit the associated culture's perception of reality" 
(Michaels, 1977 p. p. 334). The question of whether colour language can affect the per- 
ception and cognition of colour, while being perhaps more crucial, 
is an aspect of the 
relativity vs. universalism debate that has received less attention. 
The reason for this 
seems to be because of the disproportionate influence of a series of cross cultural studies 
by Rosch (Bosch, 1972, Heider & Olivier, 1972, Rosch, 1973) in which on the basis of 
evidence from two language groups it was claimed that 
language had no effect on any 
aspect of colour perception or cognition. In these papers, 
Rosch looked at the percep- 
tion of and memory for colour in the Dani a native tribe of the highlands of the 
former 
17 
New Guinea (now Indonesia). Their language was particularly interesting because it is 
the only identified example of a stage I language. The Dan, describe colour using only 
two basic terms: mili meaning dark 'cold' colours and mola meaning bright 'warm' colours 
(Rosch, 1972). 
In Rosch (1972), Rosch compares American English and the Dam on a recognition 
memory task in which a Munsell colour chip was presented for 5 sec and which after a 
30 sec. delay had to be found in an array of 160 maximally saturated Munsell colours 
arranged in Munsell order in terms of lightness and hue. Rosch compared memory for 
three types of colour: focal, internominal and boundary. Focal colours corresponded to 
the choices of best examples of BCTs in Berlin and Kay's data; internominal colours 
where colours that were never chosen as the best examples of BCTs in any language and 
boundary colours were colours between focal and internominal regions. The basic result 
was that for both the Americans and the Dani, focal colours were remembered better 
than either internominal or boundary colours while the latter did not differ from each 
other in their memorability. Therefore, despite the Dani lacking any term to identify the 
best examples of red, green, yellow, orange etc. they, like English speakers, still showed 
an advantage in remembering those colours. It seemed that basic colour categories, al- 
though not expressed in the language of the Dani, were nevertheless nascent. Further 
experiments showed that focal colours also had an advantage in long term as well as 
short-term memory for the Dani. The Dani found it easier to learn arbitrary names for 
focal colours than any other colours. Rather than language determining perception, 
Rosch's interpreted her data as suggesting that perception determine language. There- 
fore, the reason for any association between language and colour memorability is that 
highly memorable colours tend to be those that are also most nameable in a language, 
not the reverse as Brown and Lenneberg had claimed. 
A second paper by Rosch (Heider & Olivier, 1972) looks at recognition memory for de- 
saturated colours in American English and the Dani. In this paper, Heider and Olivier 
focused on an analysis of the errors made by the two groups in order to look at the dif- 
ferences in the structure of colour memory across the language. They claimed that, al- 
though the Dani made significantly more errors than the Americans in their recognition 
memory for colour, the pattern of errors in the two populations was very similar. Fur- 
thermore, comparison of MDS scaling solutions of the memory and naming confusion 
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data in the two languages indicated a greater similarity of the Dani memory data with 
the English memory data than with the Dan, naming solution. However, measures of 
goodness of fit between the solutions indicated the relationship between Dam naming 
and memory was higher than between the Dani and American memory solutions 
(Roberson, Davies and Davidoff, 2000). 
In a third paper (Rosch, 1973), Rosch presents data showing how the Dani learnt Eng- 
lish colour categories. In this study, Rosch presented the Dani with colour categories 
(sets of three Munsell colour chips varying on a single dimension). In one type of set, the 
focal colour was central in the Munsell series; i. e. there was a colour chip present in the 
series both above and below the colour in either brightness or hue. In another type of 
set, the focal colour was peripheral, rather than central, in the category of three colours. 
The Dani were repeatedly shown these colours and were required to remember a name 
for them. Rosch reports that the Darn found the categories in which the focal colour 
was central easier to learn than the categories in which the focal colour was peripheral. 
Therefore, in support of universalism it appeared that focal colours facilitated the 
learning of colour categories. However, against this interpretation, Rosch found the 
Dani unwilling to designate any colour in their 'newly learned' categories, as a best ex- 
ample. If focal colours were so universally salient, it is difficult to see why this was the 
case. 
Challenges to universalism. 
Although Rosch claims her findings with the Dani show strong support for universalism 
against relativity in colour categorisation (see Rosch, 1977), some authors have chal- 
lenged this interpretation. Shönbach (1977) suggests that a relationship between lan- 
guage and memorability in Rosch's study might have been found if the memory 
load was 
increased beyond a single colour; with more items, the tendency to verbally label colours 
could well increase and their role in colour memory could be more 
important. Ratner 
(1989) notes that, although the Dani showed an advantage for focal colours 
like the 
Americans, their overall performance was much poorer suggesting, as Rosch argued, that 
the Dani were poorer at memory games, but may also suggest that they were 
inhibited 
by their limited colour vocabulary. Ratner argues that, as the difference in overall per- 
formance between American and Dani was greater than the difference between focal 
and non-focal colours, suggests that culture was playing a greater role 
in colour memory 
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than focality. Ratner and McCarthy (1990) show that with ecologically relevant stimuli 
rather than meaningless colour squares, colour typicality and not focality, determines 
memorability. This suggests that Rosch's finding may have little relevance to everyday 
colour memory, which may be contextually bound and thus culturally relative. 
Lucy and Schweder (1979) provide evidence that gives the strongest challenge to Rosch. 
They found that Rosch's focal colours could be identified more accurately and more 
quickly than non-focals in a perceptual search task using the Rosch (1972) array of 160 
tiles. The saliency of focal colours in Rosch's memory task therefore may not actually be 
due to any intrinsic advantage for these colours, as Rosch seems to be claiming, but 
rather be due to the greater discriminability of these colours within the Rosch array. 
Lucy and Schweder produced an array that they claim controls for this discriminability 
by deleting colour chips that were frequently selected in error as targets in their search 
task and by randomising the ordering of colours in the array. With this new array, Lucy 
and Schweder found that the advantage for focal colours over non-focals in short-term 
recognition memory was no longer significant. The 'universal' salience of focal colour 
categories described by Berlin & Kay and Rosch, may then be partly a function of the 
particular colours shown to a speaker rather than any universal precedence. Replications 
of this study have produced inconsistent results however, which may question the sta- 
bility of this finding (cf Garro, 1988; Lucy & Schweder, 1988). Lucy and Schweder 
(1979) claim that linguistic measures (communication accuracy) of colour codability ac- 
count for more variance in the recognition memory of different colours than focality. 
Lucy and Schweder (1988) further state, consistent with relativism, that active verbal 
encoding of focal colours may be required for a focal advantage to be displayed. If inci- 
dental conversation between experimenter and participant occurs, this tends to reduce 
the advantage for focal colours. 
A recent paper by Roberson, Davies and Davidoff (2000) describes the only attempt to 
replicate Rosch's cross-cultural colour memory studies (Rosch, 1972; Heider & Olivier, 
1972). The study compared English speakers with the Bermemo, a tribe of a neigh- 
bouring geographic region to the Dani. Berinemo has five basic terms by Berlin and 
Kay's criteria, compared to two terms for the Dani. However, an initial attempt to map 
their terms onto a Munsell array using Berlin and Kay's procedure showed considerable 
disagreement in the choice of the best examples of their basic terms. In a comparison of 
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recognition memory for colour in English speakers and the Berinemo, the evidence fa- 
voured relativity more than universalism, each group was most accurate at recognising 
colours that were most namable in their language. Errors in each language tended to be 
consistent with naming patterns, colours that had the same name as targets tended also 
to be selected in error within each language. 
1.4.2. Development of colour categories and colour language 
Research in infants' perception of colour categories has shown a similar historical trend 
to the work with adult data. Initial studies favoured linguistic relativity in suggesting 
that an infant's perception of hue was determined by his/her linguistic knowledge of 
colour terms (e. g. Dale, 1969; Kimball & Dale, 1972). Most work looking at colour 
category development in children, performed since the mid 1970's has tended to support 
universalism in suggesting that the perception of colour categories in children precedes 
their acquisition of colour language. Bornstein, on the basis of a number of experiments 
looking at infant colour vision (Bornstein, 1975; Bornstein, Kessen & Weiskopf, 1976) 
argues that pre-language infants perception of hue is much the same as ours. Bornstein 
(1975) shows that infants of only 4-5 months showed a preference for focal over non- 
focal coloured lights despite the lights being equated for luminance. His evidence sug- 
gests that infants behaved in a manner that suggests they had intact hue boundaries 
similar to those of adults (Bornstein, Kessen & Weiskopf, 1976), infants habituated to a 
light showed preferential looking towards lights that were from a different category 
over one of the same colour category although the physical distance between the two 
and the habituated stimulus was the same (see also Catherwood et al, 1990)5. Experi- 
ments with older children have yielded similar results. Rosch (1971) found that com- 
pared to non-focal colours, 3-4 year olds were more likely to choose focal colours when 
asked to pick up 'any colour', more accurately match focal colours and were more likely 
to choose focal colours as the best examples of any basic colour terms they knew. 
'A recent paper by Gerhardstein, Renner and Rovee-Collier (1999) using colours scaled in Munsell units 
rather than wavelength does not support Bornstein. They found that perceptual distance, rather than cate- 
gory membership, determined the tendency of colours to 'pop-out' to young infants. However, the study is 
problematic in its failure to use the correct illuminants for the stimuli (Davies & Franklin, submitted). 
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Mervis, Catlin and Rosch, (1975) and Raskin, Maital and Bornstein, (1983) performed 
cross-sectional studies looking at the development of colour category structure with age. 
Both studies indicate certain changes in colour category structure with age, but suggest 
an underlying invariance. Mervis, Catlin and Rosch, (1975) compared the use of colour 
names in three age groups: young infants, third-grade schoolers and adults. It was found 
that naming of focal colours was more stable than the position of boundaries between 
names for all age groups while the overall size of categories tended to increase with age 
(adults were more willing to accept colours of lower saturation as being members of ba- 
sic categories). Raskin, Maital and Bornstein, (1983) looked at colour naming across the 
blue-green and green-yellow boundary in four age groups: three-year-old and four-year- 
old children, adults and elderly adults. Evidence suggested a `sharpening' of the categori- 
sation function with age up to adulthood with a corresponding narrowing of boundary 
widths. However, despite this, the crossover (i. e. boundary) point remained invariant 
with age, suggesting that this aspect of categorisation is not learned but is nascent. 
1.5. Categorical perception and Colour 
1.5.1. Definitions of Categorical Perception 
Perception, it seems, plays a direct role in the categorisation process. Where a continu- 
ous stimulus dimension is organised into distinct categories, members of the same cate- 
gory come to resemble one another more and members of different categories come to 
be perceived as more distinct. Therefore operationally, on any categorised dimension, 
where perceptual differences are the same, discriminations between stimuli that straddle 
category boundaries tend to be superior to discriminations of stimuli that 
fall inside the 
same category. 
Some of the earliest demonstrations of categorical perception 
(CP) were in speech per- 
ception. Given a continuum of sounds varying 
from one phoneme to another in physi- 
cally equal steps (e. g. 
/do/ to /to/), discrimination was found to be no better than ab- 
solute identification, sounds that were 
identified as instances of a phonemic category 
could not be discriminated 
from each other (Liberman et al., 1957). Later work showed 
that discrimination within categories, although poorer than across categories was gener- 
ally above chance 
(Pastore, 1987; Pisoni, 1991), showing that categorical perception 
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was not absolute. Furthermore, although early CP theorists stressed the uniqueness of 
the speech domain by claiming a link between speech perception and production 
(Liberman et al., 1957), it was found that CP seemed to be a general characteristic of 
perception and not even confined to the auditory modality. CP has been found in the 
perception of. musical intervals (Siegel & Siegel, 1977; Zatorre & Halpern, 1979); facial 
emotional expressions (Young et. al., 1997; Calder et. al., 1996; Bimler & Kirkland, 
1999); facial actions (Campbell et. al., 1999); perception of the faces of different species 
(Campbell et al. 1997), and social judgements (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), among others. 
Colour perception is no exception to the list of categorically perceived stimulus dimen- 
sions. CP effects in colour discrimination have been found in a range of psychophysical 
tasks: recognition memory (Uchikawa & Shinoda, 1996); same-different judgements 
(Boynton, et al., 1989; Bornstein & Korda, 1984) and similarity judgements (Laws, Da- 
vies & Andrews, 1995). For example, Uchikawa and Shinoda (1996) presented observ- 
ers with a pair of colours in successive presentation (the memory stimuli) and after a 
two sec delay presented two comparison colours one of which was the same one of the 
memory stimuli. The observer was required to judge which of the memory stimuli corre- 
sponded to one of the comparison colours. It was found that when the two memory 
stimuli were in the same category, the observer was more likely to confuse them, and 
thus make an incorrect judgement. This was despite the fact that the difference between 
all colour pairs had been equalised in JNDs. Boynton et al. (1989) presented observers 
with two stimuli separated by a delay of 10 sec. The tendency to make a 'same' judge- 
ment in error was found lowest for stimulus pairs that were categorically most different, 
despite the perceptual spacing between all different pairs being equal in OSA6 spacing. 
The importance of CP to the question of colour categories is that it may offer clues to 
the mechanism of categorisation. The two main questions concerning CP involve the 
origin of the effect and the locus of the processes producing the effect. The question of 
the origin of CP concerns whether it occurs as a result of in-built sensitivities or 
6 The OSA (Optical Society of America) Uniform Color Scale is an alternative perceptual colour metric to 
the Munsell system. Unlike Munsell, the perceptual distance between colours and their nearest neighbours 
are approximately perceptually equal across all dimensions. However in doing this, the system does not 
include highly saturated colours. 
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whether these sensitivities are acquired as a result of categorisation. For colour percep- 
tion, this question is particularly relevant; if the former is correct, it suggests that the 
categorisation of colour is largely determined by physiology, while if the latter is correct, 
it suggests as Whorf argued, that language does indeed partly determine our worldview. 
Harnad (1987, p. p. 546) restated the Worfian hypothesis in terms of CP: "The percep- 
tual and conceptual discriminations we make are governed by the categories we name 
and by our representations of the invariant features underlying the categorization". The 
question of the location of the CP effect is a related question and concerns whether CP 
is truly perceptual or whether the peaks in discrimination emerges as a result of higher 
level (i. e. cognitive or linguistic) processes. 
1.5.2. Theories of CP 
Naturalistic theories 
Naturalistic theories of CP (Snowden, 1987; Bornstein, 1987) are allied with universal- 
ist accounts of colour categorisation and tend to emphasise the existence of CP in young 
human infants and in animal populations as evidence of a biological predisposition for 
CP. The principal claim is that perceptual categorisation is a biologically given process 
that language merely mirrors. Naming boundaries between categories develop in regions 
of high discrimination. Developmental evidence indicates that children perceive colours 
categorically before they learn names for them (see § 1.4.2. ). Further evidence that lan- 
guage is not a prerequisite for categorisation has been found in comparative research. 
Evidence of colour CP has been found in several non-human species including animals 
relatively low on the phylogenic scale, such as pigeons and bees, both these animals re- 
spond to changes in wavelength in a non-monotonic fashion, indicating the presence of 
perceptual hue boundaries (see Bornstein 1974). Macaque monkeys, animals with very 
similar colour vision system to humans (possessing three retinal cones with similar spec- 
tral sensitivities) also display heightened discrimination in regions coinciding with adult 
naming boundaries (Sandell, Gross & Bornstein, 1979; Walsh et al., 1989). Sandell, 
Gross and Bornstein (1979) trained a Macaque to make a response to a colour of a par- 
ticular dominant wavelength. They demonstrated that the animals were more likely to 
generalise responses to a colour drawn from the same hue category than a colour from 
an adjacent category but actually physically closer in dominant wavelength. Using this 
method, plots of Macaque discrimination revealed peaks of discrimination that closely 
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corresponded with adult (English) hue naming functions. Walsh et al. (1989) claims such 
processes of colour categorical perception must occur very early in visual processing, 
suggesting that colour categorisation is a very low-level activity. Macaques with lesions 
to V4 still show the same peaks in discrimination at hue boundaries as un-lesioned ani- 
mals. 
However, non-linearity in discrimination does not necessarily indicate a dimension is 
being perceived categorically; for this, there must be perception of a qualitative change 
across the dimension. We do not know that infants and primates perceive such qualita- 
tive differences. The available evidence may show little more than that young human 
infants and Macaques show a pattern of wavelength discrimination approximating those 
of an adult human; it is an assumption to claim psychological hue categories are present. 
A problem with research claiming evidence of inherent perceptually based colour cate- 
gorisation is the use of wavelength as a colour-difference metric. Uniform systems of 
perceptual colour difference (e. g. Munsell) correspond only loosely with this metric, 
however as Boynton, et al., 1989 and Bornstein and Korda (1984) have demonstrated, 
CP is still found with stimuli scaled in this metric, at least in adult humans. While natu- 
ralistic theories of CP may explain why colour categorisation is not arbitrary, they are 
not complete as theories of CP. Naturalistic theories cannot account for the flexibility 
and variation in CP. The theory has difficulties with accounting for variability between 
individuals in CP. For instance, Zatorre and Halpern (1979) show that CP in the per- 
ception of musical intervals was significantly greater in trained musicians than non- 
musicians. In colour perception it has been found that colour CP differs between speak- 
ers of different languages (e. g. Kay & Kempton, 1984). CP effects can emerge as a result 
of learning new categories (Ozgen, 2000; Goldstone, 1994; Livingstone, Andrews & 
Hamad, 1998) or be obtained from high-level contextual cues (Goldstone, 1995). The 
fact that CP can be acquired is at odds with naturalistic theories. Pisoni (1991) states 
that acquisition of CP occurs by one of two processes: acquired similarity in which sensi- 
tivity to distinctions between instances in the same category is lessened and acquired dis- 
tinctivenesr in which sensitivity to distinctions between instances in different categories is 
increased. These two processes are not mutually exclusive and evidence suggests that 
both processes may occur. For instance, Goldstone (1994) showed that massed practice 
in learning an arbitrary categorisation of stimuli varying in brightness or saturation re- 
sulted in enhancements in discrimination corresponding to the position of the learned 
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category boundary. Livingston, Andrews and Harnad, (1998) showed that learning to 
categorise nonsense-figures resulted in changes in the perceived similarity ratings of 
stimuli in the same category: stimuli trained to be classified in the same category were 
rated as more similar in the post-training phase. 
Labelling theories 
A different account of CP is given by labelling theory (see Rosen & Howell, 1987. p. p. 
121-124). This account would be equivalent with more moderate Whorfian claims (e. g. 
McNeil, 1972). CP is considered a by-product of a strategic judgement bias; a top-down 
activity driven by linguistic knowledge rather than by perception and thus not a truly 
perceptual phenomenon (see Goldstone, Lippa & Shiffrin, 2000). By possessing labels 
for categories, their codeability is increased. The demands of difficult perceptual deci- 
sions may bias participants to adopt a label based encoding strategy. This is thus com- 
patible with dual code theory (see § 1.3.4. ). The basic assumption of labelling, or dual 
code, theories of CP is that the physical and category coding of stimuli are independent 
processes. An example of a dual-code CP model is postulated by Fujisaki and Kawa- 
shima (1971); in their model, the physical representation of the stimulus is stored in 
analogue form in short-term memory. An immediate categorical judgement also occurs 
based on knowledge of the category boundary position stored in long-term memory as a 
discrete symbol; the output of this is stored in a separate short-term store. At the re- 
sponse stage, discrimination is based on the category representation when compared 
stimuli have been identified as belonging to different categories and based on the physi- 
cal representation when compared stimuli are identified as categorically identical. 
Therefore, rather than CP being truly perceptual, Fujisaki and Kawashima are claiming 
that the effect occurs as a result of mnemonic coding suggesting that CP will only be 
found in conditions involving a memory component. 
There are difficulties for labelling accounts however. Identification boundaries 
don't 
always align precisely with peaks in discrimination 
(Calder, Young & Perrett et. al., 
1996). Furthermore, differences in language categorisation doesn't always produce dif- 
ferences in CP. Comparisons between English and Russian speakers failed to find differ- 
ences in colour perception corresponding with the 
fact that Russian has two basic terms 
for blue. (Laws, Davies & Andrews, 1995; Davies, Corbett & Laws et. al., 1991). Gold- 
stone, Lippa and Shiffrin 
(2000) found evidence against labelling accounts as an expla- 
26 
nation of CP acquired through categorisation training with face stimuli. They found that 
perceived similarity between two stimuli in the same trained category (A and B) and a 
third neutral stimulus (E) became more similar as a result of category training. Gold- 
stone et al. argue that labelling cannot account for this change in perception since 
stimulus E was never seen through the training and therefore could never have had a 
label assigned to it. 
Perceptual change theories 
Perceptual change theories, (e. g. altered object description theory, Goldstone, Lippa & 
Shiffrin, 2000) propose that learning to categories a stimulus dimension, either through 
massed training or in learning to lexically distinguish stimuli, results in genuine represen- 
tational change of the stimulus dimension. The nature of perceptual change could take 
several forms: as a change in the sensitivity or warping of perceptual space around the 
boundary; a change in the weightings of attentional mechanisms to detect previously 
ignored possible discriminations or as the creation of new perceptual structures (i. e. fea- 
ture-detectors, see below). They argue that the properties of a stimulus relevant for its 
categorisation are selectively emphasised in learning to categorise. They found evidence 
to support this position above effects that could be attributed to stimulus labelling. 
Categorisation training altered not just the perceived similarity of stimuli across a cate- 
gory boundary but also the relationship with neutral stimuli that had not being assigned 
a label, suggesting a genuine warping of perception. Perceptual warping around bounda- 
ries may be advantageous to the categorisation process, by making items in different 
categories perceptually more distinct from one another, categorisation of instances near 
the boundary are less likely to be misclassified. In fact, in an Al simulation of category 
training, Harnad, Hanson and Lubin (1991) found that warping of the similarity space 
was necessary for a neural network simulation to learn categorisation of a stimulus 
di- 
mension. 
Evidence of low-level perceptual change acquired as a result of learning is found in the 
perceptual learning literature (see Goldstone, 1998, for a review). 
Massed practice at 
discriminations results in improvements that show specificity to both the particular na- 
ture of the stimulus and to retinal location (Fahle, 1994; Fahle, Edelman & Poggio, 
1995; Ahissar & Hochstein, 1997). Perceptual learning in primates results in observable 
neural change in the visual cortex post training (Recanzone, Schreiner & Merzenich, 
27 
1993; Saarinen & Levi, 1995). However, while category-training experiments have 
documented acquisitions of CP in the short-term, to date no evidence of a change in 
actual sensitivity (i. e. a change in JNDs) or of any long-term change has been reported in 
the literature, demonstration of such effects would be necessary for the acceptance of 
this theory. 
Category feature-detectors 
Colour categories possess particular combinations of attributes that define membership. 
They are defined by parameters (i. e. hue, brightness, and saturation) that specify their 
location in three-dimensional colour-space. It is possible that visual feature-detectors 
attuned to each of these parameters could exist to define colour categories. The appeal 
of such a model is that it proposes a direct neural basis for categorisation, and suggests 
that categorisation is a low-level perceptual activity. Therefore, the acquisition of fea- 
ture-detectors may be one mechanism through which long-term change in CP might be 
brought about by category learning. 
Evidence for the existence of feature-detectors is found in selective adaptation effects: 
shifts in category identification boundaries towards an adapted category because of re- 
peated exposure to a stimulus from that category. This shift is interpreted as a result of a 
`fatiguing' of a category feature-detector. Some evidence of adaptation effect in colour 
was found in Bornstein and Korda (1985). In a series of experiments, the authors pre- 
sented observers repeatedly with a colour stimulus from a particular category e. g. green. 
After this adaptation process, a colour identification task showed a shift in both identi- 
fication boundary and a change in the latency of identification, consistent with the fa- 
tiguing of a receptor for the adapted category. Moreover in support of this explanation, 
the shift was greatest when participants were adapted to focal stimuli rather than 
boundary stimuli. Adaptation also exhibited inter-ocular transfer, suggesting it is medi- 
ated by a central mechanism. This rules out the possibility that opponent colour chan- 
nels mediated the effect, since such structures are laterally organised (DeValois & De- 
Valois, 1969). Yoshioka, Dow and Vautin (1996) give some supporting evidence of the 
existence of `hard-wired' colour category feature-detectors in V4 of a macaque monkey. 
The cells responded only to particular combinations of wavelength and brightness corre- 
sponding with the brightness range of hue categories (Boynton & Olson, 1987). How- 
ever, feature-detector models have had only minimal influence on CP research (Harnad, 
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1987, p. p. 549-550; see Remez, 1987, for a critical review). Much evidence is against 
feature-detector models as an explanation of adaptation effects. Adaptation by poor 
category exemplars can cause shifts in the opposite direction predicted by a feature de- 
tection model (Bornstein and Korda, 1985). Adaptation-like shifts can be produced 
even on arbitrary stimulus dimensions, often after only a few trials, undermining the fa- 
tigue explanation (Remez, 1987). 
1.6. Summary 
The structure of perceptual categories, and particularly colour categories, seems best 
captured by prototype accounts. Work by Berlin and Kay and Rosch has given a strong 
empirical foundation for the universal salience of prototype colours. The distinction be- 
tween basic and non-basic levels of categorisation made by Rosch has proved to be par- 
ticularly relevant for colour categories. Independent measures testify to the primacy of 
basic-level colour terms above non-basic terms. The wealth of research on colour lan- 
guage that came from Berlin and Kay's work testifies to the constraints on categorisa- 
tion. Rather than, as early relativists argued, colour categories being products of lan- 
guage structuring perception, colour categories seem to be examples of natural categories 
that exist independently of language. However, this is not to deny the importance lan- 
guage may play in highlighting natural category divisions; where differences in colour 
language are found, evidence suggests that this can affect the perception and representa- 
tion of colour categories. The phenomenon of CP demonstrates a concordance between 
categorisation and perception and that where new categorisations are acquired, corre- 
sponding changes in perception should be observed. Exactly how colour is categorised 
and represented, however, remains unclear. It could be that categorisation of colour oc- 
curs very early in vision (DeValois & DeValois, 1975; Walsh et al., 1989); alternatively, 
language may be necessary to highlight category boundary distinctions. Without higher- 
level analysis, the colour percept may be an unbounded continuum with a gradual 
blending of hues. Work on colour naming functions (Sternheim & Boynton, 1966; 
Miller, 1997) shows that basic category hues overlap (see also Kay & McDaniel). Al- 
though there is a point where the hues intersect in these functions, this boundary may be 
less obvious if the hues become subsumed under one basic colour term. Therefore, while 
research has revealed a considerable amount about colour and colour categorisation at 
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the level of physiology and of colour language, questions remain about the relationship 
between the biological and the linguistic levels of colour categories and how colours and 
colour categories are represented. 
1.6.1. The current thesis 
The current thesis focuses on the question of how colour categories are encoded and 
represented and the role of language in this process. There are several approaches to 
looking at the problem of colour categorisation. One method is to look at the levels of 
processing of codes representing colour stimuli. A way to look at this is to manipulate 
elapsed time, the delay between to-be-judged colours. Some literature exists using 
elapsed time as a variable in looking at coding in the categorisation of letters (see Pos- 
ner, 1978; Procter, 1981). By manipulating elapsed time between presented colour 
stimuli it may be possible to glean information about the availability and time course of 
different aspects of stimulus coding and categorisation from the colour judgements 
made. One aim of this thesis is to identify the relationship between the physical repre- 
sentation of colour and the representation of colour categories. The question is whether 
category information is coded separately from the physical coding of colour, as dual code 
theory would claim, or whether physical and category codes exist as aspects of the same 
representation. 
A second question concerns the role that language plays in colour categorisation. In view 
of the specialisation of the left hemisphere for certain verbal material (Kimura, 1967; 
Levy & Trevarthen, 1981), one method to look at the role of language in categorisation 
is to manipulate the visual field of presentation of colour stimuli to determine if any 
left-hemisphere lateralisation exists in the processes involved in making colour judge- 
ments. Another method includes the use of dual-task paradigms in which colour tasks 
are performed in parallel with secondary (interference) tasks. By observing the effect of 
different secondary tasks one can infer the nature of the coding involved in the judge- 
ment on the colour task. A further method to use is the cross-cultural comparative 
method. By comparing categorisation judgements in groups differing in colour language 
it is possible to evaluate the role language plays in colour categorisation. This is done in 
chapter four in which two languages are compared on different tasks involving colour 
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judgements. The perceptual load involved in these tasks is varied in order to determine 
the locus of any differences in colour cognition. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Colour Coding in Categorisation and Discrimination Tasks 
2.1. General Introduction 
Judgements of colour are not limited by category structure. Even with extensive train- 
ing, colours can always be discriminated much better than they can be absolutely identi- 
fied (Hanes & Rhoades, 1959). This suggests that colour is processed at (at least) two 
levels: as a particular physical instance, and as a member of a category. However, 
whether these two aspects of colour representation involve separate coding processes, or 
are just different aspects of the same process, is unclear. It could be that the physical and 
category properties of colour are represented by the same single code or by two different 
codes. 
One type of task that can be used to examine the processing of the physical and category 
aspects of stimuli is the category-identity judgement task (judging if two stimuli are 
from same or different categories). Pisoni and Tash (1972) assert from observations of 
category-identity judgements that the physical and categorical aspects of a stimulus are 
represented as separate internal codes rather than as a single code. In their model, Pisoni 
and Tash claim that stimulus processing occurs in two discrete stages happening in a 
strictly serial order. In the first stage, only physical features are compared. If items are 
physically identical or sufficiently perceptually different beyond a criterion, they can be 
classified as 'same' or 'different' accordingly based on only the physical code. If the first 
stage fails to resolve identity, a second stage is brought into play where the category 
codes of the two stimuli are compared. This model accounted for two observations 
made in a category-identity judgement task conducted by Pisoni and Tash involving 
phoneme judgements. Firstly, that identical stimuli tended to be judged as same-category 
faster than perceptually different same-category stimuli. Secondly, that perceptually 
similar different-category stimuli were judged as different more slowly than different- 
category items that were highly perceptually different. 
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A parallel model could also explain the Pisoni and Tash data. Posner (1978) suggests, 
based on evidence from letter matching, that physical and categorical codes are best 
characterised as occurring in parallel. Bornstein and Korda (1984, experiment one) 
found that for colour, physical and category codes also seemed to operate in parallel. 
Bornstein and Korda measured speeded judgements of whether colour pairs were from 
the same or different basic categories using an equivalent method to Pisoni and Tash 
with phonemes. Some of Bornstein and Korda's data was compatible with the Pisoni 
and Tash model. Category-identity judgements of identical colour-pairs were faster than 
judgments of physically different same-category pairs. The latency of judgements for dif- 
ferent-category pairs increased with the perceptual similarity (i. e. discriminability) be- 
tween colour-pairs. This similarity between category-identity judgements for phonemes 
and colours suggests that similar categorisation processes operate across different mo- 
dalities and between different types of stimuli. Inconsistent with a simple serial model, 
Bornstein and Korda found that the position of colours within a category also affected 
judgement latency. Matches of both physically identical and physically different same- 
category pair-types were slower when stimuli were close to the category boundary than 
when stimuli were good examples of their categories (and thus were further from the 
boundary). Bornstein and Korda interpreted this as showing that rather that requiring an 
additional processing stage, category codes were available to influence judgements at the 
same time as physical codes. Furthermore, because the category goodness of stimuli was 
found to affect judgements of even physically-identical colours, Bornstein and Korda 
argue that category codes must be available early in visual processing. 
Alternatives to a dual-code model (Pisoni and Tash, 1974; Bornstein and Korda, 1984) 
are possible. Firstly, as suggested earlier, category-identity judgements could be based on 
a single internal code representing both the physical and categorical aspects of colours. 
In this model, the latency of identity judgements would depend on the number of ways 
in which stimuli were similar (see Posner, 1978, p. p. 35-36). This model would predict 
that the two aspects of colour should not operate independently. Second, category- 
identity could be based principally on perceptual similarity: same category colours could 
be judged 'same' only on the basis of being perceptual similar. In this model, a separate 
category code would not be required. The category identity of a stimulus-pair could be 
determined by judging the similarity of each 'candidate' instance to category prototypes. 
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If both instances were most similar to the same prototype they would be judged to have 
the same category identity. Good exemplars would therefore be categorised faster than 
poor exemplars due to being closer to the prototype. Thus, category-identity judgements 
for such pairs would be faster1. However, in this model colour-pairs straddling a cate- 
gory boundary would often be judged as same-category. A `warping' of perceptual space 
caused through category learning could reduce such errors. Through learning to catego- 
rise colour, perceptual mechanisms might have altered to produce a degree of acquired 
equivalence between colours within a category and distinctiveness between colours of 
different categories (Livingstone, Andrews & Harnad, 1998; Goldstone, 1994). This 
warping model also accounts for CP by proposing that relative enhancements in sensi- 
tivity across category boundaries are (at least partly) acquired. In learning to categorise 
colours as different, the perceptual coding of the colours themselves may become al- 
tered. 
A related question concerns the actual nature of category codes. If category codes are 
independent of physical codes, the question is of the nature of this category code. It 
could be either a perceptual (visually represented) code or a verbal label. In the former 
case, one would expect category codes to be available relatively rapidly, while in the lat- 
ter case one would expect category codes to be slower to form. Bornstein and Korda 
claim that because the position of stimuli within a category determines the latency of 
judgements, this is consistent with a perceptual category code. Their data suggests that 
category information is available too quickly to be based on verbal labelling; however, 
this is only indirect evidence. 
The purpose of this chapter is to find whether a single process model can account for 
colour categorisation and categorical perception, or whether a dual code model is more 
appropriate. The critical question is whether category codes can be shown to operate 
independently of the physical coding of colour. Experiment one in this thesis looks at 
coding in colour category-identity judgements. Experiment two 
looks at coding in col- 
our discrimination judgements. In both tasks, a stimulus pair 
is presented either simulta- 
' Although in this model the principal judgement is of perceptual similarity to a prototype, it is conceivable 
that category-identity judgements become a 'competition' between competing prototypes 
for stimuli. 
Therefore, this model could be cast as an alternative dual code model. 
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neously or successively with a variable inter-stimulus delay. Comparisons in these tasks 
are made between different stimulus types and different delay conditions. In experiment 
three, the task is visual search. Participants have to decide on the presence of a target 
colour in a matrix of distractors. A comparison is made between visual search with tar- 
get and distractors from the same category compared to visual search when targets are 
from a different category to distractors. This third experiment gives further information 
about the properties of colour category codes by examining if category information fa- 
cilitates visual search by causing targets to `pop out' from distractors. If this were the 
case, it would support the dual-code model. It would also support Bornstein and 
Korda's claim that colour category information is available early in visual processing. 
2.2. General Method 
2.2.1. Choice of colour stimuli 
In most cases, stimuli are examples of blue or green. The reasons for this choice were 
practical. Blue and green are the largest primary categories and unlike yellow and red, 
the categories of blue and green are present at all brightness levels (Boynton, 1997). 
Therefore, a larger range of blue and green stimuli can be selected. 
2.2.2. Display of colours 
All colour stimuli in the following experiments were displayed on a computer screen. An 
80486 IBM PC compatible computer fitted with a Diamond stealth graphics card was 
used for all experiments. Because equal perceptual spacing is required, distances between 
colours are made equal in terms of their position in the CIE (1976) L*u*v* system (here- 
after, CIELUV). See appendix one for further information about the Munsell and 
CIELUV colour systems. Color Science Library (CSL v. 2.0) functions, obtained from 
the CGSD Co., give computer RGB values (relative to the measured gamma function of 
each of the three phosphors of a monitor) to emulate colours of specified CIE coordi- 
nates. All colours were displayed on a 15" Sony Trinitron monitor that was situated in a 
darkened room. In order to accurately reproduce colours it was first necessary to cali- 
brate the monitor by computing the gamma function of the monitor's three electron 
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guns'. This was done according to the procedure outlined by Travis (1991). A high- 
resolution timer DLL produced by ExacTics© provided accurate event timing. All pro- 
grams to perform the experiments were written using Microsoft Visual BASIC© (version 
5.0). Participants were screened for colour vision problems using the City University 
colour vision test (Fletcher, 1980). 
2.2.3. Computation of accuracy 
In experiments one and two, accuracy is computed using the a-prime (A') statistic. A' is 
a non-parametric equivalent of the more widely used d' measure of signal-detection. The 
statistic produces a single score of signal-detection independent of response bias. It is 
based on the proportion of hits (i. e. correct response on a signal trial) compared to the 
proportion of correct-rejections (correct response on a no-signal trial). Values of A' usu- 
ally vary between 1 (perfect performance) and 0.5 (chance level performance). The type 
of trial considered as a signal or no-signal trial depends on the nature of the particular 
comparison. The stimulus under comparison in a particular analysis is always treated as a 
no-signal trial; other stimuli are treated as signal trials. However, the resulting A' is 
mathematically the same if this is reversed (see Swets, 1996, for an overview of signal 
detection theory). 
2 This function for each of the guns (red, green and blue) is the relationship between a unit of change 
specified by the 
DAC (Digital-Analog Converters) and a change in measured luminance on the screen. For 
the DAC controlling each gun, 
integer values between zero and 255 could be specified by the fitted graph- 
ics card. 
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2.3. Experiment One 
Simultaneous and Successive Category-Identity judgements of 
Colour-Pairs 
2.3.1. Introduction 
Evidence suggests that the availability of the physical code of a visual stimulus is lost 
over time. For example, with instructions to match letter identities, when letter pairs 
are presented in quick succession, same case letter pairs (e. g. A-A) are matched faster 
than different case letter pairs (e. g. A-a). However, with an inter-stimulus delay greater 
than 1500 ms separating stimuli, difference in judgement latency between these two 
pair-types approaches zero, mainly because any advantage for same-case pairs in latency 
is lost (Procter, 1981; Posner & Keele, 1969; Posner et al., 1969). 
The reduced effect of physical identity on judgements with delay suggests, for letter 
stimuli at least, the operation of at least two codes (Posner, 1978). The coding of physi- 
cal identity (i. e. physical coding) seems to be separate from category coding (in this case 
the letter name). It suggests that when a letter must be held in memory for durations up 
to 1500 ms, the physical code can be used to make category-identity judgements; beyond 
this interval category-identity judgements may tend to be based on the category code. 
The loss of influence of the physical code with delay can be accounted for by postulating 
two underlying processes. Firstly, it is possible that after a particular interval has 
elapsed, there is an active switch away from the physical code towards the category code 
as a basis for making category-identity judgements. Secondly, it may be that the trace of 
the physical code decays at a faster rate than the category code. However, this second 
process, if it occurred, would probably also lead to a switch away from the physical 
code, as the category code would provide a more reliable basis for judging category- 
identity. 3 
3 Posner et al. (1969) found that the effect of the physical code could be extended beyond 1500 ms. if the 
task demands made the physical code more useful in the task. Participants could be induced to attend to 
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If the coding of physical and categorical information is independent for colour, as it ap- 
pears to be for letter stimuli, varying the interval between stimulus presentations should 
affect the availability of the physical code. Loss of the physical code should be exhibited 
in category-identity judgements by relative changes in performance between particular 
pair-types. For instance, with simultaneous presentations of stimulus-pairs, the avail- 
ability of the physical code should be at its peak. Therefore, for physically identical pairs 
at least, the physical code alone should provide a sufficient basis for determining cate- 
gory-identity. This means that judgements of physically identical colours, as well as being 
better than judgements of physically different same-category colours, should be unaf- 
fected by the position of the colours in a category. Performance with poor exemplars 
should be the same as good example colours. That is, however, unless colours are coded 
with increasing speed as similarity to the category prototype increases, either through 
inherent or acquired sensitivity to prototypical hues. 
Category-identity judgements of physically different colours should depend on the dis- 
criminability of the colours. Performance with same-category physically different pairs 
should be better when colours are perceptually similar, judgements of different category 
pairs better when colours are perceptually distant. However, with sequential presenta- 
tions of stimuli and sufficient delay between presentations (over 1500 ms if physical 
colour codes has a similar decay to physical letter codes), category judgements of physi- 
cally identical pairs should be made on the only available code, the category code. There- 
fore, with this delay, there should be a loss in the advantage for physical identity and 
discriminability of stimulus pairs. Moreover, performance with physically identical pairs 
should become more affected by the position of the individual stimuli within a category. 
Judgements of physically identical pairs close to the category boundary should be poorer 
than judgements of such pairs that are away from the boundary. 
To summarise, the perceptual distance between stimulus pairs should become less im- 
portant, and the position of stimuli in the category more important, in determining per- 
formance as the interval between stimuli is increased if the two-codes model is correct. 
(or perhaps, rehearse) the physical code for longer periods by making all same-category pairs physically 
identical. 
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If the relationship between different pair-types were unaffected by this manipulation, it 
would be evidence against this model. It would suggest that judgements of category- 
identity are made without accessing an independent category representation, and would 
be evidence in favour of one of the alternative models of colour category-identity 
judgements proposed earlier. That is, either a model in which colour is represented by a 
single code representing both physical and category information, or a model in which 
judgements of category identity are made only by comparing perceptual similarities. 
The current experiment involves a task in which colour-pairs, drawn from a set of six 
stimuli, are presented. Individual colours of each pair are either presented at the same 
time, (simultaneous presentation), or with an inter-stimulus interval between the stimuli 
of either: 250 ms 1000 ms or 5000 ms. The six colours differ in hue only, with the dif- 
ference between adjacent colours being perceptually equal. Participants were required to 
make category-identity judgements of the colours, i. e. respond `same' if they thought 
both colours were in the same category and respond `different' if the two colours were 
in different categories. 
Category membership of stimuli 
Of the six stimuli in the current experiment, three were green and three blue. These 
were chosen based on Bornstein and Monroe (1980) who report that the blue-green 
boundary is at 7.5 BG (Munsell). The six stimuli varied in hue only; adjacent pairs (e. g. 
1-2) 2-3 etc. ) were equally spaced. Before running the main experiment, a small forced- 
choice colour naming experiment (n = 10) was performed to confirm the categorical 
status of the six stimuli. Participants were shown twelve presentations of each of the six 
stimuli, one at a time, in a randomly presented order. Participants were asked to name 
each colour as either "blue" or "green". The three putative green stimuli (stimulus 1,2 
and 3) were named green over 94% of the time. The three putative blue stimuli (stimu- 
lus 4,5, and 6) were named blue over 94% of the time. For both the green and blue 
stimuli, the boundary stimulus (stimulus 3 and 4) was named more inconsistently than 
the two stimuli not adjacent to the boundary. 
Terms to describe stimulus pairs 
All possible pair-wise combinations of the six stimuli are presented, giving 36 colour- 
pairs. This gives three basic types of pairs: physically identical pairs; same category physi- 
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cally different pairs and different category pairs. For brevity, physically identical pairs 
will henceforth be described as A-A pairs; same-category physically different pairs as A-a 
pairs and different-category pairs as A-B pairs (after Posner et al., 1969). Further com- 
parisons are made between performances in judging the category-identity of particular 
sub-types of these three basic classes. These comparisons are made in terms of the posi- 
tion of the stimulus-pair in a category and the perceptual distance (discriminability), be- 
tween the stimuli in a pair. 
Position in category 
Contrasts are made between performance of A-A and A-a pairs that contain a stimulus 
adjacent to the category boundary and A-A and A-a pairs that do not. Therefore for A-A 
pairs, pair 3-3 and 4-4 (hereafter, boundary A-A pairs) together were compared against 
pair 1-1,2-2,5-5 and 6-6 together (hereafter, non-boundary A-A pairs). For A-a pairs, 
pair 2-3,3-2,4-5, and 5-4 (hereafter, boundary A-a pairs) together were compared 
against pair 1-2,2-1,5-6, and 6-5 (hereafter, non-boundary A-a pairs). Where judge- 
ments involve category codes, better performance should be observed for non-boundary 
relative to boundary pairs since non-boundary pairs are better examples of their catego- 
ties. 
Perceptual similarity 
Contrasts are made between pairs with differing perceptual distances between the 
indi- 
vidual stimuli of the colour pairs. For A-a pairs, pairs where the 
individual stimuli are 
one step apart from each other were contrasted with pairs were the stimuli are two 
steps apart. If physical codes are involved in making judgements, 
because 1-step pairs are 
perceptually closer than 2-step pairs, judgements of category-identity should 
be advan- 
taged for the former of these pair-types. Contrasts are also made between 
A-B pairs 
based on perceptual similarity. A comparison is made 
between A-B pairs were stimuli 
are fewer than three steps apart (i. e. 1 and 2-step pairs, 
hereafter, A-B <3 pairs), with 
pairs were stimuli are three or more steps apart 
(i. e. 3,4 & 5-step pairs, hereafter A-B >_ 
3 pairs). The rationale for this is that no same-category pair 
in the task is more than two 
steps apart; pairs greater than two steps apart therefore, can 
be classified as different- 
category based only on their 
discriminability. A contrast is also made between A-a pairs 
and A-B pairs of the same perceptual 
distances (i. e. 1 and 2-step A-a pairs and 1 and 2- 
step A-B pairs). 
If perceptual warping has increased perceptual distances between stim- 
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uh across the category boundary relative to distances within categories it is possible that 
judgements of A-B pairs may be faster than judgements of A-a pairs. However, there is 
an inevitable confound between pair-type and response in a category identity judgement 
task: A-a pairs require a `same' judgement and A-B pairs a `different" judgement. The 
problem with this is that `same' judgements tend to be faster than `different' judgements 
(Proctor, 1981); however, it is possible that any advantage produced by perceptual 
warping might actually reverse this tendency. 
Predictions 
In summary, if category-identity judgements are based on a single internal code, or 
judgements are based principally on comparisons of relative perceptual similarities be- 
tween stimuli, manipulation of delay should not affect the relative judgements of differ- 
ent pair-types. The following predictions are labelled P1 - P4. Predictions P1 - P3 are 
testing the two-code model of colour identity judgements; the fourth prediction (P4) is 
made based on the theory that there has been a `warping' of similarity across the cate- 
gory boundary; i. e. the perceived distance between cross category pairs has been 
stretched relative to the distances between same category pairs. Some of the below pre- 
dictions are included as a `check' to determine if some of the basic effects found by 
Bornstein and Korda are replicated. 
P1. Physical identity: as Bornstein and Korda found, with simultaneous presentation or 
short intervals, judgements of A-A pairs should be better' than judgements of A- 
a pairs. 
P1 a. If the physical code for colour is lost over time, as it is for letters (Posner & Keele, 
1969), as the delay increases, the advantage for A-A pairs over A-a pairs should 
dissipate. 
P2. Perceptual similarity: because 1-step A-a pairs are less discritninable than 2-step A-a 
pairs, judgements of these pairs should be better. Similarly, judgements of A-B >_ 
3 step pairs should be better than judgements of A-B <3 pairs because the for- 
mer are more discriminable than the latter. 
P2a. If the physical code decays over time, advantages due to perceptual similarity 
should dissipate with delay. 
Judgements were predicted to be better in the sense of being either faster, more accurate, or both. 
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P3. Position in category: again as Bornstein and Korda found, for both A-a and A-A pairs, 
judgements for non-boundary pairs should be better than for boundary pairs. 
P3a. If the use of category codes in judging the identity of A-A pairs is done only when 
physical codes are unavailable, with simultaneous presentations advantages for 
the position of A-A pairs in a category should be small. With increasing delay, 
the advantage for non-boundary A-A pairs over boundary A-A pairs should also 
increase. No change in the advantage for category position is predicted for A-a 
pairs since judgements of these pairs should always involve category codes (A-a 
pairs should not be distinguishable from A-B pairs on the basis of similarity 
alone). 
P4. Perceptual warping. If perceptual distances have stretched perceptual space across 
category boundaries, for colours of equal step-size, trials requiring `different' 
judgements (A-B) should be faster than trials requiring `same' judgements (A-a). 
2.3.2. Method 
Participants 
Sixteen participants (4 male, 12 female), aged 18-45, took part in the experiment. 
All 
were first language English speakers and students at the University of 
Surrey; some re- 
CDCý 
ceived course credit for participation. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of a set of six colours (chromaticity coordinates and 
Munsell codes 
are given in table 2.1). The six colours varied only 
in hue (value and chroma are con- 
stant). Adjacent colours have equal perceptual spacing 
between them of 14 units in 
CIELUV)5. 
5 Equal spacing in CIELUV does not correspond to equal spacing 
in Mansell. See appendix one. 
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Table 2.1. Munsell codes and chromaticity coordinates of six stimuli. 
Stimulus Category Munsell Code CIE Coordinates 
". Ob. )'OIü. AýA&: -iPS? "Pd; PlF: #. )]+f? B. 'RS? '1C. J, ttaYO. WIDd. BiYKC. lffd, WN. O. fA'0, B. SYbdXýgh4: 0.5C d gl: E`. oYpA'Of0. WXA'bk 
Yxy L* u* v* 
1 Green 3.66 G 6/6 30.05 0.28 0.39 61.7 -32.71 
ý 18.19 
2 Green 9.33 G 6/6 30.05 0.26 0.36 61.7 -36.97 4.84 
3 Green 
4 Blue 
4.89 BG 6/6 
9.94 BG 6/6 
30.05 0.24 0.33 61.7 -39.12 -8.98 
30.05 0.23 0.30 61.7 -38.64 -22.98 
5 Blue 5.62 B 6/6 30.05 0.23 0.28 61.7 -32.9 -35.71 
6 Blue 2.0 PB 6/6 30.05 0.25 0.26 61.7 -20.94 -43.07 
Each stimulus was 55 mm2 subtending approximately 6.3° of the visual arc at an ap- 
proximate viewing distance of 500 mm. The stimulus conditions and the colour-pairs 
given are listed in table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Stimulus conditions in task. 
Within-category stimulus pairs: Cross-category stimulus pairs: require the response 
require the response "same" "different" 
A-A A-a A-B . ýN ., ý,.. ý.. 
0-step 1-step 2-step 1-step 2-step 3-step 4-step 5-step 
1-1 1-2: 2-1 1-3: 3-1 3-4: 4: 3 2-4: 4: 2 1-4: 4-1 1-5: 5-1 1-6: 6-1 
2-2 2-3: 3-2 4-6: 6-4 3-5: 5: 3 2-5: 5-2 2-6: 6-2 
3-3 4-5: 5-4 3-6: 6-3 
4-4 5-6: 6-5 
5-5 
6-6 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they would be presented with pairs of colours on screen and 
that these pairs would be presented simultaneously or sequentially with an interval of 
varying duration. Instructions were given to match stimulus-pairs on the basis of cate- 
gory-identity. Participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible but not to com- 
promise accuracy. Responses were made by a mouse-button press (left, same; right, dif- 
ferent). Reaction times (hereafter, RT) were measured from the onset of the second 
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stimulus (the onset of both stimuli in the simultaneous condition), until a response was 
made. Each stimulus was presented for 1000 ms. Stimulus pairs were presented in one 
of four delay conditions: simultaneous presentation; a 250 ms inter-stimulus delay; a 
1000 ms inter-stimulus delay or a 5000 ms inter-stimulus delay (see fig. 2.1. ). Stimuli 
were presented on a neutral grey background. Stimulus-pairs were vertically positioned 
with a3 mm. spacing between the nearest edges of the two stimuli. A vertical line inter- 
sected by two horizontal lines on the background indicated the position of the two col- 
ours of each pair before presentation. The first stimulus in the pair (the memory stimu- 
lus) was always presented in the upper position; the second (the test stimulus) was pre- 
sented in the lower position. 
There were 288 experimental trials. Each stimulus pair was presented with equal fre- 
quency in each delay condition, therefore, half of the experimental trials required the 
response 'same' and half the response 'different'. An interval of 1000 ms was given be- 
tween each trial. The order of the stimulus and delay conditions in the trials was ran- 
domised. Participants were unaware of the condition before a trial. Before performing 
the experimental trials, participants were given 30 practice trials consisting of randomly 
chosen stimulus pairs and delay conditions. Auditory feedback was given in the practice 
trials to indicate errors. 
STIMULUS 
IA 
1000 ms 
-"ý 250 ms 
`I' simultaneous 
I 
STIMULUS STIMULUS STIMULUS 
xxX 
1ßO0 ms 1000 ms 1000 m5 
500 0 ms 
STIMULUS 
x 
1000 ms 
Fig. 2.1. Schematic depiction of the four delay conditions: simultaneous presentation, 
250,1000 and 5000 ms sequential presentation. 
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2.3.3. Results 
ANOVAs were used to compare performance between certain pair-types between the 
four delay conditions. All ANOVAs reported in this section are two-way with both fac- 
tors as repeated measures. In all cases, the two factors are: pair-type (e. g. A-A, A-a) and 
delay (simultaneous presentation [i. e. 0 ms], 250 ms, 1000 ms, and 5000 ms) and in 
every case, the factor pair-type has two levels; the two variables in this factor are speci- 
fied for each ANOVA performed. All reported post-hoc tests are protected t-tests. All 
reported probability levels are two-tailed unless otherwise stated. As participants were 
asked to respond based on speed and accuracy, RT and accuracy are reported as separate 
performance measures. 
RT 
For each participant, a median RT score for correct trials was calculated for each pair- 
type for each delay condition. All reported mean RTs are across-participant means of the 
participant's median RT scores. 
Physical identity: P1, P1 a 
The prediction for physical identity was that judgements of physically identical pairs 
should be faster than non-identical pairs (P1) and that this advantage should dissipate 
with delay (P1a). Mean RT for A-A and A-a pairs is given in table 2.3. 
ANOVA com- 
parison of A-A pairs with A-a pairs showed that A-A pairs were recognised as `same' 
significantly faster than A-a pairs (F[1,15] = 33.25, p<0.0001). There was no overall 
effect of delay (F[3,45] = 1.44 p>0.05), but the pair-type x 
delay interaction was sig- 
nificant (F[3,45] = 4.97, p<0.01)6. A plot of this interaction 
is given in figure 2.2. 
Post-hoc testing found that judgements for A-A pairs were significantly faster than for 
A-a pairs in all except the 5000 ms delay condition. RTs for the 
A-A pairs among the 
simultaneous, 250 ms and 1000 ms delay conditions 
did not differ significantly from 
each other; but, judgements were significantly slower 
for A-A pairs in the 5000 ms delay 
6 The pair-type x delay interaction was still significant when accuracy was used as a covariate 
in an 
ANCOVA. 
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condition compared to all others. Therefore, support was found for both prediction Pl 
and P1a. 
Table 2.3. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for A-A and A-a pairs. 
0 ms 
Delay Condition 
250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
A-A 956.28 976.09 955.91 1080.84 992.28 
(154.96) (193.54) (192.08) (208.86) (187.36) 
A-a 1166.88 1074.38 1106.13 1087.59 1108.75 
(306.10) (137.68) (250.33) (198.11) 223.06 
Mean 1061.58 1025.24 1031.02 1087.72 
(230.53) (165.61) (221.21) (203.49) 
1400 
1300 
1200 
E 1100 
F- 
1000 
900 
800 
-I A-A 
-A-a 
r 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms 
Delay 
Fig. 2.2. Mean correct RT (+/- 1 S. E. ) for A-A and A-a pairs. 
Perceptual similarity P2, P2a 
The prediction for the perceptual similarity of pairs was that: for A-a pairs, judgements 
of similar (1-step) pairs should 
be faster than for the more dissimilar (2-step) pairs while 
for A-B pairs, judgements of dissimilar (>_ 3-step pairs) should be faster than for similar 
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(< 3-step) pairs (P2). The further prediction was made that these effects should dissi- 
pate with delay (P2a). 
a) A-a pairs 
Mean RT for 1 and 2-step A-a pairs, is given in table 2.4.7 One-step A-a pairs were rec- 
ognised as `same' significantly more quickly than 2-step A-a pairs (F[1,14]= 29.75, p< 
0.0001). The step-size x delay interaction was not significant (F[1,14] = 1.50, p= 
0.23). Observation of the means suggests that the trend in mean RT scores was not con- 
sistent with prediction P2a. The means show that RT for 2-step pairs was becoming in- 
creasingly fast with delay, while RT for 1-step pairs remained largely stable across all 
delay conditions. This trend is inconsistent with the prediction of a dissipating of the 
advantage for 1-step pairs with delay. Rather, it suggests that judgements of 2-step pairs 
tended to be facilitated by the increase in delay while judgements of 1-step pairs were 
not. 
Table 2.4. Mean correct RT for 1 and 2-step A-a pairs. 
0 ms 
Delay Condition 
250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
1-step 1099.83 1030.47 1061.53 1041.27 1058.75 
(370.31) (307.00) (270.98) (161.16) (277.36) 
2-step 1306.53 1255.27 1187.73 1126.77 1219.08 
(280.06) (120.27) (238.40) (177.42) (204.04) 
Mean 1203.18 1142.87 1124.63 1084.02 
(325.19) (213.64) (254.69) (169.29) 
b) A-B pairs 
Mean RT for >_ 3 and <3 A-B pairs is given in table 2.5. It was found that >_ 3 A-B pairs 
were recognised as `different' faster than A-B <3 pairs (F[1,14] = 36.40, p<0.0001). 
However, the pair-type x delay interaction was non-significant and the difference in RT 
between these scores showed no trend with delay. 
The RT data from one participant was omitted from the means and analysis because the participant did 
not make a correct 
'same' response to any 2-step pairs in one condition. 
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Table 2.5. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for A-B <3 and A-B ?3 pairs. 
0 ms 
Delay Condition 
250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
<3 step 1323.70 1222.63 1238.07 1347.47 1282.97 
(339.48) (282.33) (240.42) (325.92) (297.38) 
3 step 1043.23 1018.60 1016.63 1056.63 1033.77 
(225.96) (207.83) (189.20) (249.90) (218.22) 
Mean 1183.47 1120.62 1127.35 1202.05 
(282.72) (245.08) (214.81) (287.91) 
Therefore, support for prediction P2 was found for both A-a and A-B pairs. For both 
pair-types, there was an effect of perceptual similarity on category judgements. How- 
ever, evidence from neither pair-type supported prediction P2a. The change in latency 
for neither A-a nor A-B pairs showed any trend consistent with a loss in the physical 
code. 
Position in category: P3, P3a 
The prediction for the position of pairs in a category was that judgements of non- 
boundary pairs away should be better than for boundary pairs for both A-A and A-a 
pairs (P3), and that for A-A pairs this advantage for non-boundary pairs should increase 
with delay (P3a). 
a) A-A pairs 
Means for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs are given in table 2.6. Non-boundary 
A-A pairs were correctly recognised as `same' faster than boundary 
A-A pairs (F[1,14] = 
14.02, p<0.01). There was no main effect of delay, but there was a significant pair- 
type x delay interaction (F[3,42] = 3.32 p<0.05). Post-hoc testing found that 
bound- 
ary A-A pairs were recognised as `same' slower than non-boundary 
A-A pairs both in the 
1000 ms (t[14] = 3.83, p<0.01) and 5000 ms (t[14] = 4.14, p<0.01) 
delay conditions; 
this effect also approached significance in the 250 ms condition 
(t[14] = 1.9, p=0.08). 
With simultaneous presentation, the difference in RT between 
boundary and non- 
boundary A-A pairs was non-significant. The interaction can be observed in figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3. Mean correct RT (+/- 1 S. E. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs. 
A further analysis was performed to investigate the trend in participant RT across the 
four delay conditions for the two pair-types in the interaction. This was done by com- 
puting beta coefficients from regression lines calculated from each participant's median 
RT across the four delay conditions, separately for each pair-type. To calculate a partici- 
pants regression line for a particular pair-type, the participant's median RT for that pair- 
type were treated as positions in two-dimensional space: the x-axis of which represents 
delay, the y-axis, RT. The log of the delay interval was specified on the x-axis for the 
four conditions8. The beta coefficients of these regression lines show the average direc- 
tion and magnitude of change in RT across the delay conditions. A positive beta indicates 
RT is increasing with delay; a negative beta indicates RT decreases with delay. The larger 
the beta, the greater the average changes in RT. The mean across participant beta was 
57.46 (65.94) for boundary A-A pairs and 6.40 (29.80) for non-boundary A-A pairs. 
8 The simultaneous condition was given the log of 1 (0). The regression analysis was also performed with 
the position on the x-axis set to the actual values of delay in ms, i. e. 0,250,1000 and 5000. With these 
values, the mean across-participant 
beta for boundary A-A pairs was 0.04 (0.06); for non-boundary A-A 
pairs it was 0.014 (0.027). However, t-test showed that with this analysis the difference in beta only ap- 
proached significance 
(t[15] = 1.74, p = 0.102). This suggests that the trends in the RT exhibited a loga- 
rithmic change rather than a 
linear change with delay. 
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This difference was significant (415] = 3.33, p<0.01). Therefore, while for both types 
of A-A pair there is a positive change in RT with delay, the increase is significantly 
greater for boundary pairs than non-boundary pairs. 
Table 2.6. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs. 
Delay Condition 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
Boundary 963.19 1049.53 1085.56 1205.69 1075.99 
(41.16) (58.43) (80.13) (76.76) (64.12) 
Non- 953.56 956.38 906.38 1012.13 957.11 
boundary (41.87) (48.55) (44.92) (45.52) (45.22) 
Mean 958.38 1002.96 995.97 1108.91 
(41.52) (53.49) (62.53) (61.14) 
b) A-a pairs 
Means for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs are given in table 2.7. For these pairs, 
as for A-A pairs, judgements of boundary pairs were slower than judgements of non- 
boundary pairs (F[1,15]= 11.68, p<0.01). However, unlike for A-A pairs, there was 
no effect of delay or any interaction on RT scores. 
Table 2.7. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs. 
0 ms 
Delay Condition 
250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
Boundary 1198.28 1094.28 1293.88 1167.34 1188.45 
(459.96) (161.87) (478.61) (227.27) (388.61) 
Non- 1085.19 1020.34 995.25 1042.03 1035.70 
boundary (237.04) (162.49) (194.42) (249.91) (210.97) 
Mean 1141.74 1057.31 1144.57 1104.69 
(348.5) (162.49) (336.52) (238.59) 
Therefore, support was found for prediction P3. For both A-A and A-a pairs, judge- 
ments of stimulus pairs 
in which one (or both) of the stimuli was adjacent to the cate- 
gory boundary were significantly slower than 
judgements of pairs in which neither of the 
stimuli was adjacent to the 
boundary. Prediction P3a was also supported, a significant 
50 
advantage for non-boundary pairs over boundary pairs was only found with a 1000 or 
5000 ms delay. With simultaneous presentation or a 250 ms delay, there was no signifi- 
cant advantage in RT for the position of colours in a category in judging category- 
identity. 
Perceptual warping. P4 
It was predicted that for pairs of equal perceptual distances, judgements should be bet- 
ter for A-B pairs than for A-a pairs. The ratio of 1 to 2-step pairs was different for A-a 
and A-B pairs (2: 1 and 1: 2). Therefore, in order to show comparable scores for A-a and 
A-B pairs of the same perceptual distance, the average of the individual mean scores for 
1 and 2-step pairs are given. These means can be found in table 2.8. below. As can be 
seen, the effect was not in the direction predicted by P4. Mean `different' responses to 1 
and 2-step A-B pairs were, on average, slower than `same' responses to 1 and 2-step A-a 
pairs; this advantage was found across all delay conditions9. 
Table 2.8. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for A-a pairs and A-B pairs, 1 and 2-step pairs to- 
gether. 
Delay Condition 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
A -a 1203.18 1142.87 1124.63 1084.02 1138.68 
(325.19) (213.64) (254.69) (162.29) (238.95) 
A-B 1394.52 1245.63 1306.50 1367.28 1328.48 
(261.03) (371.95) (275.57) (362.99) (331.99) 
Mean 1298.85 1194.25 1215.57 1225.65 
(293.11) (292.80) (254.69) (262.64) 
Accuracy 
Physical identity: P1, P1 a 
Mean accuracy for A-A and A-a pairs is given in table 2.9. Judgements for A-A pairs 
were found to be more accurate than for A-a pairs (F[1,15] = 15.40, p<0.01). The 
effect of delay was also significant (F[3,45] = 6.84, p < 0.01). Post-hoc testing found a 
Judgements of A-a pairs were also found to be faster than judgements of A-B pairs between both one 
and 2-step pairs 
individually. 
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significant loss in accuracy between the 250 ms and 1000 ms delay conditions (t[12] _ 
2.38, p<0.05) and the 250 ms and the 5000 ms delay conditions (t[12] = 2.59, p< 
0.05). This shows that the greatest loss in accuracy was between 250 and 1000 ms. No 
significant pair-type x delay interaction was found (F[3,45] = 0.50P = 0.69). Therefore, 
prediction P1 was supported, but not prediction Pla. Although as for RT, judgements 
of A-A pairs was better than A-a pairs, unlike for RT the advantage for A-A pairs was 
maintained across all delay conditions in accuracy. 
Table 2.9. Mean A' (s. d. ) for A-A and A-a pairs. 
Delay Condition 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
A-A 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.91 0.94 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) 
A-a 0.87 0.89 0.84 0.84 0.86 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) 
Mean 0.92 
(0.07) 
0.93 
(0.07) 
0.88 
(0.07) 
0.88 
(0.11) 
Perceptual similarity: P2, P2a 
a) A-a pairs 
Mean accuracy for 1 and 2-step A-a pairs are given in table 2.10. One-step A-a pairs 
were recognised as `same' significantly more accurately than 2-step A-a pairs (F[1,15] _ 
28.51, p<0.0001). Accuracy overall, was significantly better in the simultaneous and 
250 ms delay conditions than in the 1000 or 5000 ms condition (F[1,15] = 28.51, p< 
0.0001). However, the interaction between pair-type and delay was not significant. 
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Table 2.10. Mean A' (s. d. ) for 1 and 2-step A-a pairs in each delay condition. 
Delay Condition 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
1-step 0.93 0.93 ON 0.90 0.92 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
2-step 0.81 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.82 
(0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) 
Mean 0.87 0.89 0.85 0.85 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.1) (0.11) 
b) A-B pairs 
Mean accuracy for A-B <3 and A-B >_ 3 pairs is given in table 2.11. Judgements for A-B 
>_ 3 pairs were significantly more accurate than for A-B <3 pairs (F[1,15] = 24.24, p< 
0.0001). Accuracy was higher in the simultaneous and 250 ms conditions compared to 
the 1000 and 5000 ms delay condition (F[3,45] = 5.45, p<0.05). There was no inter- 
action between pair-type and delay. 
Table 2.11. Mean A' (s. d. ) for A-B <3 and A-B >_ 3 pairs in each delay condition 
0 ms 
Delay Condition 
250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
<3 step 0.83 0.87 0.80 0.83 0.83 
(0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) 
>3 step 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.94 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Mean 0.89 0.915 0.865 0.875 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
Therefore, prediction P2 was supported. For both A-a and A-B pairs, judgements of A-a 
pairs tended to be more accurate when pairs were similar. Judgements of A-B pairs 
tended to be more accurate when pairs were more perceptually dissimilar. As with RT, 
no support was found for prediction P2a in the accuracy data. For neither of these pair- 
types was there a loss of the effect of perceptual similarity with delay. 
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Position in category: P3, P3a 
a) A-A pairs 
Mean accuracy for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs is given in table 2.11. Similar 
mean accuracy was found for boundary and non-boundary pairs within each delay con- 
dition. ANOVA showed that the difference between the two pair-types was non- 
significant. Accuracy was significantly higher in the simultaneous and 250 ms conditions 
compared to the 1000 ms and 5000 ms conditions (F[3,45] = 10.44, p < 0.0001). There 
was no interaction between pair-type and delay. 
Table 2.11. Mean A' (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs in each delay con- 
dition. 
0 ms 
Delay Condition 
250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
Boundary 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.94 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
Non- 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.94 
boundary (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Mean 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.92 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) 
b) A-B pairs 
Mean accuracy scores for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs are given in table 2.12. 
For A-a pairs, accuracy was significantly higher for non-boundary pairs than for bound- 
ary pairs (F[1,15] = 18.82, p<0.01). Accuracy significantly reduced with delay (F[3, 
45] = 3.38, p<0.05) but there was no significant interaction. 
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Table 2.12. Mean A' (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs in each delay con- 
dition. 
0 ms 
Delay Condition 
250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
Boundary 0.91 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.89 
(0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) 
Non- 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 
boundary (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
Mean 0.93 0.925 0.90 0.89 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
0 
Therefore, some support was given to prediction P3, significant differences in accuracy 
between boundary and non-boundary pairs were found for A-a pairs but not for A-A 
pairs. Pia, however, was not supported by the accuracy data. There was no advantage 
for non-boundary A-A pairs over boundary A-A pairs in accuracy and no significant in- 
teraction with delay. 
2.3.4. Discussion 
Performance data was consistent with the operation of two separate internal codes be- 
ing involved in category-identity judgements. The discussion will individually consider 
each of the predictions made and their implication for the validity of the two-code 
model of categorisation. 
There was an effect of physical identity on category-identity judgements (P 1, P1 a) : 
physically identical pairs were judged `same' faster and more accurately than non- 
identical same pairs. With RT, this advantage was lost with a 5000 ms delay, although 
the advantage in accuracy persisted. This effect suggests a partial shift 
from judging iden- 
tity based on the physical code of the stimuli, to one of making this judgement 
based on 
the category code. It suggests that, as with physical codes representing visually presented 
letters, the representation of the physical identity of a colour decays at a faster rate than 
the representation of its category. This is consistent with the notion that the 
internal 
representations of physical and categorical codes are 
independent. There was a loss in 
55 
the advantage for A-A pairs over A-a pairs in RT with delay. However, judgements of 
physically identical pairs were significantly more accurate than judgements of non- 
identical pairs across all delay conditions. This implies that some level of the physical 
code of the memory colour maintaining an accurate stimulus representation must still be 
available at least up to 5000 ms. The reason why the physical code may still be present 
for this duration may be a result of the particular stimuli used. If one assumes that as the 
physical code decays, the representation of the memory stimulus becomes more variable, 
physical judgement of A-A pairs could be made as long as the representation of the 
physical code remains closer to the memory stimulus than to adjacent stimuli in the 
stimulus set. The larger the perceptual distances between stimuli in the stimulus set, the 
more likely category-identity can be judged on the basis of physical identity. If adjacent 
stimuli were more perceptually similar therefore, the experiment might become more 
sensitive to losses in the physical code in accuracy. Alternatively, increasing the inter- 
stimulus delay beyond 5000 ms may also have similar implications for the loss of physi- 
cal code. 
There were also effects of perceptual similarity on judgements (P2, P2a), suggesting that 
the physical code affects category-identity judgements of non-identical as well as 
identi- 
cal stimulus pairs. Perceptual similarity had an effect on judgements of 
both A-a and A- 
B pairs. For A-a pairs, perceptually similar pairs were judged as `same' 
faster and more 
accurately than more perceptually different pairs. For A-B pairs, the opposite was the 
case. However, prediction P2a was not supported; for 
both A-a and A-B pairs the effect 
of perceptual similarity showed no indication of diminishing with 
delay. The difference 
in RT between 1 and 2-step A-a pairs did become less with delay, but this was princi- 
pally due to judgements of 2-step pairs becoming faster with 
delay, rather than judge- 
ments of 1-step pairs becoming slower. Therefore, while the effect of physical 
identity 
on judgements is lost with delay, the effect of perceptual similarity 
is not. 
An effect of position in category was 
found (P3 and P3a). For both A-A and A-a pairs, 
the position of colours in the category 
in relation to the boundary affected category- 
identity judgements. When stimulus pairs contained a colour adjacent to the category 
boundary, judgements tended to be slower and less accurate than when pairs 
did not 
contain such a colour. 
For A-A pairs, the effect of position in category was dependent 
on delay. With simultaneous presentation of stimulus pairs, 
the effect was not signifi- 
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cant; as delay increased, so did the advantage for non-boundary A-A pairs. This effect 
can be taken as evidence in support of the two-code model. It shows that the advantage 
in making judgements of non-boundary stimuli on this task is not inherent in the proc- 
essing of the colour. The position in category of stimuli only affected judgements in this 
task after a sufficient delay between stimuli was present; with simultaneous presenta- 
tion, the physical code alone seems to provide a sufficient basis for making judgements. 
It may also be the case that with simultaneous presentation, judgements are made before 
the category code is available. As delay is increased, the data suggests an increasing trend 
towards using the category code over the physical code as a basis for judging category- 
identity with physical identical colours. 
Finally, no support was found for the prediction that `different' judgements would be 
faster than `same' judgements given equal perceptual distances between pairs (P4). Con- 
trary to this prediction, correct `same' responses for such pairs were actually significantly 
faster than correct `different' responses. Therefore, this is not evidence in support of 
perceptual warping. However, neither is it necessarily evidence against the possibility. 
As stated earlier, `same' responses tend to be faster than `different' responses. One and 
2-step A-B pairs in the current task were further disadvantaged in always being com- 
posed of at least one stimulus adjacent to the boundary. These two effects may have 
outweighed any advantages for A-B pairs produced through any warping of the under- 
lying perceptual similarity space across boundaries. 
In summary, the data from this experiment were largely consistent with a model of cate- 
gory-identity judgements in which judgements are made in parallel and based on two 
independent codes. The data demonstrates that judgements of category-identity are not 
purely judgements of perceived similarity. Although the effect of physical identity and of 
perceptual similarity on judgements are compatible with such a model, the model cannot 
account for why the effect of physical identity on judgement does not remain constant 
with delay. Furthermore, the model cannot account for why the position of a stimulus 
pair in a category in relation to the boundary should influence judgements for physically 
identical pairs. The single code model, correspondingly, fails for similar reasons; this 
model is unable to account for why the aspects of the code for a colour stimulus repre- 
senting physical identity seem to 
decline before those representing the category. The ef- 
fects in this experiment seem to be best understood by arguing that the physical and 
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categorical properties of colours are represented as separate internal codes. Judgements 
of physical identity can be made based on the physical code when a stimulus is encoded 
in memory for short intervals. With longer intervals, the category code of a colour is in- 
creasingly used. The next experiment tests if similar effects are found consistent with 
the two-code model in categorical perception. 
2.4. Experiment Two 
Simultaneous and Successive Discrimination of Colour-Pairs 
2.4.1. Introduction 
Categorical perception (CP, see § 1.5.1. ) shows that discrimination judgements in colour 
recognition memory are often related to category structure. When the perceptual dis- 
tances between stimuli are the same, colours that straddle category boundaries are more 
easily discriminated than colours within a category. For instance, Bornstein and Korda 
(1984, experiment two) presented colours in a delayed same-different speeded discrimi- 
nation task. With an interval of 250 ms between stimuli, physical identity judgements 
were faster for cross-category pairs than within-category pairs. 
As stated in the previous chapter (see § 1.5.2. ), CP could result from inherent variations 
in sensitivity to colour differences, acquired changes in perceptual coding or verbal 
strategies. According to the two-code model of CP (Fu)isaki & Kawashima, 1971; Born- 
stein & Korda, 1984), CP occurs because discrimination judgements are influenced by a 
redundant code representing the category-identity of stimuli that may complement the 
physical code. The two-code model is compatible with the category code being either a 
perceptual code or a verbal label. 
Perceptual models of CP (e. g. CP as a result of inherent sensitivities in the perceptual 
code or CP as the result of acquired changes in perceptual space), have different 
implica- 
tions compared to two-code models. Perceptual models imply that CP is independent of 
any delay present 
between stimuli. File (1980) claims that the effects of perceptual 
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similarity in the discrimination of colours do not interact with delay, but are stable 
across time. In File's task, participants were presented with pairs of colours and asked to 
judge if the colours were physically `same' or `different'. Colours that were perceptually 
more distant from one another were found to be more easily discriminated whether pre- 
sented simultaneously, or sequentially with a 4500 ms delay. If the effects of relative 
perceptual similarities on discrimination are preserved as delay is increased, perceptual 
models imply that the magnitude of CP is unaffected by delay between colours. By con- 
trast, a two-code model implies that CP effects should become larger as the elapsed time 
between the presentations of two colours is increased. As the availability of the physical 
code is lost, discrimination judgements would increasingly depend on the category code. 
Consistent with this, experiment one found that the influence of category codes on 
judgements increases with delay, at least where a category-identity judgement is re- 
quired. Roberson and Davidoff (2000) compared colour CP at different intervals and 
they found no difference in the magnitude of CP with a 5000 or a 10000 ms delay. 
However, it is possible that there is an effect of delay, but that this occurs at somewhere 
around 5000 ms or less. 
Therefore, if CP arises from the comparison of category codes, which take time to be- 
come available, CP effects should increase with the interval between stimuli. However, 
if CP results from inherent perceptual sensitivities or perceptual warping, as in a percep- 
tual model of CP10, manipulation of the inter-stimulus interval between stimuli should 
not affect the magnitude of CP. These competing predictions are tested in the current 
experiment by using a same-different judgements task in which the inter-stimulus inter- 
val (delay) between stimuli is varied. The current experiment therefore uses the same 
stimulus and delay conditions as experiment one. However, judgements of physical iden- 
tity rather than category identity were required. 
As for experiment one, two sets of predictions are made. Some predictions were in- 
cluded as a `check', to test that the same results as Bornstein and Korda (1984) and File 
1° The implications of the inherent sensitivities model and the perceptual warping model of CP are the 
same for this experiment. 
Therefore, both models will hence be referred to as perceptual models and dis- 
cussed at the same time. 
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(1980) were found by the current experiment. Other predictions were made to compare 
perceptual and dual code models of categorisation. 
Predictions 
P1 Category effect- For colour-pairs with the same perceptual distance, judgements will be 
better when making cross-category discriminations (A-B) compared to when 
making within-category (A-a) discriminations. That is, judgements of 1-step A-B 
pairs should be better than for 1-step A-a pairs and judgements of 2-step A-B 
pairs better than for 2-step A-a pairs. 
Pla If CP is perceptual (see footnote 10), CP effects should be at maximum with simul- 
taneous presentations of stimuli and be preserved until the perceptual code de- 
cays completely. However, if CP arises from the comparison of category codes 
then CP effects should be smallest with simultaneous presentations of stimuli 
and increase with delay. 
P2 Perceptual similarity: For both A-a and A-B pairs, judgements of 1-step pairs should be 
better than judgements of 2-step pairs. 
P2a If perceptual similarity relations remain constant with delay (File, 1980), there 
should be no interaction between delay and step-size for either A-a or A-B pairs. 
P3a Position in category: For A-A pairs, as in experiment one, judgements should be facili- 
tated by the category code: the category code should complement the physical in 
indicating that colours are physically identical. Therefore, the two-code model 
implies that judgements should be poorer (i. e. slower, less accurate) for bound- 
ary A-A pairs compared to non-boundary A-A pairs, because the category code is 
stronger for non-boundary pairs. A perceptual model implies opposite effect. If 
perceptual space was stretched across the category boundary, discrimination 
would become finer near this boundary and judgements of physical identity 
should improve the closer a stimulus was to the boundary. 
P3b Position in category: For A-a pairs, unlike experiment one these pairs require a `differ- 
ent' response in a discrimination task. Therefore, the fact that the category code 
may indicate that the colours are in the same category is unhelpful in judging 
that they are physically different. The category code is indicating that the colours 
are `same' although the colours are physically different. The two-code model 
therefore implies that judgements of non-boundary A-a pairs should be poorer 
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than judgements of boundary A-a pairs because the category code is stronger for 
non-boundary pairs. 
P3c If the availability of category codes increases with delay or if category codes are only 
attended to when reliable judgements cannot be made on the basis of the physi- 
cal code. The effect of position in category should increase with delay. The ef- 
fect should be lowest with simultaneous presentation of stimuli and monotoni- 
cally increase with delay. This effect should occur for both A-A and A-a pairs 
2.4.2. Method 
Participants 
Sixteen participants (5 male, 11 female) aged 18-42 took part in the experiment. All 
participants were first language English speakers and all were students at the University 
of Surrey, some received a course credit for their participation. 
Stimuli 
The same stimuli were used as in the previous experiment. However the stimulus to re- 
sponse assignment differed: only A-A pairs now required a `same' response; A-a and A-B 
pairs both required a `different' response. 
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Procedure 
Instructions were the same as the previous experiment except that participants were 
told to respond on the basis of physical identity. The same stimulus-pairs and delay con- 
ditions as in the previous experiment were used, again in random order. Because 
matches were based on physical identity, the proportion of same and different trials was 
no longer equal; there was a ratio of 3: 15, for same and different trials. Before the ex- 
perimental trials, there were 30 practice trials of randomly chosen stimulus and delay 
conditions, with auditory feedback to indicate errors. 
2.4.3. Results 
As in experiment one, RT and accuracy performance measures are analysed and reported 
separately. For `different' pairs, the principal comparison of interest was between A-a 
and A-B pairs of the same perceptual difference. For this reason, only 1 and 2-step A-B 
pairs are included in the analysis. As in experiment one, ANOVAs were used to compare 
performance in discrimination judgements for the different pair-types under the four 
delay conditions. Unless otherwise specified, all reported ANOVAs are two-way with 
repeated measures. The factors are pair-type (e. g. A-a, A-B) and delay (simultaneous, 
250 ms, 1000 ms, 5000 ms). The specific variables in the pair-type factor are specified 
for each ANOVA. All reported post-hoc tests are protected t-tests. All reported prob- 
ability levels are two-tailed unless otherwise stated. Data treatment was as in experi- 
ment one. 
RT11 
Category effect P 1, P1a; Perceptual similarity: P2, P2a 
It was predicted that judgements of A-B pairs should be faster than A-a pairs of the 
same perceptual distance (P1). If the two-code model is correct it was predicted that 
this effect should increase with delay (P1a). It was further predicted that judgements of 
1-step pairs should be faster than for 2-step pairs and that this effect should not interact 
with delay (P2a). 
" The RT data from one participant was omitted from the analysis as an outlier. However, the partici- 
pant's data was included 
for the accuracy analysis. 
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Mean RT for both 1-step A-a and A-B pairs are given in table 2.13. The mean RT for 2- 
step A-a and A-B pairs are given in table 2.14. A three-way ANOVA (pair-type x step- 
size x delay) was performed. Significant main effects were found for step-size and delay. 
judgements of 2-step pairs were faster than judgements of 1-step pairs (F[1,13] = 37.58, 
p<0.0001). Judgements became slower with delay (F[3,42] = 7.71, p<0.0001). No 
interaction between any factors approached significance. 
Table 2.13. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for 1-step A-a and A-B pairs 
Delay Condition 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
A-a 1038.00 982.07 1031.17 1111.43 1040.69 
(181.06) (165.52) (226.00) (288.39) (215.24) 
A-B 976.27 1028.70 972.93 1137.97 1028.95 
(160.33) (212.83) (311.32) (270.77) (238.81) 
Mean 1007.14 1005.39 1002.05 1124.67 
(170.70) (189.18) (268.66) (279.58) 
Table 2.14. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for 2 -step A-a and A-B pairs 
Delay Condition 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
A-a 885.83 880.33 852.73 962.87 895.44 
(100.33) (142.22) (129.60) (198.44) (142.65) 
A-B 866.80 842.17 808.67 959.30 869.24 
(108.19) (110.95) (138.79) (151.74) (127.42) 
Mean 876.32 861.25 830.70 961.09 
(104.26) (126.59) (134.20) (175.09) 
Therefore, no support was given to prediction P1 or Pla. There was no advantage in RT 
in discriminating colours that fell across category boundaries either for 1-step or 2-step 
pairs in the RT data. Prediction P2 and P2a were both supported. Judgements were 
faster overall for 2-step A-a and A-B pairs. Furthermore, this effect did not interact 
with delay; the advantage 
for 2-step pairs was maintained across all delay conditions. 
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Po rition in category: P3a, P3b, P3c 
If the two-code model is correct it was predicted that judgements for boundary A-A 
pairs should be slower than for non-boundary pairs (P3a). For A-a pairs it was predicted 
that judgements of non-boundary pairs should be better than for boundary pairs (P3b). 
This effect of position in category for both pair-types was predicted to increase with 
delay (P3c). 
Mean RT for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs are given in table 2.15. Judgements 
for non-boundary A-A pairs were significantly faster than for boundary A-A pairs. 
(F[1,14] = 4.91, p<0.05). RT increased as delay increased (F[3,42] = 8.82, p< 
0.0001). There was no significant interaction between pair-type and delay. 
Table 2.15. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for Boundary and Non-boundary A-A pairs. 
Delay Condition 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms Mean 
Boundary 1027.10 
(157.88) 
Non- 1009.57 
977.27 
(179.25) 
949.07 
950.47 
(182.31) 
949.90 
5000 ms 
1195.33 
(297.71) 
1116.07 
1037.54 
(204.29) 
1006.15 
boundary (154.31) (177.71) (162.11) (345.87) (210.00) 
Mean 1018.34 963.17 950.19 1155.70 
(156.10) (178.48) (172.21) (321.79) 
Mean RT for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs are given in table 2.16. There was 
no significant difference between boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs in RT (F[1,14] 
= 2.10, p > 0.05). RT tended to increase with delay (F[3,42] = 3.91, p<0.05). No in- 
teraction between pair-type and delay was found. 
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Table 2.16. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs. 
0 ms 
Delay Condition 
250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
Boundary 990.83 972.80 1080.23 1141.97 1046.46 
(215.84) (181.09) (397.83) (339.66) (283.61) 
Non- 958.50 925.33 974.57 1092.13 987.63 
boundary (164.94) (203.50) (222.12) (372.56) (240.78) 
Mean 974.67 949.07 1027.40 1117.05 
(190.39) (192.30) (309.98) (356.11) 
There was a significant effect for position in category for A-A pairs but not for A-a 
pairs. The overall pattern of results for A-A pairs was similar to experiment one (com- 
pare table 2.15. with table 2.7. ). Therefore, prediction Pia was supported, thus fa- 
vouring the two-code model. Prediction P3b was not supported. The difference be- 
tween boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs in RT was not significant. Prediction P3c, 
was also not supported. The effect of position in category did not increase significantly 
with delay for either A-A or A-a pairs. However, consistent with this prediction, the 
effect of boundary position for A-A pairs was largest in the longest delay condition. 
Accuracy 
Category ffect P1, Pla; Perceptual similarity: P2, P2a 
Mean accuracy for 1-step A-a and A-B pairs is given in table 2.17. Mean accuracy for 2- 
step A-a and A-B pairs are given in table 2.18. 
Table 2.17. Mean A' (s. d. ) for 1-step A-a and A-B pairs 
Delay Condition 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
A -a 
0.99 0.91 0.90 0.76 0.89 
(0.02) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) 
A-B 0.98 0.89 0.90 0.84 0.90 
(0.04) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) 
Mean 0.99 0.90 0.90 0.80 
(0.03) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) 
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Table 2.18. Mean A' (s. d. ) for 2-step A-a and A-B pairs. 
Delay Condition 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
A -a 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.90 0.96 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
A-B 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.90 0.96 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
Mean 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.9 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
A three-way ANOVA (pair-type x step-size x delay) was performed on the accuracy 
data scores. Significant main effects were found for both step-size (F[1,15] =62.43, p< 
0.0001) and delay (F[3,45] = 33.33, p<0.0001). There was no overall main effect of 
pair-type. A significant two-way interaction was found between pair-type and delay 
(F[3,45] = 4.71, p < 0.01) and between step-size and delay (F[3,45] = 6.88, p<0.01). 
A significant three-way interaction was found between step-size, pair-type and delay 
(F[3,45] = 3.47, p < 0.05). Post-hoc tests looked further at these interactions. The re- 
sults of these post-hoc tests are given in the sub-sections below. Comparisons relevant 
to prediction P1 are given in the first (a), and comparisons relevant to prediction P2 and 
P2a given in the second (b), of these sub-sections. 
a) Category effect: P1 
Post-hoc tests found that 1-step A-B pairs were recognised significantly more accurately 
than 1-step A-a pairs in the 5000 ms delay condition only (t[14] = 4.58, p<0.01). In 
other delay conditions, there was no significant advantage 
for 1-step A-B pairs over A-a 
pairs. No significant difference was found between 2-step 
A-a and A-B pairs in any de- 
lay condition. The fact that a category effect was found 
for 1-step pairs but not for 2- 
step pairs means that partial support can be given to prediction 
P1. The fact that a cate- 
gory effect was not found 
for 2-step A-B pairs does not seem to be because of a ceiling 
effect on performance 
for these pairs. Prediction Pla was also supported, favouring the 
two-code model. The presence of CP for 1-step pairs was 
dependent on the delay condi- 
tion. A significant category effect was only found in the 5000 ms 
delay condition. 
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b) Perceptual similarity: P2, P2a 
Post-hoc comparisons between 1 and 2-step pairs were made. Although a significant 
interaction between step-size and delay was found, this seemed to be a result of the al- 
most ceiling performance of both pairs in the simultaneous presentation condition. A 
significant difference in accuracy was found between 1 and 2-step pairs in all delay con- 
ditions except the simultaneous condition, however the overall difference in perform- 
ance between 1 and 2-step pairs was not significantly greater in the 5000 ms condition 
than either the 250 ms or 1000 ms delay condition. Therefore, supporting prediction P2, 
there was a significant effect of perceptual distance: colours that are more perceptually 
similar are harder to discriminate. Support was also given to prediction P2a., the advan- 
tage for 2-step pairs over 1-step pairs was not affected by the delay. 
Position in category: Pia, P3b, P3c 
Mean accuracy scores for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs are given in table 2.19. 
There was a significant effect for position in category (F[1,15] = 11.19, p < 0.01), accu- 
racy was significantly better for non-boundary than boundary pairs. A significant effect 
was also found for delay (F[3,45] = 36.19, p<0.0001). The pair-type x delay interac- 
tion approached significance (F[3,45] = 2.67, p = 0.058). Because of this, post-hoc tests 
were performed comparing the difference in accuracy between boundary and non- 
boundary A-A pairs in each delay condition. Post-hoc testing found that in the 5000 ms 
delay condition, accuracy for boundary A-A pairs is significantly less than non-boundary 
pairs (t[14] = 3.90, p < 0.01). There was no significant difference between these pairs in 
any other delay condition. 
Table 2.19. Mean A' (s. d. ) for Boundary and Non-boundary A-A pairs. 
Delay Condition 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
Boundary 0.98 0.94 0.89 0.80 0.90 
(0.03) 
Non- 0.99 
(0.08) 
0.94 
(0.07) 
0.92 
(0.12) 
0.85 
(0.08) 
0.93 
boundary (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) 
Mean 0.99 0.94 0.91 0.83 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) 
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Mean accuracy for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs is given in table 2.20. The 
main effect of boundary position was not significant (F[1,15] = 0.25, p>0.05). The 
effect of delay was significant (F[3,45] = 42.83, p<0.05), and the interaction between 
boundary position and delay was also significant (F[3,45] = 3.06, p<0.05). Post-hoc 
testing found that accuracy for non-boundary A-a pairs was significantly less than for 
boundary A-a pairs in the 5000 ms delay condition. There was no significant difference 
in accuracy between these pairs in any other delay condition. 
Therefore, in summary, for the effect of position of stimulus pairs in the category, sup- 
port was found for prediction P3a in that there was a significant effect of the position 
in category for A-A pairs. Judgements of the physical identity of A-A pairs were more 
accurate when pairs were not adjacent to the category boundary. There was also support 
for prediction P3b. An effect of position in category was also found for A-a pairs, the 
direction of this effect was opposite to that of A-A pairs. Judgements of A-a pairs were 
more accurate when one of the stimuli of the pair was adjacent to the boundary. 
Table 2.20. Mean A' (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs. 
Delay Condition 
0 ms 250 ms 1000 ms 5000 ms Mean 
Boundary 1.00 0.90 0.87 0.80 0.89 
(0.01) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) 
Non- 0.98 0.93 0.90 0.73 0.89 
boundary (0.03) (0.08) (0.07) (0.16) (0.09) 
Mean 0.99 
(0.02) 
0.92 
(0.09) 
0.89 
(0.10) 
0.77 
(0.14) 
The position in category effect was influenced be delay for both A-A and A-a pairs 
(P3c). For both these pair-types, this effect was only significant in the longest delay 
condition. 
68 
2.4.4. Discussion 
All of the predictions made were given some support by the data. Firstly, the experi- 
ment showed that discrimination across the category boundary is superior to within- 
category discrimination (P1). Thus the result supports Bornstein and Korda, (1984) in 
showing CP in colour discrimination. However, unlike Bornstein and Korda, the effect 
was only found in accuracy, not RT. Judgements of A-B pairs were more accurate than 
judgements of A-a pairs but not faster. This difference may reflect differences between 
the stimuli used in the two experiments. Perceptual distances in the current stimulus set 
were on average about twice as large as in Bornstein and Korda's study (adjacent pairs 
were about 6.8 CIELUV units apart, compared to 14 units in the current study). Consis- 
tent with this possibility is the fact that for 2-step pairs in the current study, no category 
effect was found. 
The advantage in discriminating A-B pairs over A-a pairs was dependent on delay and 
only found in the longest delay condition (Pla). This effect was therefore in support of 
the two-code model of CP. It suggests that CP occurs only after a certain time has 
elapsed after stimulus presentations. This could be either because the category code is 
not available at short delays or that category codes are only employed when difficult dis- 
criminations are required. Consistent with the latter possibility was the finding of CP 
only for judgements of (the more difficult) 1-step pairs and not for 2-step pairs. It sug- 
gests that participants attend to category codes as a basis for making physical 
identity 
judgements when the physical code is not reliable. 
There was a significant effect of perceptual similarity on discrimination 
(P2). Judge- 
ments were both faster and more accurate for 2-step pairs compared to 
1-step pairs. The 
relative advantage for 2-step pairs was unaffected by 
delay (P2a). This result supports 
the finding by File (1980) that relative perceptual similarities are preserved 
in colour 
memory despite the fact that the discriminations 
involved were much more difficult 
than those given in File's study. 
As found in experiment one with category-identity judgements, A-A pairs adjacent to 
the boundary were judged to 
be same both more slowly and less accurately than pairs 
that were not adjacent to the 
boundary (P3) There was also an effect of position in 
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category for A-a pairs (P3b). Accuracy was significantly higher for boundary A-a pairs 
relative to non-boundary A-a pairs. The finding of a significant effect of position in 
category for A-a pairs suggests that in discriminating A-a pairs, the category code may be 
promoting a `same' response conflicting with the required `different' response for these 
pair-types. As in experiment one, the effect of the position of A-A pairs in the category 
on judgements was dependent on delay. The effect was also found for A-a pairs (P3c). 
For both pair-types, a significant effect of position in category was found only in the 
longest delay condition. These above results are all consistent with the two-code model, 
rather than a perceptual model, in suggesting that discrimination involves two codes 
that are differently affected by delay. They suggest that category codes have the greatest 
influence on discrimination when there is a sufficient delay present between stimuli. 
In summary, this experiment supported a two-code model of CP over a perceptual 
model. It shows therefore, that the two-code model does not just apply to tasks where 
explicit category judgements are required such as judging category-identity. Category 
codes seem to facilitate discriminations between colours of different categories and in- 
hibit discriminations within a category. The effects of category codes interact with de- 
lay. Effects of the category code are found to be strongest when a stimulus must be held 
in memory and weakest when stimuli are simultaneously presented. Like experiment 
one, the current experiment is consistent with the notion that physical colour codes de- 
cay more quickly than category codes. The next experiment looks at category coding in a 
visual search task; a task in which no memory component is involved. 
Experiment Three 
Category effects in Visual search. 
2.5.1. Introduction 
When items differ substantially from their background, they often seem to `pop out, 
without an active search 
being required. Research on this phenomenon (e. g. Treisman 
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and Gelade, 1980) has showed that decisions about the presence of target items, defined 
by a single attribute such as colour, can be made very rapidly. Furthermore, decisions do 
not seem to be influenced by the number of distractors. As the number of distractors is 
increased, there is no increase in decision time. A distractor- set-size (i. e. number of dis- 
tractors) function with a zero slope for decision time (RT) is thus considered character- 
istic evidence of pop-out. The usual explanation for pop-out is that when targets are 
very different from distractors, the presence of targets can be decided by a parallel 
search which simultaneously includes all the elements in a display. The perceptual dis- 
tance between targets and distractors is an important factor in determining this (Carter, 
1982). With colours that are perceptually similar to distractors, decision time shows a 
monotonic increase with the number of items in a display. It is only when targets are 
perceptually different enough from distractors beyond a certain criterion that targets 
appear to `pop out' from distractors. When targets are more similar to distractors, the 
presence of targets must be decided through a serial search in which individual elements 
in a display are compared sequentially (Nagay & Sanchez, 1990). 
More recent research however, has shown that target-distractor discriminability is not 
the only factor determining pop-out. With heterogeneous distractors (i. e. more than one 
distractor colour) the relative positioning of targets and distractors in perceptual space 
is 
also important. D'Zmura (1991) found that with heterogeneous 
distractors, pop-out 
occurs only for targets that are linearly separable from 
distractors in perceptual space. 
For example when targets and distractors were collinear (i. e. present 
in a straight line in 
perceptual space) and the target was between the two distractors, pop-out sometimes 
did not occur. This was found despite perceptual differences 
between targets and dis- 
tractors being quite large. The difference between linearly non-separable and 
linearly 
separable targets is illustrated in figures 2.4. and 
2.5. below. In fig. 2.4. the target is not 
linearly separable from the distractors: no line can be 
drawn that separates the target 
from both distractors. Note that for linear non-seperablility, it is not just necessary for 
target and distractors to be collinear, the target must also 
be between the distractors. In 
fig 2.5. the target is linearly separable from the distractors: at least one line can 
be drawn 
that separates the target from the distractors. 
71 
ET 
"D1 
X 
"D2 
Fig. 2.4. Target (T) is collinear with dis- 
tractors (Dl, D2). No single straight 
line segregates target from distractors. 
x axis 
Fig. 2.5. Target (T) is linearly separable 
from distractors (Dl, D2). A line can be 
drawn between target and distractors. 
More recent work by Bauer, Jolicoeur and Cowan (1996) made a more complete de- 
scription of the effect of linear separability in visual search for colour. They used a larger 
number of stimulus sets and systematically varied target-distractor perceptual relations. 
They found that the critical factors eliciting pop-out with linearly separable targets was 
both the perceptual distance of targets from the distractor line and the perceptual dis- 
tance between distractors. A target- distractor-line difference of at least 10 CIELUV 
units was necessary for pop-out to occur. With targets collinear with distractors, pop- 
out was found to occur when the distances from distractors were large (in the region of 
30 CIELUV units or greater). Linear separability determined pop-out even when dis- 
tances between targets and distractors were held constant across collinear and non- 
collinear conditions. The effect of linear separability was found for different regions of 
colour space and for stimuli differing in hue, saturation or luminance. 
However, one factor that Bauer et al. (1996) did not look at systematically was the ef- 
fect of colour categories on visual search. An important question is whether the linear 
separability rule is violated when targets and distractors are in different colour categories 
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(cross-category) compared to when targets and distractors are in the same category 
(within category). It may be that if targets are defined by category membership, a cate- 
gory search can be performed to determine their presence in a display. If category mem- 
bership does provide an important cue in visual search, the importance of perceptual 
relations between targets and distractors may lessen and thus the effect of linear separa- 
bility on decision time should decline. Such an explanation would therefore be consis- 
tent with a dual-code model of visual search in which two types of information would 
be available from stimuli that could be used to determine the presence of a target: a 
physical code and a category code. Another possibility that would also result in differ- 
ences between visual searches with cross and within category distractors is that there are 
discontinuities of perceptual space. Such discontinuities could either be inherent or be 
acquired through learning. It would mean that the perceptible difference between col- 
our categories, relative to distances within categories, would tend to be larger. If this 
was the case, it is possible that different-category distractors would appear so different 
from targets that pop-out would be found even when target-dis tractor differences were 
relatively small, compared with same-category distractors. 
Therefore, it is possible that cross-category targets collinear with distractors may still 
pop-out outside of the criteria defined by Bauer et al., or at least exhibit a flatter slope 
than with within-category distractors. If differences were found between visual search 
with cross and within category targets it would indicate something about the nature of 
colour categories. Bauer et al. report RTs of approximately 500 ms in conditions with 
pop-out; this means that decisions tend to occur before verbal labels for stimuli would 
be available (Boynton & Olson, 1987). Therefore, if pop-out was found for collinear 
cross-category targets, it would be support the notion of colour category information 
being available early in visual processing and suggest that colour categories were 
grounded in early visual processing. 
The current experiment constitutes a part-replication of Bauer et al. (1996). The same 
visual search paradigm is used but stimuli are so chosen that in one condition the target 
and two distractors fall in three different basic categories (cross-category); in the other 
condition targets and distractors fall in the same basic category (within-category). In 
both conditions, linear separability of targets is manipulated. Targets are either collinear 
(linearly-non separable) with, or linearly separable from distractors. There were there- 
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fore four conditions in the experiment: within-category/ target collinear (WC-CL); 
within-category/ target linearly separable (WC-LS); cross-category/ target collinear (CC- 
CL) and cross-category/ target linearly separable (CC-LS). In all conditions, set-size 
(number of distractors) was varied in order to assess pop-out in targets. Set-sizes of 4, 
16 and 32 were given. 
Predictions 
A near-flat slope of RT with set-size was considered indicative of target pop-out. For 
within-category conditions, pop-out should occur only for linearly separable stimuli. If 
category codes override the collinear effect, then pop-out should occur for both cross- 
category conditions. 
2.5.2. Method 
Participants 
Eight participants (3 male, 5 female; mean age 28) were used. 
Stimuli 
Six colour stimuli were used in the experiment; three each for the within and cross- 
category conditions respectively. Colour names and chromaticity measurements of these 
six stimuli are given in table 2.21. For both the within and cross-category conditions, 
the three stimuli fell on a single straight line in u' v'. For both conditions, the middle 
stimulus of the three (G2, Pr) was always collinear (i. e. not linearly separable) with the 
other two. In the within-category conditions, in the collinear condition, stimulus G2 
was the target, G1, and G3 distractors; in the linear-separable condition, stimulus G1 
was the target, G2, and G3 were the distractors. In the cross-category condition, in the 
collinear condition, stimulus Pr was the target, B, and Pk distractors; in the linear- 
separable condition, stimulus B, was the target, Pr, and Pk were distractors. Stimuli 
were positioned on an imaginary 6x6 matrix in the search display. Each location had 
dimensions of 17 mm2, subtending a visual angle of approx. 1.9' at an average viewing 
distance of 500 mm. With a set-size of 4 or 16, stimulus locations were randomly se- 
lected in the matrix. With a set-size of 36, stimuli were present in all locations in the 
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matrix. For target-absent trials, there was an equal number of each of the two distractor 
colours. For target-present trials, a target replaced one of the distractor colours. As in 
Bauer et al., the location of targets in the matrix was random with the constraint that 
targets never appeared in either of the four corners of the matrix and that the target oc- 
curred equally often in the remaining 32 positions within each condition. 
Table 2.21. CIE coordinates of colours. 
ýýana. atxa»"a, ý,:. ucinýtýcýs>aýaawc": a ý, wav; ý, " gian ýwuvý, ýaq x? ýýeýa; wuaewaý .?, aoaaa>a+a., H+. morcrsmr.; ymý. v. ýza¢sweviTarar! n-aaaazv,, »aaaev, ý+, a 
Within Category Cross Category 
Y u' v` Y u' v' 
G1 (Green) 10.5 . 135 . 548 B (Blue) 17.0 . 180 . 449 
G2 (Green) 10.5 . 135 . 498 Pr (Purple) 17.0 . 222 . 448 
G3 (Green) 10.5 . 135 . 523 Pk (Pink) 17.0 . 202 . 448 
Procedure 
The procedure mostly followed that in Bauer et al. Each participant performed all four 
conditions (WC-CL, WC-LS, CC-CL, CC-LS) in a counterbalanced order. Each condi- 
tion consisted of a training stage followed by visual search. The first part of the training 
stage consisted of exposing the participant to the target and the two distractors at the 
same time; these were presented for about one minute. Labels indicated the target and 
distractors. The second part of the training stage consisted of a forced-choice identifica- 
tion task in which stimuli were presented one at a time after the onset of a fixation 
cross. For each presented stimulus it had to be decided whether it was a target or dis- 
tractor. Decisions were indicated by a mouse-button press (left, target; right, distractor). 
Twenty presentations of each of the three stimuli in the condition were given in a ran- 
dom order. If participants made fewer than 20% misidentifications, they moved on to 
perform the visual search task. If performance on the training stage was poorer than this 
criterion, training was repeated. In the visual search stage, 192 trials were given, 
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each set-size. An equal number of target-present trials were given 
for each set-size. Tri- 
als were presented in a random order. Each trial was preceded 
by a fixation cross that 
remained onscreen for 250 ms, followed by a 400 ms blank 
interval before presentation 
of the search display. The search display remained present until a response was made. 
As 
for the training stage, decisions were indicated by a mouse-button press (left, target- 
present; right, target-absent). Participants were instructed to respond quickly 
but not to 
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compromise accuracy. A 400 ms interval was given between successive trials. 
2.5.3. Results 
For each condition, for each participant, median RTs for correct trials were calculated. 
All reported RTs are across-participant means of the median correct RTs. Mean RT for 
the within category conditions (WC-CL and WC-LS) are given in fig. 2.6. Mean RT for 
the cross category conditions (CC-CL and CC-LS) are given in fig. 2.7. For all condi- 
tions, separate RTs are given for target present and target absent trials. Errors rates, ex- 
pressed as percentages of total trials, are given in fig. 2.8 for conditions WC-CL and 
WC-LS, and in fig. 2.9. for conditions CC-CL and CC-LS. Note that it was necessary to 
differently scale the axis for the within and cross-category conditions because of the 
large differences in mean performance between these conditions for both RT and error 
rates. 
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For the within-category condition it can be seen that with a linearly separable target 
(WC-CL), the RT slope with set-size for target-present trials was almost flat (a slope of 
3.94 items/ms). For the collinear condition (WC-LS), RT showed a much steeper in- 
crease with set-size (a slope of 39.66 items/ms). For the cross-category condition, over- 
all RTs were lower than for the within-category condition. There were also differences 
in the effect of linear separability. For the linearly separable condition (CC-LS), as for 
WC-LS, the RT slope with set-size is again almost flat (a slope of 0.64 items/ms). For 
the collinear condition (CC-CL), there was an increase in RT with set-size, but the slope 
is much flatter than for the within-category condition (a slope of 5.71 items/ms). One- 
way ANOVAs performed on each of the RT slopes showed that all conditions except 
CC-CL showed a significant non-zero increase in RT with set-size. 
Similar findings are observed on target-absent trials, although target-absent trials tend to 
have longer RTs than target present trials. For the within-category condition, a steeper 
slope is observed for a collinear target compared to a linearly separable target. Condition 
WC-LS shows a slope of 14.21, while condition WC-CL shows a slope of 39.66. For the 
cross-category condition, the RT slope is almost flat for condition CC-LS (a slope of 
0.60 items/ms). A steeper slope is found for condition CC-CL (a slope of 9.88 
items/ms). Importantly, the slope for CC-CL is much flatter than for condition WC-CL. 
One-way ANOVAs performed on each of the RT slopes showed that, as with target- 
present trials, all conditions except CC-LS showed a significant non-zero increase in RT 
with set-size. 
Observation of the differences between slopes in target-present and target-absent trials 
shows further differences between the cross and within-category conditions. For both 
conditions, with linearly separable targets (WC-LS, CC-LS), similar slopes are obtained 
for both target-present and target-absent trials. However, with a collinear target, the 
differences between target-present and target-absent trials in RT are much greater for 
the within-category condition (WC-CL) than the cross-category condition. 
Further testing of the significance of the differences in RTs between the conditions was 
performed using ANOVA. All ANOVAs described below had three factors: condition 
(within; cross); linearity (collinear distractors; linearly separable distractors), and set-size 
(4; 16; 32). All factors were repeated measures. Separate analyses were performed for 
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RT on target-present and target-absent trials. Only effects relevant to the predictions 
will be mentioned. 
For target-present trials, RT increased significantly with set-size (F[2,14] = 15.44, p< 
0.001). RT was significantly faster with cross-category distractors compared to within- 
category distractors (F[2,14] = 112.14, p<0.001). RT with linearly-separable distrac- 
tors were faster than with collinear distractors (F[2,14] = 60.83, p<0.0001). There 
was a significant condition x set-size interaction (F[2,40] = 12.40, p<0.001) and a 
significant linearity x set-size interaction (F[2,14] = 12.36, p<0.001). A significant in- 
teraction was found between all three factors (F[2,14] = 10.24, p<0.002). This analy- 
sis was repeated as an ANCOVA with error rates as a covariate. All above effects re- 
mained significant with this analysis. 
For target-absent trials, as with target-present trials, RT for target absent trials increased 
significantly with set-size (F[2,14] = 20.46, p<0.0001); RT was significantly faster 
with cross-category distractors than within-category distractors (F[1,7] = 61.55, p< 
0.0001). RT with linearly-separable distractors was faster than with collinear distractors 
(F[1,7] = 42.30, p<0.0001). There was significant condition x set-size interaction 
(F[2,14] = 21.77, p<0.0001), and a significant linearity by set-size interaction (F[2, 
14] = 17.71, p<0.0001). The three way interaction between all factors was also signifi- 
cant (F[2,14] = 14.46, p<0.0001). As with target-present RT, the analysis was re- 
peated as an ANCOVA with error rates as a covariate. With this analysis, again all ef- 
fects remained significant. 
Therefore, the above analyses, for both target present and absent trials, support the pre- 
diction that there was a significant' difference between cross and within conditions in 
the effect of linear separability on pop-out. For the within-category condition, with the 
target collinear with distractors (WC-CL), RT increased significantly in a monotonic 
fashion as a function of set-size. However, with targets linearly separable from distrac- 
tors (WC-LS), RT showed a flat function with set-size: as set-size increased, there was 
only a small increase in RT. This same pattern was found for both target-present and 
target-absent trials. However, for the cross-category condition, with the target collinear 
with distractors (CC-CL), mean RTs were lower than for the within-category collinear 
condition (WC-CL) for all set-sizes. For the cross-category condition, with a linearly 
79 
separable target (CC-LS), overall RT was also slower than for the corresponding within- 
category condition WC-LS. Furthermore, the increase in set-size with RT for condition 
CC-LS was less than for condition WC-LS. Again this same pattern was found for both 
target-present and absent trials. Error rates showed a generally similar pattern to RT. 
When analysis of RTs used error as a covariate, the general pattern of results was not 
affected. 
2.5.4 Discussion 
The results support the prediction that pop-out is affected not just by the perceptual 
relations between targets and distractors, but also by their category membership. When 
targets and distractors fall in the same category, pop-out occurs when targets are linearly 
separable from distractors but not when they are collinear with distractors. With a tar- 
get linearly separable from its distractors, visual search was relatively unaffected by set- 
size and decisions on target-present trials are about the same as on target-absent trials. 
With collinear target-dis tractors, both RT and error rates increased monotonically as set- 
size increases. Furthermore, decisions on target-absent trials took significantly longer 
than on target-present trials. Therefore, for same category targets and distractors it 
seems, as Bauer et al. (1996) claim, that linear separability is important in determining 
pop-out. When target and distractors fall in different categories, the importance of lin- 
ear seperability is lessened. With linearly separable target-distractors the steepness of the 
RT slope is about the same for the cross-category condition as it is for the within- 
category. However, with collinear target-dis tractors, the steepness of the RT slope with 
set-size for the cross-category condition is considerably less than for the within-category 
condition. In addition, the difference in RT on target-present and target absent trials is 
less than for the within-category condition. 
Therefore, the experiment suggests that category membership can provide a salient cue 
in decisions about the presence of a target in a display. Like linear-separability, the cate- 
gory membership of target and distractors provides a determinant of pop-out. When tar- 
gets are not collinear with distractors, this cue may be unnecessary; decisions about the 
presence of a target can be made rapidly based on the linear separability of the target. 
However, when targets and distractors are collinear, decisions can be speeded by targets 
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being in a different category The cost of targets being collinear with distractors is thus 
not as great for cross-category trials. It is possible that the advantage for cross-category 
visual search is due to perceptual distances across category boundaries being larger than 
distances inside categories. However, it seems more likely that the advantage is due to a 
redundant category code that can facilitate visual search in parallel with the physical 
code. The duration of the decisions involved suggest that such a code must be available 
rapidly. Even with collinear target-dis tractors, RTs tended to be considerably lower 
than 1000 ms for the cross-category condition. It therefore suggests that the code is not 
verbal. Rather, it is consistent with a model in which colour categories are perceptually 
coded and available early in visual processing. 
2.6. General Discussion 
The evidence from both experiments one and two support the notion that both physical 
and categorical aspects of a stimulus are important in colour judgements. Both aspects 
are important for judgements of categorical, as well as physical, identity. The evidence 
suggested that the two aspects of the stimulus were represented by separate codes. The 
relative influence of these codes on judgements was found to change with delay. With 
category identity judgements (experiment one), for judgements of same-category pairs, 
physical identity influenced judgements more with short inter-stimulus delays than long 
delays. With short delays, there was an advantage in RT for judgements of physically 
identical `same' pairs; with long delays this advantage was lost. In contrast, the effect of 
position of stimuli in the category influenced judgements with long delays but less so 
with short delays. With short delays, there was no significant advantage in RT for stim- 
uli away from the category boundary; with long delays, this advantage became signifi- 
cant. This effect was also found for physical identity judgements (experiment two), but 
here the effect was found in accuracy, not RT. Also for experiment two, it was found 
that judgements of physically different stimulus-pairs in difference categories were more 
accurate than judgements of pairs in the same category even though the perceptual dis- 
tances were the same. As with physically different pairs, this effect for same pairs was 
only found for long delays. 
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The fact that both physical and category aspects of a stimulus can influence judgments 
of physically the same and physically different colour pairs whether the judgement is of 
physical or category identity is consistent with physical and category codes being avail- 
able in parallel. However, the fact that the influence of the category code increased with 
delay for both category-identity and physical-identity judgements suggests either that the 
category code is only employed in conditions where the physical code has decayed or 
that the category code is not available with short delays. 
Experiment three found evidence consistent with the possibility that category codes fa- 
cilitate visual search. Decisions about the presence of a target colour were significantly 
faster when a target was in a different category to distractors than when it was in the 
same category. This factor was found to influence pop-out: the number of distractors 
had less influence on decision time when distractors were in a different category com- 
pared to being in the same category. The fact that visual search can be influenced by the 
categorical properties of stimuli suggests that category codes are, in fact, present early in 
visual processing. Unlike experiments one and two, there is no memory component to 
visual search; stimuli were always presented simultaneously. Furthermore, decision times 
in the cross category condition were very rapid, suggesting that category coding must 
also be rapid in order to influence judgments. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Nature of Category Codes in Colour Judgements 
3.1. General Introduction 
It was argued in the previous chapter that colour is represented as two separate codes: a 
physical code and a category code. However, the previous chapter did not show the na- 
ture of the category code. It has been speculated that colour categories are implemented 
principally as perceptual codes. In support of this authors have pointed to the existence 
of colour categories in infants (e. g. Bornstein et al., 1976) and other species (e. g. Born- 
stein, 1987). Other authors claim that colour category codes are verbal labels. It has been 
demonstrated that language measures of colour coding (e. g. communication accuracy) are 
highly predictive of colour memory: colours easily communicated to other speakers in a 
language tend to be better remembered than colours that are poorly communicated (e. g. 
Lucy & Schweder, 1979; 1988). 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the nature of colour category codes by looking for 
evidence of verbal codes being involved in categorisation and CP. Chapter one presented 
evidence from cross-language studies of colour cognition supporting the idea that lan- 
guage is involved in colour category representation (e. g. Roberson et al., 2000). However, 
this research has only demonstrated associations between language and categorisation. 
That is, an unmeasured third factor may be causing any observed differences in colour 
language and colour cognition between different groups. For instance, Bornstein (1973) 
notes incidences of tritinopic-like colour vision deficits are greater in populations in 
tropical and equatorial regions of the world. He also notes that this pattern coincides 
with regions in which many languages are found to lack separate terms for blue and 
green. Bornstein argues that, in a population, an above average incidence of a colour vi- 
sion defect that reduces discriminability between green and blue could pressure the evo- 
lution of a language against separating these categories. Therefore, rather than con- 
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structing colour categories, language may merely reflect underlying differences in biology. 
The fact that colour cognition and language are related is not in itself sufficient evidence 
to determine the importance of language in colour category representation. However, 
evidence from neuropsychology and experimental research has also implied a role of lan- 
guage in colour category representation. This evidence is discussed below. 
Colour anomia (impaired colour naming resulting from neurological lesion), has been 
found to be related to colour categorisation impairments (Roberson, Davidoff & Braisby, 
1999; Fukuzawa, et al. 1988; Beauvis & Salhant, 1985, case MP). Of these studies, Rober- 
son et al. 's study of patient LEW provides the most detailed investigation of colour cate- 
gorisation. Roberson et al. show that LEW has a severe colour anomia: in tasks where 
LEW was required to access colour names, the patient was deeply impaired. LEW could 
not name colours or correctly point to a named colour. LEW also had great difficulty 
categorising colour. Normal participants find it relatively easy to sort a large number of 
different colour chips into groups on the basis of perceived similarity; colours are usually 
quickly sorted into groups on the basis of hue. LEW however, showed severe difficulties 
on this task and his sorting solutions lacked this simple categorical structure; sorts took 
considerable effort to produce and colours seemed to be categorised more on the basis 
of their brightness than hue. While normal participants would tend to survey the total set 
of colours, LEW only made individual comparisons between pairs of colours. When the 
set of colour was reduced to only 12 stimuli (6 blue chips, 6 green chips), LEW's sorting 
still was impaired: he claimed that the colours all belonged in the same group. It can be 
suggested that because LEW had lost the ability to access verbal colour codes, his inter- 
nal representation of colour categories was also lost. Without categories to structure per- 
ceptual information, colour sorting may become almost impossible since the number of 
possible sorting solutions is very large. Sorting colours into groups would necessitate that 
some colours in the same group would be perceptually closer to colours in different 
groups than to some colours in the same group. Without a category structure to resolve 
the ambiguities in sorting certain colours, it may become very difficult to group them on 
a purely perceptual basis. 
Further work with LEW, however, showed that his loss of colour category representa- 
tions was not complete. On some tasks, LEW demonstrated intact knowledge of colour 
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category boundaries. In a triads (odd-one-out) task or delayed colour discrimination task, 
LEW showed normal CP, indicating that at least some residual categorical representation 
must still be present. Given two colours equally perceptually different from a third col- 
our, LEW like most normal English speakers, would tend to choose the colour that fell 
into a different hue category as `most different'. Similarly, in discrimination, given equal 
perceptual differences between colours, like normal participants, LEW was better at dis- 
criminating colours that straddled category boundaries compared to colours that fell 
within the same category. Based on this evidence, Roberson et al. propose that LEW's 
category impairment is restricted only to tasks where explicit access to colour category 
representations are required. They claim that verbal codes are required in making implicit 
knowledge of colour categories, explicit. The nature of LEW's impairment, then, through 
his colour language loss is not a loss of colour categories but a loss of explicit access to 
these categories. 
Roberson & Davidoff (2000), using an interference paradigm found further evidence of 
verbal involvement in categorisation. Roberson et al. 's study of LEW also suggests that 
verbal codes are involved in representing colour categories. They used a 2-alternative 
forced-choice (2A-FC) task. A memory colour was first presented, then after a5 sec in- 
terval two test colours, one identical to the memory stimulus and one a distractor, were 
presented. The task was to decide which of the test stimuli was the same as the memory 
stimulus. Normal participants showed reliable CP in this task; discrimination was 
better 
when test stimuli straddled a category boundary (cross-category pairs) than when they 
fell 
inside a category (within-category pairs). In further experiments, Roberson and 
Davidoff 
compared the effects of verbal and visual-interference on the accuracy of cross and 
within-category discriminations with an aim to test different accounts of colour category 
code representation, as a perceptual or verbal code. Visual-interference was provided 
by 
tracking a static line of colour dots present in a background of different colour 
dots using 
eye-movements, for the duration of the delay interval 
between the memory and the test 
stimuli. Verbal-interference was provided by requiring the reading aloud of a 
list of col- 
our-words during the interval. While visual-interference 
had an effect on overall accu- 
racy, it had no effect on CP. The relative advantage 
in discriminating cross-category rela- 
tive to performance in discriminating within-category stimuli was about the same as the 
baseline condition. Verbal-interference, however, affected both overall accuracy and CP; 
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the accuracy in discriminating cross-category pairs was reduced significantly more than 
within-category pairs. Further experiments showed that the same effect of verbal- 
interference was found on CP when the verbal-interference task involved reading non- 
colour words or counting backwards aloud. The effect was also obtained when the verbal 
interference was presented only while the memory stimulus was being encoded com- 
pared to presenting the interval over the delay. 
The results support the position that category codes are represented as verbal, rather 
than perceptual codes, at least in CP. CP, according to Roberson and Davidoff, is that it 
is a direct language effect: the participant remembers the target colour name and com- 
pares this to the names of the test stimuli. However, the interference tasks used in 
Roberson and Davidoff make interpretation difficult. Further, this result is difficult to 
reconcile with Roberson et al. 's findings with patient LEW (see above). LEW's colour 
anomia means than he can neither access nor retain colour names. If CP effects are due 
to verbal labelling, LEW should not show CP. However, he does show normal CP in a 
discrimination task similar to that in Roberson and Davidoff. Therefore, the verbal- 
interference tasks used by Roberson and Davidoff do not produce an effect equivalent to 
LEW's impairment. 
It may be that despite LEW's colour anomia, his `lemma' (the structures representing un- 
derlying concepts of words), may remain intact (see Drucks and Shallice, 2000). There- 
fore, although LEW may not be able to access colour names themselves, the linguistic 
structures representing colour categories could still operate. Another possibility is that 
LEW has frontal damage in addition to his colour naming problems that causes difficul- 
ties in the patient making decisions involving compromises. Even 3 year-old Namibian 
children are able to sort colours into sensible groups based on hue despite knowing al- 
most no colour terms (Boyles, 2001). It may be then that LEW does not provide a good 
object of study for the role of language in representing colour categories. It is in fact pos- 
sible that the fundamental deficit in colour anomia is sometimes not even language re- 
lated. The evidence could be turned around to argue that the reason for poor colour 
naming in the colour anomic patient is sometimes the result of an underlying 
deficit in 
perceptual categorisation. Because we are only observing an association between two 
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deficits this is neither evidence for or against verbal codes being involved in colour cate- 
gory representation. 
In summary, there is some evidence of verbal codes being involved in representing col- 
our categories. However, it is not clear how necessary verbal coding is in categorisation; 
whether access to verbal codes is required when making explicit category judgements or 
just in CP. Roberson et al. suggest that loss of verbal codes impairs the ability to explicitly 
organise colours in a categorical fashion. If this is the case, decisions of category-identity 
that are difficult to make on the basis of physical judgements should require access to 
verbal codes. The experiments in this chapter try to address these issues. 
The first experiment (experiment four), looks at how category-identity judgements of 
simultaneously presented colours are made. If verbal codes are always required in making 
category-identity decisions, not just in short-term memory, evidence of verbal coding 
should be found even when stimuli are presented simultaneously. Access to verbal codes 
is manipulated by varying the visual-field stimuli are presented in. Right visual-field pres- 
entations have more direct access to the left-hemisphere language centres and should 
therefore reveal possible verbal effects more clearly than left visual field presentations. 
Experiments five to seven look at verbal category codes when colours are presented se- 
quentially with a delay between colours, therefore involving a possible memory compo- 
nent. An interference paradigm, similar to that used by Roberson and Davidoff (2000), 
was used. Experiment five looks for evidence of verbal codes in judging colour category- 
identity, while experiments six and seven looks for evidence of verbal codes in CP in dis- 
crimination tasks. 
3.2. General Method 
General method is same as in § 2.2. 
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3.3. Experiment Four 
Effect of Visual-Field of Stimulus Presentation on Category-Identity 
Judgements 
3.3.1. Introduction 
For the majority of individuals, the brain structures responsible for language are localised 
primarily in the left hemisphere (Kimura, 1967). For this reason, stimuli requiring verbal 
processing tend to be advantaged when stimuli are directed to this hemisphere. Because 
of the contralateral mapping of the brain, this means that, for visually presented stimuli 
requiring verbal processing, a right visual-field (RVF) bias tends to be observed (see 
Springer & Deutsch, 1997). Such a RVF bias has been found in tasks where colour 
naming is required; Tokar, Matheson & Haude (1989) found there was a colour naming 
advantage when colours were presented in the RVF. Levy & Trevarthen (1981) found 
that split-brain patients, who lack the ability to transfer information between hemi- 
spheres, only showed above-chance colour naming when colours were presented in the 
RVF. Interestingly, Wilson (1987) found that, in a colour discrimination task, patients 
with unilateral LH lesions were less likely to show CP relative to patients with RH le- 
sions'. It is therefore possible that the LH may play a role in representing colour catego- 
ries as well as colour names. 
The right hemisphere (RH) tends to be superior processing information on certain kinds 
of visual-spatial tasks e. g. the perception of part-whole relations. In tasks requiring colour 
judgements, the RH seems to have a greater involvement in discriminating between hues. 
Perceptual colour deficits such as dyschromatopsia arise more frequently from lesions to 
the right hemisphere (Davidoff, 1991). Brightness, hue and saturation discrimination 
judgments of colour show greater accuracy with LVF (RH) presentations (Davidoff, 
1975; 1976). Advantages have also been found for LVF presentations in colour discrimi- 
nation RT (Pennel, 1977). 
1 Unfortunately, the author does not report whether these patients also had colour naming impairments 
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Laterality effects, however, are often unreliable and are affected by small changes in ex- 
perimental procedure. For instance, Franzon and Hugdahl (1987) found differences in 
RT with left and right visual-field of presentation in a Stroop task. However, these could 
be confounded by speed-accuracy trade-off: when participants were instructed to empha- 
sise speed rather than accuracy in responding, the effect was lost. Hannay (1979) ob- 
tained laterality effects with simultaneously presented stimuli in a colour discrimination 
task; however, with sequential presentations the effect was lost. 
In the current experiment, participants are required to make speeded category-identity 
judgements of simultaneously presented colours. The visual-field of presentation of the 
colours is manipulated so that the colours appear unpredictably on the left or right posi- 
tion of the screen. Advantages in judging the category-identity of a particular colour-pair 
in either visual-field should correspond to an advantage in accessing the category in the 
contralateral hemisphere. Category-identity judgements of colour-pairs that can be de- 
termined as same or different, at least partly on the basis of their discriminability, i. e. the 
physical code should be advantaged by LVF presentation, consistent with the LVF ad- 
vantage found in discrimination tasks (Davidoff, 1976; Pennel, 1977). If in judging the 
category-identity of some colour-pairs it is necessary to access verbal category represen- 
tations, like the advantage found in accessing colour names (Levy & Trevarthen, 1981; 
Tokar, Matheson & Haude 1989), a RVF advantage should be found. 
Predictions 
P1. LVF presentations: Category-identity judgements of colour-pairs advantaged by their 
discriminability should show more facilitation by LVF presentations than judge- 
ments of colour-pairs not advantaged by this factor. That is, any advantage in 
judging the category-identity of physically identical or perceptually similar `same' 
pairs, i. e. A-A pairs over A-a pairs; 1-step A-a pairs over 2-step A-a pairs, the ad- 
vantage in judging perceptually more discriminable `different' pairs, i. e. >_ 3-step 
over >3 step A-B pairs, should be greater with LVF relative to RVF presenta- 
tion. 
P2. RIVF presentations. If verbal representations are being accessed in determining cate- 
gory-identity, judgements of A-a pairs and non-boundary A-A pairs specifically, 
should be advantaged by RVF presentation more than by LVF presentation. 
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3.3.2. Method 
Participants 
Eight right-handed males, aged 18-42, performed the task. Handedness was assessed us- 
ing the Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Males were used exclusively 
because lateralisation has been found to be more pronounced in males than females 
(McGlone, 1978). 
Stimuli 
The stimuli used in this experiment were the same as those used in experiment one. The 
same stimulus conditions, i. e. colour-pairs, were also presented (refer to table 2.2. ). 
Procedure 
The task was to make category-identity judgements of simultaneously presented colour- 
pairs presented briefly in the left or right visual-field. For each trial, a fixation cross was 
presented 750 ms preceding the onset of a stimulus-pair to the left or right of the cross. 
The stimulus-pair was always presented on either the left or the right of the screen. The 
duration of the stimulus pair was 150 ms in order to make a fixation movement impossi- 
ble during the stimulus presentation, thus increasing the effectiveness of the lateralisa- 
tion. Responses were made by mouse-button press; allocation of left and buttons to re- 
sponse-type was counterbalanced across observers. RT was measured from stimulus on- 
set until a response was made. The two stimuli were vertically positioned on the screen. 
There was a3 mm separation between the two stimuli. Presentations in the left or right 
visual field were equally spaced from the fixation cross at a distance of 70 mm. This gave 
a visual angle of 8.0° of the stimuli from the fixation point for an average viewing dis- 
tance of 500 mm. In half of the experimental trials, the colour-pairs were presented in 
the LVF, and half the trials in the RVF. The order of presentation of the visual-field 
condition was randomised for each participant. Presentations were balanced so that equal 
numbers of each colour-pair were presented in each visual-field. The order of presenta- 
tion of colour-pairs was also randomised. Presentations were further balanced so that 
each colour of each of the colour-pairs was presented with equal frequency in the upper 
and lower vertical position. 
A 1000 ms interval was given between each trial. Each par- 
ticipant performed 432 experimental trials given in two blocks of equal length. They were 
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given the option of a short break between blocks. Thirty practise trials were given before 
proceeding onto the experimental trials. Practise trials were given consisting of randomly 
selected stimulus pairs. Auditory feedback was given to indicate errors made during the 
practise trials. 
3.3.3. Results 
Comparisons of performance for different pair-types with different visual-field presenta- 
tions were made by computing a series of ANOVAs for each comparison made. All re- 
ported ANOVAs in this section are two-way; in all cases, the two factors are pair-type 
(e. g. A-A, A-a) and visual-field (LVF, RVF); both factors have two levels and are re- 
peated measures. The variables in the pair-type factor are specified in the sub-sections 
below for each ANOVA comparison made. Participant instructions emphasised both 
speed and accuracy in responding, therefore both RT and accuracy measures are reported 
under separate headings. 
RT 
Only RTs for correct trials were used in the analysis. For each pair-type comparison, a 
median RT score was calculated for each participant. All reported mean RTs for each 
pair-type class are across-participant means of the individual median RT scores. These 
are reported separately for LVF and RVF presentations. ANOVAs were performed on 
the participant median RT scores. The effects of visual-field on the relative different pair- 
types are reported under different sub-headings. 
Physical identity 
Means for A-A and A-a pairs are given in table 3.1. Judgements of A-A pairs were 
significantly faster than for A-a pairs (F[1,7] = 34.41 p<0.01). No significant effect for 
visual-field was found (F[1,7] = 0.26 p>0.05). There was no significant pair-type x 
visual-field interaction (F[1,7] = 0.06 p>0.05). 
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Table 3.1 
. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for A-A and A-a pairs. 
LVF RVFT Mean 
A-A 769.06 764.63 766.85 
(102.66) (110.62) (106.64) 
A-a 869.00 860.81 864.91 
(128.06) (132.26) (130.16) 
Mean 819.03 812.72 
(115.36) (121.44) 
Perceptual distance 
Mean RTs for 1-step and 2-step A-a pairs are given in table 3.2. Judgements for 1-step A- 
a pairs were significantly faster than for 2-step pairs (F[1,7] = 39.92, p<0.0001). There 
was no significant main effect of visual-field. No significant interaction was found. 
Table 3.2. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for 1-step and 2-step A-a pairs. 
LVF RVF Mean 
1-step 823.00 820.125 821.56 
(130.59) (126.50) (128.55) 
2-step 941.19 930.60 935.90 
(141.28) (126.08) (133.68) 
Mean 882.10 875.36 
(135.94) (126.29) 
Mean RTs for A-B <3 and A-B >_ 3 pairs are given in table 3.3. Judgements A-B <3 
pairs were judged as `different' significantly more slowly than A-B ?3 pairs (F[1,7] = 
20.75, p<0.01). However, there was no main effect of visual-field and no interaction. 
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Table 3.3. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for A-B <3 and A-B ?3 pairs. 
LVF RVF Mean 
1079.38 1057.94 1068.66 
(242.25) (330.35) (286.30) 
3 855.06 847.38 851.22 
(130.73) (142.28) (136.51) 
Mean 967.22 952.66 
(186.49) (236.32) 
Position in category 
Means for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs are given in table 3.4. Judgements of 
non-boundary A-A pairs were faster than for boundary A-A pairs. (F[1,7] = 15.18, p< 
0.01). The main effect of visual-field was not significant, nor was the interaction. 
Table 3.4. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs. 
LVF RVF Mean 
Boundary 783.19 807.5 795.35 
(105.53) (133.24) (119.39) 
Non-boundary 763.94 750.25 757.10 
(100.65) (100.93) (100.79) 
Mean 773.57 778.88 
(103.09) (117.09) 
Means for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs are given in table 3.5. There was a non- 
significant trend towards judgements of non-boundary A-a pairs being faster than for 
boundary A-a pairs. (F[1,7] = 4.02, p=0.09). There was no main effect of visual-field 
and no significant interaction. 
93 
Table 3.5. Mean correct RT (s. d. ) for Boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs. 
LVF RVF Mean 
Boundary 865.44 840.88 853.16 
(171.45) (128.30) (149.88) 
Non-boundary 803.50 809.13 806.315 
(119.02) (117.79) (118.41) 
Mean 834.47 825.005 
(145.24) (123.05) 
In summary, for RTs, no support was found for either prediction P1 or P2. Advantages 
for certain pair-types were found similar to the effects reported in the simultaneous pres- 
entation condition of experiment one. However, there was no significant main effect or 
interaction with visual-field for any pair-typet. 
Accuracy 
Physical identity 
Mean accuracy for A-A and A-a pairs are given in table 3.6. Accuracy was significantly 
better for A-A pairs than for A-a pairs (F[1,7] = 50.27, p<0.0001). There was no main 
effect of visual-field and no interaction. 
Table 3.6. Mean correct A' (s. d. ) for A-A and A-a pairs. 
ýýýýýý LVF RVF Mean 
A-A 0.95 0.95 0.95 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
A-a 0.89 0.89 0.89 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Mean 0.92 0.92 
(0.02) (0.02) 
2 Laterality effects are sometimes clouded by effects such as subject head movement, eye movement etc. Such effects 
tend to diminish over the course of an experiment. In order to test if such factors 
had concealed any possible effects, a 
separate analysis was performed producing a median 
for just the last 100 of the 432 trials for each participant. It was 
found that the across-participant median RTs of these trials tended to be lower than the median RTs computed from 
all trials. However, there was still no effect of visual-field 
for any pair-type. 
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Perceptual distance 
Mean accuracy for 1 and 2-step A-a pairs are given in table 3.7. Accuracy for 1-step pairs 
was significantly higher than for 2-step pairs (F[1,7] 45.73, p<0.001). There was no ef- 
fect of visual-field and no interaction. 
Table 3.7. Mean A' (s. d. ) for 1-step and 2-step A-a pairs. 
LVF RVF Mean 
1-step 0.92 0.92 0.92 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
2-step 0.87 0.87 0.87 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Mean 0.90 0.90 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Mean accuracy for A-B <3 and A-B >_ 3 pairs is given in table 3.8. Judgements for A-B >_ 
3 pairs were significantly more accurate than judgements of A-B <3 pairs (F[1,7] 
=38.40, p<0.0001): No main effect of visual-field was found. There was an interaction 
approaching significance between these factors (F[1,7] = 3.95, p = 0.087). 
Table 3.8. Mean A' (s. d. ) for A-B <3 and A-B >_ 3 pairs. 
Nýý LVF RVF Mean 
<30.84 0.85 0.85 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
>_ 3 0.95 0.94 0.95 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Mean 0.90 0.90 
(0.04) (0.03) 
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Position in category 
Mean accuracy for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs are given in table 3.9. There 
was no significant effect of boundary position (F[1,7] = 0.08, p>0.05). No effect of 
visual-field was found and no interaction. 
Table 3.9. Mean correct A' (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs. 
LVF RVF Mean 
Boundary 0.95 0.95 0.95 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Non-boundary 0.94 0.95 0.95 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Mean 0.95 0.95 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Mean accuracy for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs are given in table 3.10. Judge- 
ments of non-boundary A-a pairs are more accurate than judgement of boundary A-a 
pairs. (F[1,7] = 7.20, p<0.05). There was no significant effect of visual-field and no in- 
teraction. 
Table 3.10. Mean correct A' (s. d. ) for Boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs. 
LVF RVF Mean 
Boundary 0.91 0.89 0.9 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Non-boundary 0.94 0.95 0.95 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Mean 0.93 0.92 
(0.03) (0.04) 
In summary for the accuracy data, as with RT, significant differences tended to 
be found 
between pairs in different stimulus conditions consistent with the effects reported for 
experiment one. However, no significant effects related to the manipulation of visual- 
field were found. 
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3.3.4. Discussion 
Differences in performance in the judgement of the category-identity of colour-pairs 
were found with both the RT and accuracy measures. Comparison between different 
pair-types showed significant effects of physical identity, perceptual distance and position 
in category of stimuli in determining performance. However, for no pair-type was their 
any significant main effect of visual-field and no interaction with visual-field was found 
with either performance measure. Therefore, prediction P1 was not supported. LVF 
presentations of stimuli did not facilitate category-identity judgements of pairs that were 
advantaged by the perceptual distance between pairs. It can, therefore, be suggested that 
the advantage for these pair-types may not involve the same processes as those of a pure 
discrimination task, such as those in Davidoff (1976). Prediction P2 was equally not sup- 
ported, RVF presentations of stimuli did not facilitate the advantage for judgements of 
physically different same pairs or of non-boundary physically identical pairs. This sug- 
gests that verbal coding of stimuli did not play a role in judging category identity in this 
task. 
It could be argued that the negative findings are due to low power. However, against this 
possibility is the finding of significant small effects. For instance, a significant effect of 
position in category was found for A-A pairs despite an average difference of less than 40 
ms. There is no evidence of even a non-significant trend with visual-field. For most pair- 
types, mean RT and accuracy was almost identical between the left and right conditions. 
The only evidence of any possible trend towards an effect of visual 
field was for A-B 
pairs, a (non-significant) interaction was found for these pairs in accuracy. 
However, it is 
questionable whether this effect would be replicable. The weight of the results suggests 
that the manipulation of visual field had no effect on category-identity judgements. 
The 
absence of laterality effects on this task is consistent with some similar work on 
letter 
identity judgements. No advantage has been found in presenting letter-pairs in either the 
left or right visual-field in facilitating letter-identity judgements: 
judging whether two 
presented letters have the same name (Boles, 1981; 
Boles & Eveland, 1983). Boles & 
Eveland (1983) claim from this and other evidence that the processes involved in making 
letter identity judgements does not require access to the names of a letter but instead in- 
volves the generation of visual representations. 
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This study does show that the effects found in experiment one in the simultaneous con- 
dition can be replicated. In the current experiment however, responses tended on average 
to be faster, without any corresponding accuracy loss. This may be because all presenta- 
tions were simultaneous, and therefore, unlike experiment one, the expectancy of when 
to make a response was predictable. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, a significant ef- 
fect for position in category was found with A-A pairs. In experiment one, with simulta- 
neous presentation, the effect was not significant, non-boundary A-A pairs were faster 
only by 10 ms. This difference may be explained by differences in stimulus duration be- 
tween the two tasks. The brevity of the stimulus presentations in this experiment meant 
that responses tended to be made after the stimulus-offset whereas in experiment one, 
responses tended to be made when the stimuli were present on-screen. The task, then, 
may become more of a comparison of the representation of two colour-pairs in memory 
rather than making a judgement on the basis of the available visual percept. This differ- 
ence may have increased the tendency to use category codes in judging physically identi- 
cal colour-pairs. 
In summary, the notion that verbal representations are involved in determining category 
identity judgements is not supported by this particular task. However, it may be possible 
that perceptual category codes may be available when judgements can be made rapidly 
after stimuli are presented, but, with longer inter-stimulus intervals verbal coding may be 
required to represent colour categories. The next experiment in this chapter is another 
attempt to find evidence of verbal coding in a category-identity judgement paradigm. It 
uses successive colour-pair presentations, with a 5000 ms delay between colour-pairs in 
order to promote verbal coding of stimuli. 
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3.4. Experiment Five 
Effect of Interference on Category-Identity Judgements 
3.4.1. Introduction 
Roberson and Davidoff (2000) claim colour categories are verbally, rather than perceptu- 
ally coded because CP is affected by verbal interference but not by visual-interference. 
The current experiment uses a similar interference paradigm to investigate if category 
codes are verbally represented in a delayed category-identity judgement task. There was a 
primary task and two types of secondary (interference) tasks. The primary task required 
category-identity judgements of sequentially presented colour-pairs separated by a 5000 
ms delay (inter-stimulus interval). This primary task was performed in three interference 
conditions: no-interference, verbal-interference and visual-interference. The difference 
between the conditions was in the secondary task performed over part of the delay. In 
the no-interference condition, there was no secondary task. The no-interference condi- 
tion thus serves as a baseline for the other interference conditions. In the verbal- 
interference condition, the secondary task was a rhyming task. Pairs of words were pre- 
sented sequentially during the delay; the task was to decide if the presented words 
rhymed. In the visual-interference condition, the secondary task was a shape judgements 
task. Pairs of shapes rather than words were presented and the task was to decide if the 
first shape of the pair was able to fit inside the second. 
The purpose of the verbal-interference task was to interfere with any verbal code of the 
memory colour (the first colour of the pair). There are a number of ways in which this 
could be done e. g. articulatory suppression (see Baddeley, 1991). However, in most ex- 
periments investigating working memory, the memory load of the primary task usually 
consists of a set of items. In the current task, the set size is only a single item, one colour. 
It is likely that a more difficult verbal task than simple articulatory suppression is required 
to have any detectable interference. The rhyme judgement task also had the advantage of 
requiring no overt verbal responding and allowing performance to be recorded on the 
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secondary task. All rhyming word-pairs presented were orthographically dissimilar e. g. 
"yacht" and "ploti3. 
If colour category codes are represented verbally, verbal-interference should affect colour 
category-identity judgements more than visual-interference. Conversely, if category iden- 
tity judgements are made on the basis of a visual (perceptual) category code, visual inter- 
ference should have a greater effect on category-identity judgements than verbal interfer- 
ence. If the physical characteristics of the stimuli are represented by a visual code, ad- 
vantages in judging the category-identity of A-A pairs over A-a pairs in the no- 
interference or verbal-interference condition should be reduced with visual-interference. 
That is, visual interference should affect judgements of A-A pairs more than A-a pairs. 
As the physical code decays faster than the category code (see experiment one), visual 
interference should affect the physical code more than the category code even if the 
category code is also visually represented4. 
Predictions 
In summery of the preceding considerations, the following predictions were addressed in 
each of the three interference conditions. 
P1. No-interference: performance on the primary task should be similar to the performance 
observed in experiment one in the 5000 ms delay condition. That is, for A-A and 
A-a pairs, no advantage for either of these pairs should be found in RT . 
Accu- 
racy should be significantly greater for A-A pairs compared to A-a pairs. Judge- 
ments of non-boundary pairs should be faster than for boundary pairs. Judge- 
ments for 1-step A-a pairs should be faster than for 2-step A-a pairs. 
3 Brown (1987) claims that an explicit phonological strategy is required in judging rhyming in orthographically dissimi- 
lar words. When rhyming word-pairs are composed of similar letters, rhyming could be decided on the basis of com- 
paring the common letters across the words e. g. "house" and "mouse". Therefore, deciding rhyming in the former 
word-pair type is likely to load more heavily on verbal processing resources. 
4 If colour category codes, are visually represented, there must be differences in the nature of the visual representation 
that account for the greater durability of the category code than the physical code with elapsed time. For instance, it 
may be that the category code is represented as a category prototype and that this representation has an advantage in 
short-term visual memory. 
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P2. Verbal category codes if category codes are verbally represented, verbal-interference 
should have a greater effect on category-identity judgements than visual- 
interference. 
P2a. verbal-interference should interfere more with judgements of colour-pairs less ad- 
vantaged by their physical discriminability i. e. A-a pairs compared to A-A pairs; 
2-step compared to 1-step A-a pairs; 1-step compared to 2-step A-B pairs. For 
such colour-pairs, the reliance on the category code as a basis for determining 
category identity is greater. 
P3. Visual category coder. if category codes are visually represented, visual-interference 
should have a greater effect on category-identity judgements than verbal- 
interference. 
P3a if the physical code is visual, advantages for A-A pairs over A-a pairs should be lost 
with visual-interference because the trace of the physical code is more vulnerable 
than the category code. 
3.3.2. Method 
Participants 
Fifteen participants (11 female, 4 male) aged 18-40, performed the task. All were students 
from the University of Surrey. Some received a course credit. 
Stimuli 
The same stimuli used in experiment four were used. Only a subset of the stimulus-pairs 
used in this experiment was presented. This subset consisted of all A-A pairs and all 1- 
step and 2-step A-a and A- B pairs (see table 3.11. ). The reduction in the different num- 
ber of pairs was done to reduce the number of trials. The average trial duration was 
greater in the current experiment than in experiment four. 
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Table 3.11. Stimulus conditions in experiment five. 
Within-category stimulus pairs: Cross-category 
require the response "same" 
A-A A-a 
0-step 1-step 2-step 
1-1 1-2: 2-1 1-3: 3-1 
2-2 2-3: 3-2 4-6: 6-4 
3-3 4-5: 5-4 
4-4 5-6: 6-5 
5-5 
6-6 
Procedure 
stimulus pairs: re- 
quire the response 
"different" 
A-B 
1-step 2-step 
3-4: 4: 3 2-4: 4: 2 
3-5: 5: 3 
The primary task was judging category-identity of successively presented colour-pairs. 
The inter-stimulus interval between colours was 5000 ms. The first colour, the memory 
colour, was presented for 1000 ms. The second colour, the test colour, was also pre- 
sented for 1000 ms or until a response was made, depending on which occurred sooner. 
Responses were made by a mouse button press (left, same; right, different). Participants 
were instructed to respond quickly but without compromising accuracy. RT was meas- 
ured from test colour onset until a response was made. 
Trials were given in one of the three interference conditions: no-interference, verbal- 
interference and visual-interference. Each colour-pair was presented with equal frequency 
in each of the three conditions. Participants were not aware of the interference condition 
before each trial. In the no-interference condition participants were presented with a 
neutral grey screen for the interval duration. In the verbal and visual-interference condi- 
tions, participants had to make responses to visually presented stimuli on-screen. The 
stimuli used for the verbal-interference task consisted of successively presented word- 
pairs (see appendix two). Words were presented in upper-case letters (Arial, font size 38). 
On each verbal-interference trial, the first word of each pair was presented 300 ms after 
the offset of the memory stimulus, and remained for a duration of 1500 ms. The offset 
102 
of this stimulus was followed by a blank 1000 ms interval. The second word of the pair 
was then presented for 1500 ms. Participants were required to decide if the word-pairs 
rhymed. Participants had to respond before the offset of the second word; responses 
made after this were recorded as misses. Responses to both tasks where made by press- 
ing an arrow cursor key on the computer keyboard (left, positive response; right, negative 
response). A positive response was required for rhyming pairs, a negative response for 
non-rhyming pairs. RT on the secondary task was measured from onset of the second 
stimulus to response. 
The stimuli for the visual-interference task consisted of successively presented shapes. 
All shape-pairs were two-dimensional outline drawings (see fig. 3.1. for an example). The 
shapes in each pair were always physically different from one another. The task was to 
decide if the first shape could, in any rotation, fit (slot) inside the second shape. The se- 
quence of stimulus presentation for the visual-interference condition was identical to the 
verbal-interference condition, in duration of stimuli, interval between stimuli and type of 
response made. A positive response was required for shape pairs when the first shape 
would fit, a negative response when it would not. After presentation of the second word 
or shape stimulus, there was a 700 ms unfilled interval, before the presentation of the test 
colour. 
Fig. 3.1 Example of a shape-pair trial in the visual-interference task. On this trial, a posi- 
tive response is required. The first shape (A, left) fits inside the second shape (B, right). 
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In both the verbal and the visual interference condition, on the secondary task half the 
trials required a positive response, half a negative response. No word or shape pair was 
presented twice. The allocation of word or shape-pairs to particular colour-pairs was 
done randomly. The overall sequence of presentations of all the stimuli in the task in the 
three interference conditions is illustrated in fig. 3.2. Responses on the rhyme and shape 
judgement task had to be made as quickly as possible, without compromising accuracy. 
There were 216 experimental trials, given in blocks of 36. The option of a short break 
between blocks was given. 
A 
1000 ms 
VISUAL INTERFERENCE CONDITION 
1500 irks 1500 ms 
SHAPE .ý ShýAPE 8 
.> 1000 ms 
5000 ms 
NO INTERFERENCE CONDITION 
1000 ms 
WORD A. WOR© 1 
1500 rns 1500 ms 
VERBAL INTERFERENCE CONDITION 
STIMULUS 
X 
1000 ms 
Fig. 3.2. Schematic depiction of the sequence of stimulus presentations in experiment 
five. 
Before performing the experimental trials, participants were given practice trials. Initial 
practise trials familiarised participants with the three different tasks in the experiment: 
the rhyme judgements task, the shape judgements task and the colour category-identity 
judgement task. In these initial practise trials, participants were consecutively given ten 
word-pairs and ten shape-pairs and required to make the appropriate judgement with 
each pair. Auditory feedback was given to indicate any errors. Participants were then 
consecutively presented with twenty colour-pairs and required to make category-identity 
judgements of each. After completing this, further practice trials equivalent to experi- 
mental trials were given. These consisted of ten trials of the category-identity judgement 
task in each of the three interference conditions. Again, auditory feedback was given to 
indicate errors on the task. Feedback was not given in the experimental trials. All word 
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and shape-pairs used in the practice trials were different to those used in the experimen- 
tal trials. 
3.4.3. Results 
Analyses of primary task performance are reported first. As participants were asked to 
respond based on speed and accuracy, RT and accuracy are reported as separate per- 
formance measures. All reported ANOVAs are two-way with both factors as repeated 
measured. In all cases, the two factors are pair-type and interference. Pair-type has two 
levels (e. g. A-A, A-a) and interference three levels (no-interference, verbal-interference, 
visual-interference). Analysis of each pair-type is reported under separate sub-headings; 
the two levels in the pair-type factor are specified for each ANOVA. All reported post- 
hoc tests are protected t-tests. Performance on the two interference tasks and analysis of 
the relationship between performance on these tasks and the primary task is given in a 
later sub-section. These analyses describe secondary task performance and look at pri- 
mary task performance when performance on secondary tasks is taken into account. 
RT 
For each participant, a median RT score for correct trials was calculated for each pair- 
type separately for each interference condition. All reported mean RTs are across- 
participant means of the participant's median RT scores. 
Physical identi y 
Mean RT for A-A and A-a pairs are given in table 3.12. There was no significant effect of 
pair-type (F[1,14] = 2.9, p > 0.05), or interference (F[2,28] = 2.28, p > 0.05). The pair- 
type x interference interaction was not significant (F[2,28] = 1.22, p>0.05). The RT 
data, therefore, supports prediction P1: no significant advantage is found in RT for 
physical identity when making category-identity judgements with colours separated by a 
5000 ms inter-stimulus interval. 
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Table 3.12. Mean RT (s. d. ) for A-A and A-a pairs. 
Interference Type 
No pýý Verbal Visual ýýý Mean 
Interference interference Interference 
A-A 978.93 932.83 963.43 958.40 
(202.71) (274.41) (244.96) (240.69) 
A-a 1054.27 995.40 965.93 1005.20 
(285.64) (361.72) (255.30) (300.89) 
Mean 1016.60 964.12 964.68 
(244.18) (318.07) (250.13) 
Perceptual distance 
Mean RT for 1 and 2-step A-a pairs in each interference condition are given in table 3.13. 
Judgements of 1-step pairs were significantly faster than of 2-step pairs (F[1,13] = 4.93, p 
< 0.05). No effect of interference was found (F[2,26] = 0.76, p > 0.05) and no interac- 
tion (F[2,26] = 1.38, p > 0.05). 
Table 3.13 Mean RT (s. d. ) for 1 and 2-step A-a pairs. 
Interference Type 
No Verbal Visual Mean 
Interference interference interference 
1-step 1055.23 981.00 956.47 997.57 
(302.99) (356.25) (267.31) (308.85) 
2-step 1031.36 1240.50 1015.50 1095.79 
(205.60) (956.18) (306.36) (489.38) 
Mean 1043.30 1110.75 985.99 
(254.30) (656.22) (286.84) 
Mean RT for 1 and 2-step A-B pairs are given in table 3.14. There was no effect of step- 
size (F[1,12] = 0.66, p > 0.05), but an effect of interference was found (F[2,24] = 
5.68, p 
< 0.05). Post-hoc testing of this showed that compared to the no-interference condition, 
RT in the verbal and visual interference condition was significantly faster. Judgements of 
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A-B pairs overall then, were significantly faster in the verbal and visual interference con- 
ditions than the no interference condition. However, there was no significant difference 
between the verbal and visual interference conditions. The interaction between the fac- 
tors was not significant (F[2,24] = 0.91, p > 0.05). 
Table 3.14 Mean RT (s. d. ) for 1 and 2-step A-B pairs. 
Interference Type 
No Verbal Visual Mean 
interference interference interference 
1-step mm 1569.83 1251.27 1141.73 1320.94 
(825.15) (474.02) (225.90) (508.36) 
2-step 1269.47 1216.50 1189.57 1225.18 
(345.80) (398.99) (352.07) (365.62) 
Mean 1419.65 1233.89 1165.65 
(585.48) (436.51) (288.99) 
Position in category 
Means for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs are given in table 3.15. Non-boundary 
A-A pairs were identified as same faster than boundary A-A pairs (F[1,14] = 13.77, p< 
0.01). There was no significant effect of interference (F[2,28] = 0.60, p>0.05), and no 
interaction (F[2,28] = 0.20, p > 0.05). 
Table 3.15 Mean RT (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs. 
Interference Type 
Mean No Verbal Visual___ 
interference interference interference 
Boundary 1104.23 1078.87 1167.83 1116.98 
(241.13) (506.80) (459.60) (402.51) 
Non-boundary 941.40 871.40 925.97 912.92 
(227.56) (266.29) (256.27) (250.04) 
Mean 1022.82 975.14 1046.90 
(234.35) (386.55) (357.94) 
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Means for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs are given in table 3.16. For these pairs, 
the effect of position in category was not significant (F[1,14] = 0.28, p>0.05). There 
was a main effect of interference (F[2,28] = 8.91, p < 0.001) and the pair-type x interfer- 
ence interaction approached significance (F[2,28] = 3.31, p=0.051). This interaction 
seems to be due to the direction of the position in category effect with visual and verbal 
interference. With visual interference, judgements for non-boundary pairs are slower 
than for boundary pairs. With verbal interference, this effect is reversed. 
Table 3.16. Mean RT (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs. 
Interference Type 
No Verbal Visual Mean 
interference Interference interference 
Boundary 1112.03 1028.30 915.17 1018.50 
(365.61) (354.83) (183.33) (301.26) 
Non-boundary 1041.57 948.70 1004.30 998.19 
(330.39) (356.29) (404.35) (363.68) 
Mean 1076.80 988.50 959.74 
(348.00) (355.56) (293.84) 
In summary, few significant differences were found between pairs and conditions in RT. 
Where significant interference effects were found, they were opposite to the predicted 
direction. RTs tended to be faster in the verbal and visual interference condition com- 
pared to the no-interference condition. 
Accuracy 
Physical identity 
Mean accuracy for A-A and A-a pairs in the three interference conditions are given in 
table 3.17. Accuracy for A-A pairs was higher than for A-a pairs (F[1,14] = 9.46, p< 
0.01). There was an effect of interference (F[2,28] = 4.51, p < 0.05). Post-hoc testing 
found the difference between the no-interference and verbal-interference and the differ- 
ence between the no-interference and visual-interference conditions approached signifi- 
cance; there was no significant difference between the verbal and visual interference con- 
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ditions. The pair-type x interference interaction was non-significant (F[2,28] = 0.6 1, p> 
0.05). 
Table 3.17. Mean A' (s. d. ) for A-A and A-a pairs. 
.. ý.. ýa. ý. ý,. ýý. ý. ývý. ý., ý..,... ý.,.. ýý... Interference Type 
No Verbal Visual Mean 
interference interference interference 
A-A 0.92 0.88 0.89 0.90 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
A-a 0.87 0.83 0.82 0.84 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Mean 0.90 0.86 0.86 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) 
Perceptual distance 
Mean accuracy for 1 and 2-step A-a pairs is given in table 3.18. Accuracy was higher for 
1-step compared to 2-step A-a pairs (F[1,14] = 10.02, p<0.01). There was an effect of 
interference that approached significance (F[2,28] = 3.14, p=0.059). There was no sig- 
nificant interaction (F[2,28] = 1.89, p > 0.05). 
Table 3.18. Mean A' (s. d. ) for 1 and 2-step A-a pairs. 
Interference Type 
No Verbale Visual Mean 
Interference interference interference 
1-step 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.86 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
2-step 0.83 0.79 0.75 0.79 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
Mean 0.86 0.82 0.8 
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) 
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Mean accuracy for 1 and 2-step A-B pairs is given in table 3.19. Accuracy for 2-step A-B 
pairs was significantly higher than for 1-step A-B pairs (F[1,14] = 32.34, p<0.0001) 
there was an effect of interference (F[2,28] = 5.01, p<0.05). Post-hoc testing showed 
that the difference between the no-interference and verbal interference condition ap- 
proached significance. Differences between the other interference conditions were not 
significant. The pair-type x interference interaction was not significant (F[2,28] = 0.9 1, p 
> 0.05). 
Table 3.19. Mean A' (s. d. ) for 1 and 2-step A-B pairs. 
Interference Type 
ýýý No Verbal Visual Mean 
interference interference interference 
1-step 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.79 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.15) 
2-step 0.91 0.86 0.87 0.88 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) 
Mean 0.88 0.83 0.81 
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) 
Position in category 
Mean accuracy for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs are given in table 3.20. 
ANOVA found no effect of position in category. Accuracy for non-boundary pairs was 
not significantly higher than for boundary A-a pairs (F[1,14] = 0.00, p>0.05). The ef- 
fect of interference was significant (F[1,15] = 4.89, p<0.05). There was no significant 
pair-type x interference interaction. Post-hoc testing showed that difference in accuracy 
between the no-interference and the verbal and visual interference conditions ap- 
proached significance. There was no significant difference between the verbal and visual 
interference conditions. 
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Table 3.20. Mean A' (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-A pairs. 
Interference Type 
No - Verbal Visual Mean 
interference interference interference 
Boundary 0.92 0.89 0.87 0.89 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) 
Non-boundary 0.92 0.87 0.89 0.89 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
Mean 0.92 0.88 0.88 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) 
Accuracy for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs are given in table 3.21. There was no 
main effect of pair-type (F[1,15] = 1.97, p>0.05) or interference (F[1,15] = 1.19, p> 
0.05). The interaction between the two factors was also non-significant (F[1,15] = 0.10, p 
> 0.05). 
Table 3.21. Mean A' (s. d. ) for boundary and non-boundary A-a pairs. 
Interference Type 
No ýýVerbal ýý ýý Visual ýýýý Mean 
interference interference interference 
Boundary 0.86 0.84 -------- ----------- -- -- - ----------- ---- - 0.83 ------- --- 0.84 
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Non-boundary 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.88 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) 
Mean 0.88 0.86 0.85 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) 
Therefore, while the effect of interference tended to be significant for some pair-types in 
the accuracy data, this was not consistent with any of the predictions. Accuracy did tend 
to be significantly lower in the verbal and visual interference conditions compared to the 
no interference (baseline) condition but there was no indication for any pair-type that 
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either verbal or visual interference had a selectively greater effect on accuracy than the 
other. 
Interference task performance 
Median correct RT scores on each secondary task were produced for each participant. 
The across-participant mean of these median RTs was 927.20 (155.78) for the rhyme 
judgement task and 982.13 (163.17) for the shape judgement task. Accuracy on the inter- 
ference tasks was calculated by summing the frequency of hits (correct response to posi- 
tive trials) with the frequency of correct rejections (correct response to negative trials). 
This value was then expressed as a proportion of the total number of trials in the inter- 
ference condition. From this, for the rhyming task, a mean accuracy of 84.63 (10.76) was 
obtained; for the shape judgements task, a mean accuracy of 73.43 (15.81) was obtained. 
The majority of errors on both the tasks were not due to incorrect judgements but fail- 
ures to respond in the allotted time. Therefore, the level of accuracy on these tasks shows 
that participants were generally attending to the interference tasks. 
It is possible that the failure to find differential effects of verbal and visual-interference 
could be because participants were differentially attending to the interference tasks. Two 
re-analyses of the primary task were performed, taking into account the performance on 
the interference to find if any such trade-off had masked any differential effect of the 
tasks in the verbal and visual interference conditions. Firstly, an ANCOVA (pair-type x 
interference) was performed using RT on the interference tasks as a covariate. Secondly, 
ANOVAs were performed on the participant scores for the primary task only to include 
trials were the interference task was performed correctly. Both these re-analyses were 
done only for the comparison between same pairs, i. e. between A-A and A-a pairs. The 
reanalysis was performed on both the RT and accuracy measures of the primary task. For 
none of these re-analyses was there a significant change in the result, therefore, neither 
re-analysis with either performance measure on the primary task indicated any differential 
effects of verbal and visual interference in judging category-identity. 
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3.4.4. Discussion 
The first prediction (P1) was largely supported. In the baseline condition (no- 
interference), judgements of physically identical pairs were more accurate than judge- 
ments of non-identical pairs. Judgements of 1-step A-a pairs were faster and more accu- 
rate than of 2-step A-a pairs. An effect of position in category was found for A-A pairs 
but not for A-a pairs. For A-A pairs, judgements of non-boundary pairs were faster than 
judgements of boundary pairs. 
No support was obtained for either prediction P2 or P3. There was no selective effect of 
verbal or visual-interference on colour category-identity judgements for either RT or ac- 
curacy. RTs on the category identity judgement task tended to be lower in the verbal and 
the visual-interference condition compared to the baseline no-interference condition, 
although this effect was only significant for some pair-types. This suggests that the inter- 
ference tasks were facilitating the speed with which responses were being made. A possi- 
ble explanation is that the offset of the word or shape stimulus acted as a timing cue for 
the onset of the test colour. Relative to the no-interference condition, category-identity 
judgements became poorer for most pair-types in the verbal and visual-interference con- 
ditions. There was no indication of a selective effect, relative to the no-interference con- 
dition, of either verbal or visual-interference on overall performance for any pair-type 
that would be consistent with prediction P2 or P3. Therefore, neither interference task 
seemed to have any selective effect on either physical or category coding of the memory 
stimulus. This means that neither a verbal nor a visual (perceptual) model of category 
coding is supported by the current experiment. The difference between the verbal and 
visual-interference conditions and the no-interference condition on the accuracy of cate- 
gory-identity judgements seems to be a general effect of performing a secondary task 
compared to not having such a task, and did not seem to be related to specific demands 
of the task. 
Posner et al. (1969) shows that internal visual codes can be generated from a verbal 
stimulus. It may be that verbal colour codes can be generated on the basis of the physical 
code. This may mean that in the verbal interference condition, a verbal colour code of 
the memory colour may still be available when the test colour is presented. A difficulty 
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with this interpretation is that it would still predict some loss of the categorical code. The 
verbal code would need to be generated after the verbal-interference was presented. Mis- 
naming of the memory colour, especially for colours near the boundary, should therefore 
be more likely than in the visual-interference condition if this was the case. 
In summary the results of the current experiment concur with experiment four in being 
inconsistent with verbal codes being involved in representing colour categories, at least in 
tasks where explicit judgements of category identity are required. 
3.5. Experiment Six 
Effect of Interference on Discrimination: 2A-FC Task 
3.5.1. Introduction 
This experiment looks at category codes in CP using the same interference paradigm as 
experiment five. The aim was to test the claim of Roberson and Davidoff (2000) that CP 
is the result of verbal labelling of stimuli. To recap, Roberson and Davidoff used a de- 
layed colour discrimination task (two-alternative forced-choice; hereafter, 2A-FC), given 
in three conditions: no interference, verbal interference and visual interference. No inter- 
ference consisted of the 2A-FC task with just a blank screen being inserted between 
presentation of the memory and test colours. Verbal interference consisted, of requiring 
participants to read a list of words. Visual interference consisted of visually tracking a 
coloured line. Therefore, neither task required a response. In the no-interference condi- 
tion, CP was found: discrimination was more accurate across a category boundary, com- 
pared to within categories. With visual interference, overall accuracy was lower than the 
no-interference condition but CP was still present. In the verbal interference condition, 
overall accuracy was also affected but the effect was selectively greater for cross-category 
pairs. 
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However, there is a possible artefact in their design due to their choice of interference 
tasks. The selective effect of verbal-interference on CP could be because the verbal inter- 
ference task was more difficult than the visual-interference task, not because it interfered 
with verbal labelling. Consistent with this possibility is the finding that visual-interference 
had a noticeably lesser overall effect on accuracy than verbal-interference. Because no 
measure of performance was made on the secondary tasks it is possible that participants 
may have given less attention to the visual-interference task. The verbal interference task 
required participants to speak out loud while the visual interference task did not require 
an overt response. This factor may have meant that participants attended less to the vis- 
ual interference task compared to the verbal interference task. It is possible, then, that 
the effect of verbal interference on CP was not because verbal interference affected vis- 
ual coding of the stimuli. Rather, it may have been because the particular verbal interfer- 
ence task was either more difficult than the visual interference task or was given more 
attention by participants than the visual interference task. Neither of these alternative 
explanations of the Roberson and Davidoff result can be discounted. 
In the current experiment, a partial replication of Roberson and Davidoff is performed. 
As in Roberson and Davidoff, a 2A-FC colour discrimination task is given in three con- 
ditions: no-interference; verbal-interference and visual-interference. Rather than the tasks 
used in Roberson and Davidoff, the verbal and visual interference tasks in experiment 
five are used. These tasks are more similar to each other than those of Roberson and 
Davidoff, they should thus be more equally demanding of attention. Furthermore, both 
interference tasks require a response, meaning that performance can be measured. This 
means that the effect of the type of interference can be examined relatively independently 
from the performance on the interference tasks themselves. 
A replication of the same effect of verbal-interference with these different types of inter- 
ference task would strengthen Roberson and Davidoff's claim about verbal coding and 
CP. However, experiment five found no effect of verbal interference on judging category 
identity. Therefore, if a selective effect of verbal-interference on CP is found, it would 
also suggest that the category code responsible for CP is different to the code involved in 
judging category identity. 
115 
Predictions 
P1. No-interference condition: CP should be found in the no-interference condition i. e. dis- 
crimination of A-B pairs should be better than discrimination of A-a pairs. 
P2. Verbal category coding. if CP is the result of verbal codes (Roberson & Davidoff, 2000), 
verbal interference should reduce CP. That is, in the verbal-interference condi- 
tion, relative to the no-interference condition, there should be selective interfer- 
ence on any advantage for A-B pairs over A-a pairs. 
P3. Visual category coding. If category coding in CP is perceptual (e. g. Bornstein, 1987), vis- 
ual-interference should have a selective effect on any advantage for A-B pairs 
over A-a pairs. 
3.5.2. Method 
Participants 
Twenty-eight participants (3 male, 25 female; age range 18-26) performed the task. All 
were students at the University of Surrey; some received a course credit for participation. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of 16 stimuli of constant chroma (Munsell 7.4) and combinations 
of four Munsell hues and values. Hues were 1.44 B; 8.76 BG, 6.06 BG or 4.04 BG. Val- 
ues were 5.40,5.80,6.20 or 6.60. The matrix of stimuli is shown schematically in table 
3.3. All horizontal adjacent stimuli had a perceptual distance of nine units in CIELUV5. 
Vertically adjacent stimuli differed in four units in CIELUV (see appendix one for a de- 
scription of the CIELUV and Munsell systems). Pilot data on the naming of these 16 
colours showed that English speakers named all stimuli of 1.44 B and 8.76 BG as "blue" 
at all lightness levels and named all stimuli of 6.06 BG and 3.46 BG as "green". There- 
fore, the blue-green category boundary was between Munsell hue 8.76 BG and 6.06 BG 
at all the different Munsell values. All stimulus-pairs used in the experiment were hori- 
zontally adjacent in the matrix. The matrix arrangement, gave more cross-category colour 
5 Although adjacent stimuli were equidistant in CIELUV, they were not exactly equidistant in Munsell. 
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pairs, without having both one and 2-step pairs6 and without needing to present the same 
stimulus repeatedly across trials, unlike experiment two where the stimulus set was com- 
posed of only six colours. A-a pairs consisted of stimulus pair 1.44 B-8.76 B or 6.06 B- 
3.46 BG. A-B pairs consisted of stimulus pair 8.76 B-6.06 B. There were therefore 
twelve stimulus pairs: eight A-a pairs and four A-B pairs. Discrimination of these pairs 
had been shown to produce CP. Pilot data found that discrimination for the A-B pairs in 
this set was reliably better than discrimination of the A-a pairs. 
1.44 B 8.76 BG 6.06 BG 3.46 BG 
BBGG6.60/7.40 
BBGG6.20l7.40 
BBGG5.80/7.40 
BBGG5.40/7.40 
Figure 3.3. Schematic representation of the matrix of 16 stimuli showing Munsell hue 
(horizontal axis) and value (vertical axis). 
Procedure 
The primary task was a 2AFC discrimination task. On a trial, a colour from one of the 
stimulus-pairs (the memory stimulus) was presented for 1000 ms. Each stimulus of each 
colour-pairs was presented as the memory stimulus with equal 
frequency. The memory 
stimulus had to be remembered for an interval of 5000 ms which 
began after the offset 
of the memory stimulus. After the interval, two colours were presented: one the same as 
the memory stimulus, the other a distractor (the other stimulus in the pair with the mem- 
6 Experiment two indicated that CP effects are only found when comparing colours that are perceptually close. Unlike 
experiment two, the stimulus pairs 
in the current stimulus set are all perceptually equidistant. 
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ory stimulus). These were presented for an interval of 1000 ms or until a response was 
made, whichever occurred earlier. The task was to decide which of the two colours was 
the same as the memory stimulus. 
Stimuli at the test stage were presented 3 mm apart, in a horizontal arrangement. Alloca- 
tion of the position of the memory and distractor stimulus at the test stage was balanced 
so that the memory stimulus appeared in the left and right position with equal frequency. 
Response was by a mouse button press (left, right), corresponding to the position of the 
memory colour. As in Roberson and Davidoff, participants were instructed to respond 
based on accuracy alone. 
Participants were given 216 trials divided into six equal blocks with the option of a short 
break between each block. Within a block, all trials were in the same interference condi- 
tion. Two blocks of each interference condition were given in a random order for each 
participant. Each colour-pair were presented with equal frequency in each interference 
condition. The interference conditions was the same as experiment five. Fig. 3.4. shows a 
schematic depiction of the order of events on a trial in experiment six in each of these 
conditions. All word and shape-pairs used as stimuli in the secondary tasks were the same 
as experiment five. As in Roberson and Davidoff's study, all trials within each block were 
in the same interference condition. The order of these blocks was randomised for each 
participant. Participants were informed which interference condition was to be given be- 
fore a block commenced. 
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Fig. 3.4. Schematic depiction of a trial in experiment six. 
Practice trials were given before the experimental trials. Initial practice trials familiarised 
participants with the three different aspects of the experiment performed in isolation, the 
rhyme judgements task, the shape judgements task and the 2AFC colour discrimination 
task. Then 20 2AFC colour discrimination trials were given without any interference task. 
Further practise trials were then given: 10 trials of the 2AFC task in each of the three in- 
terference conditions. Auditory feedback was given throughout the practice trials indi- 
cating errors. 
3.5.3. Results 
Results were analysed by two-way ANOVA. Post-hoc comparisons were done by pro- 
tected t-tests. Mean accuracy for A-a and A-B pairs in the three interference conditions 
are given in fig. 3.5. Pair-type (A-a, A-B) was compared against interference (no- 
interference, verbal-interference, visual-interference), both as repeated measures factors. 
Both main effects were significant. Accuracy, overall, was higher for A-B pairs than for 
A-a pairs (F[1,27] = 6.40, p<0.05). There was a significant effect of interference (F[2, 
54] = 17.16, p<0.0001). The pair-type x interference interaction was also significant 
(F[2,54] = 3.47, p<0.05). Post-hoc testing found that accuracy was worse in both the 
verbal and visual interference conditions relative to the no interference condition. 
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Fig. 3.5. Mean accuracy (+/- 1 S. E. ) for A-a and A-B pairs. 
Post-hoc testing of the interaction found that there was an advantage for A-B pairs over 
A-a pairs in the no-interference condition (t[26] = 3.16, p<0.01) and in the visual- 
interference condition (t[26] = 2.82, p<0.01). In the verbal-interference condition, no 
advantage was found for A-B pairs over A-a pairs (t[26] = 0.23, p>0.05). The advantage 
for A-B pairs over A-a pairs differed significantly between the no-interference and verbal 
interference conditions (1[25] = 3.38, p<0.01), and between the visual and verbal inter- 
ference conditions (t[25] = 3.05, p<0.01), but not between the no-interference and vis- 
ual-interference conditions (425] = 0.34, p > 0.05). 
For A-B pairs alone, compared to the no-interference condition accuracy was signifi- 
cantly lower in both the verbal-interference (t[25] = 5.70, p<0.0001) and visual- 
interference (t[25] = 3.72, p<0.001) conditions. Difference in accuracy for A-B pairs 
between the verbal and visual-interference conditions, approached significance (425] = 
1.98, p =0.059). For A-a pairs alone, compared to the no-interference condition accuracy 
was significantly lower in both the verbal-interference (425] = 2.32, p<0.05), and visual- 
interference (t[25] = 3.39, p<0.01) conditions. The difference in accuracy for A-a pairs 
120 
No Verbal Visual 
interference interference interference 
between the verbal and visual-interference conditions was not significant (t[25] = 1.67, p 
> 0.05). 
To summarise, in the no-interference condition A-B pairs were discriminated signifi- 
cantly better than A-a pairs, thus supporting prediction P1. The interaction between pair- 
type and interference condition was mainly due to the effect of verbal-interference on 
discrimination of A-B pairs relative to its effect on discrimination of A-a pairs. Visual- 
interference had an approximately equal effect in reducing the accuracy of discriminating 
both A-a and A-B pairs. Therefore prediction P2 (verbal coding) was supported; no sup- 
port was given to prediction P3 (visual coding). 
Although verbal-interference had more effect on CP than visual-interference, it is possi- 
ble that this was a result of participants attending more to the rhyme task than the shape 
task. In the same manner described for experiment five, two further analyses were per- 
formed to test if this was the case. Firstly, a two-way ANCOVA using median RT on the 
secondary task as a covariate was performed. Secondly, an ANOVA compared only trials 
where the secondary task was performed accurately in the verbal and visual-interference 
conditions. Neither re-analyses had any effect on the overall pattern of results. Therefore, 
this suggests that the effect of verbal-interference on CP was not an effect of task diffi- 
culty or of participants differently attending to the two secondary tasks. 
Secondary task performance 
RT and accuracy scores on the thyme and shape judgement tasks were calculated the 
same as described in experiment six. For the rhyme task, the across-participant median 
RT was 890.43 (154.27), and mean accuracy was 84.23% (12.13). For the shape task, the 
across-participant median RT was 919.61 (155.86) and mean accuracy was 75.40% 
(15.23). 
3.5.4. Discussion 
Consistent with the prediction that CP would occur in the no-interference condition 
(P1), accuracy for A-B pairs was significantly higher than for A-a pairs in this condition. 
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Prediction P2 stated that verbal-interference would have a significant effect on CP This 
was supported. Verbal-interference, had a significant effect on discrimination of both 
pair-types compared to the no-interference condition, but had a proportionately greater 
effect on A-B pairs. Prediction P3 was that visual interference would have a significant 
effect on CP. There was no support for this claim. In the visual-interference condition, 
while overall accuracy was lower than the no-interference condition, the advantage for A- 
B pairs over A-a pairs was still about the same. Visual-interference had an approximately 
the same effect on the ability to discriminate A-a pairs as A-B pairs. Further re-analyses 
suggested that the effect of verbal-interference did not seem to be related performance 
on the interference tasks themselves. The same effect of verbal interference was found 
relative to the visual interference condition even with performance on the interference 
tasks themselves was taken into account. Therefore, it is possible to dismiss possible al- 
ternative explanations of the effect of verbal-interference on CP such as task difficulty or 
unequal attention being given on the secondary tasks. 
The experiment then, favours a verbal coding account of category coding (CP) in dis- 
crimination, rather than a visual coding account. It supports Roberson and Davidoff 
claim that CP, in 2A-FC discrimination tasks at least, are effects of stimulus labelling 
rather than the result of perceptual category coding or of perceptual warping existing 
across category boundaries. 
3.6. Experiment Seven 
Effect of Interference on Discrimination: Same-Different Judgements 
3.6.1. Introduction 
The previous experiment supports Roberson and Davidoff s assertion that CP is a `direct' 
language effect. However, the effect of verbal interference in the last experiment could 
actually be an artefact of the method. A 2A-FC task may in some way invite stimulus 
naming. Using the same stimulus set as the previous experiment, 
Özgen (unpublished 
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data) found that verbal-interference had no effect on CP in same-different colour dis- 
crimination judgements. The verbal-interference task, in this case a `Sternberg-type' 
memory search task (presentation of several memory items followed by a probe item) 
had an overall effect on accuracy but, like visual interference in the last experiment, its 
effect was the same for both A-a and A-B pairs. Therefore it might be the case that there 
are some important differences in CP in these two tasks. It has been found that 2AFC 
and same different (S-D) paradigms are not equivalent in their assessment of dis- 
criminability. Hautus and Lee (1998) compared 2AFC and S-D (as well as two other psy- 
chophysical methods: matching-to-sample and yes-no procedures). Given an equal num- 
ber of trials, they found that the tasks differed in sensitivity. With events on the threshold 
of discriminability, the 2AFC task was better at estimating discriminability, while with 
more highly discriminable events, the same-different task was better. The differences 
between the tasks in the nature of the judgement required warrant consideration; it could 
explain why the data from Özgen failed to find an effect of verbal interference. In the 
2AFC paradigm, the two test stimuli are presented together, while in the S-D task, only 
one stimulus is ever present at any time; the 2AFC task therefore requires a relative 
judgement to be made and the S-D task an absolute judgement. It is possible that relative 
judgements invite verbal labelling more than absolute judgements. If this is the case, the 
2AFC task may actually invite participants to make verbal contrasts and therefore pro- 
duce verbally biased discriminations. CP on other discrimination tasks where a relative 
judgement is not required, such as an S-D task, may reflect the operation of different 
codes. 
The current experiment, therefore, sought to see if the same effect found in experiment 
six would be found in an S-D discrimination task. Both the same stimuli and the same 
interference tasks as experiment six were used in the current experiment. The predictions 
are the same as those for experiment six. 
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3.6.2. Method 
Participants 
Twenty-eight participants (9 male, 19 female) aged 18-45, were used. All were students at 
the University of Surrey; some received a course credit for participation. None had taken 
part in experiment six. 
Stimuli 
The same stimulus-pairs from the 16 stimuli used in experiment six were used. However, 
because the current experiment was now a S-D discrimination task it was necessary also 
to include physically identical (i. e. A-A) pairs. All 16 A-A pairs were included from the 
set of 16 stimuli. 
Procedure 
Procedure was the same as experiment six except for the primary task now being an S-D 
discrimination task. All durations of all stimuli and inter-stimulus intervals were the same 
as experiment six. Therefore on each experimental trial, the memory stimulus, a colour 
from one of the stimulus pairs was presented for 1000 ms; followed by a 5000 ms delay. 
The test stimulus, the second colour from the pair was presented for 1000 ms, or until a 
response was made. Participants were instructed to decide if the test stimulus was the 
same as the memory stimulus by a mouse-button press (left, same; right, different). As in 
experiment six instructions were given to respond on the basis of accuracy and 216 ex- 
perimental trials were given in six blocks of equal length with the option of a break be- 
tween blocks. All trials within a block were in the same interference condition. Two 
blocks of each interference condition were given with the order of blocks was random- 
ised for each participant. The two stimuli of all `different' pairs, i. e. A-a and A-B pairs, 
were presented equally often as the memory or test stimulus in a condition. All 16 `same' 
(A-A), pairs were presented with equal frequency in each condition. In order to give the 
same ratio of A-a to A-B trials as experiment six, but retain equal frequency of presenta- 
tion of all physically different pairs, it was necessary to have a greater frequency of pres- 
entations of A-A pairs across trials. Therefore, there was a ratio of 3: 2 for experimental 
trials requiring a 'same' and 'different' response in each condition. Participants were in- 
formed which interference condition they would be performing before starting each 
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block. The procedure for the interference tasks was identical to experiment six. Practise 
trials were given for the S-D discrimination task and interference tasks before the main 
experimental trials in the same manner as described in experiment six and seven. 
3.6.3. Results 
As the number of same and different responses was not equal, A-prime (A'), rather than 
a percentage score, was used in calculating accuracy for A-a and A-B pairs. Other than 
this, the analysis followed that of experiment seven. Mean accuracy for A-a and A-B pairs 
in each interference condition are shown in fig. 3.6. 
0.9 
0.8 
a 0.7 - 
0.6 
0.5 
N A-a 
None Verbal Visual 
Interference type 
Fig. 3.6. Mean A' (+/- 1 S. E. ) for A-a and A-B pairs. 
The two factors in the ANOVA were pair-type (A-a, A-B) and interference (no- 
interference, verbal-interference, visual-interference). Both factors were repeated meas- 
ures. Both main effects were significant. Accuracy overall was better for 
A-B pairs than 
A-a pairs (F[1,27] = 6.54, p<0.5) and there was a significant effect of interference (F[2, 
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54] = 3.90, p<0.05). The pair-type x interference interaction was also significant (F[2, 
541 = 3.20, p < 0.05). 
Post-hoc testing showed that accuracy in the verbal and visual-interference conditions 
was significantly lower than in the no-interference conditions. Post-hoc testing also 
showed that accuracy for A-B pairs was higher than for A-a pairs with no-interference 
(t[26] = 3.17, p < 0.01) and with visual-interference (t[26] = 3.77, p < 0.001). With verbal- 
interference, accuracy for A-a and A-B pairs was not significantly different (t[26] = 0.15, 
p<0.05). The difference in the advantage for A-B over A-a pairs was not significant 
between the no-interference and visual-interference conditions (t[26] = 0.15, p>0.05). 
However this was significant between the no-interference and verbal-interference condi- 
tions (t[26] = 3.02, p<0.01) and between the visual-interference and verbal interference 
conditions (t[26] =, p < 0.01). For the A-B pairs, the difference in accuracy between the 
no-interference and the verbal-interference condition was significant (t[25] = 4.27, p< 
0.001), as was the difference between the no-interference and the visual-interference 
condition (t[25] = 2.39 p<0.05). The difference between the verbal and visual- 
interference conditions approached significance (t[25] = 1.88, p=0.072). For the A-a 
pairs, the difference in accuracy between the no-interference and the verbal-interference 
conditions was not significant (t[25] = 1.24, p>0.05). The difference in accuracy be- 
tween no-interference and visual-interference conditions was significant (t[25] = 2.98, p< 
0.01). The difference between the verbal and visual conditions approached significance 
(t[25] = 1.74, p=0.094). Therefore as in experiment six, there was an advantage in dis- 
criminating A-B pairs over A-a pairs in the no-interference condition. This advantage 
was also found in the visual-interference condition, but not in the verbal-interference 
condition. 
As in the previous experiment, two types of data re-analyses were performed to take into 
account performance on the secondary task. Firstly, a two-way ANCOVA, using median 
RT on the secondary task as a covariate was performed; secondly, an ANOVA was per- 
formed on A' scores recomputed to only including trials where the secondary task was 
performed correctly. Neither re-analyses changed the overall pattern of the results. 
Therefore, even when account is taken of performance in the secondary task, the effect 
of verbal interference on CP is still found. 
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Secondary task performance 
RT and accuracy on the secondary task were computed in the same manner as experi- 
ment five. The across participant mean RT was 885.00 (111.53) and 957.39 (150.24), for 
the rhyme and shape judgement task respectively. On the thyme judgement task, accu- 
racy was 86.31% (5.67); on the shape judgement task, accuracy was 75.89% (14.64). 
3.6.4. Discussion 
The same predictions were met using an S-D discrimination task as with using a 2AFC 
task. By comparing figs. 3.5 and 3.6 one can see substantial similarity in the patterns of 
accuracy obtained for A-a and A-B pairs across all interference conditions in the different 
tasks. In the no-interference condition, a CP effect of similar magnitude to the effect 
found in experiment six is found. In the no-interference condition, participants were 
better at rejecting colours from a different colour category as physically different from 
the memory stimulus then they are at rejecting colours from the same category. In the 
verbal-interference condition, this CP effect is lost due to a greater effect of verbal- 
interference on the accuracy of discriminating A-B pairs, relative to the effect on A-a 
pairs. In the visual-interference condition, there was an effect on overall accuracy, but the 
CP effect was still preserved. Discrimination of A-B pairs was still better than discrimi- 
nation of A-a pairs. Therefore, there is no suggestion that verbal coding of category in- 
formation is specific to tasks where relative judgements are required. Furthermore, there 
was no suggestion that the CP effect was perceptually (visually) coded. Like experiment 
six, an explanation of CP as a direct language effect was supported. 
3.7. General Discussion 
Experiments four and five looking at how judgements of category-identity were made 
and found no evidence consistent with language being involved in making judgements 
about the category identity of colours. Here there was no advantage for presenting col- 
ours in the RVF and no specific effect of interference on category-identity judgements. 
However, experiments six and seven found that in discrimination, verbal interference had 
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a selective effect on CP suggesting the stimuli were being labelled with a category name. 
Evidence from both experiments six and seven suggested that CP in discrimination was a 
direct language effect. Together, these experiments suggest that category coding per se is 
not verbal. However, under conditions where discriminations between colours are re- 
quired, verbal labels may draw attention to the categorical properties of colours. This in- 
formation makes judgements of colours straddling category boundaries less difficult then 
judgements where both colours fall in the same category but the perceptual distance be- 
tween colours is the same. When verbal interference is present however, the verbal code 
of the category is lost and advantage in discriminating cross-category colours is also cor- 
respondingly lost. 
Therefore, in order to retain a two-code model of colour cognition, it is necessary to as- 
sume two separate types of category code involved in colour judgements, a verbal cate- 
gory code prominent in discrimination and a non-verbal category code prominent in 
tasks were explicit category judgements are required. If the model is correct, it suggests 
that there is a category code that does not directly give rise to CP. Therefore, by studying 
only CP some aspects of the representation of perceptual categories may not be revealed. 
If a non-verbal category code exists, it most likely does so in the form of a perceptual (i. e. 
visual) code. However, the visual-interference task used in the experiments this chapter, 
had no specific effect on any pair-type suggesting that it was not affecting any specific 
coding process. It may be that the representations of colour and form information have 
some separation in short-term memory. If this were the case, a secondary colour task 
would be required to interfere with visual colour codes. 
The CP observed in delayed discrimination tasks seemed attributable to the effects of 
verbal labelling. It is entirely possible that different mechanisms are responsible for CP in 
tasks involving no short-term memory component. The problem is that it is difficult to 
produce adequate tasks that could interfere with verbal coding in a situation in which 
colours are simultaneously present. If verbal-interference effects are not found, in an ex- 
periment using simultaneously presented colours, it could be because participants are 
`switching' attention between the two tasks. Several reasons could explain why category 
identity judgements may not involve verbal codes; it is possible that judgements of cate- 
gory identity tend to be easier than discrimination judgements. A direct comparison of 
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category identity and discrimination judgements on the same stimuli (A-a) pairs found 
that with a5 sec. delay category identity judgements tend to be more accurate than dis- 
crimination judgements, therefore supporting this explanation; however against this ar- 
gument, with simultaneous presentations the reverse was the case (cf table 2.12. and table 
2.20, chapter two). A different explanation could be made in terms of the fact that dis- 
crimination judgements do not actually require any category judgment at all; therefore 
making any category judgement of stimuli made likely to be strategic. Therefore, dis- 
crimination tasks may lend themselves towards participants using direct labelling strate- 
gies to encode stimuli. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Cross-Language Comparisons on Three Tests of Colour 
Cognition 
4.1. General Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of comparisons between two languages on three colour 
cognition tasks. The aim of these comparisons is to test if colour language differences are 
associated with differences in colour cognition. For each of the three tasks, predictions 
are made consistent with the notion that colour language does affect colour cognition. 
These predictions are not rigid because the open-ended nature of some of the tasks 
means that different strategies can be used. The logic of choice of the tasks was that 
they vary among them in how useful language strategies are in performing the tasks. The 
tasks differ in the degree to which they invite comparisons of stimulus names. The in- 
tent was to find the type of tasks on which languages would be found to differ. This in 
turn should reveal the types of processes in colour cognition that are affected by lan- 
guage. The results of the previous chapter suggest that categorical perception is a mis- 
nomer. It suggested that advantages in discriminating colours from different categories 
are not perceptual but the result of stimulus labelling. However, it is possible that cate- 
gorical perception is found in other sorts of colour judgement. The experiments in this 
chapter test this possibility by comparing two groups with different systems of colour 
language: English and Ndonga. Native speakers of each are tested on three colour cogni- 
tion tasks. Ndonga is a native language of southern Africa. It differs from English in 
having fewer basic colour terms. The colour terms Ndonga possesses represent perceptu- 
ally larger colour regions than English colour categories. This means that colours from 
different basic English categories often fall in the same Ndonga category. 
The tasks used were chosen to differ substantially in the locus of their cognitive load. 
The first of the tasks (colour sorting) is a relatively high-level cognitive task. It involves 
making explicit colour classifications by sorting a large number of colour stimuli into 
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groups on the basis of similarity. The second of the tasks (colour triads) is less highly 
cognitively loaded. Subjective judgements of colour difference were required for indi- 
vidual sets of three colours. The task was to choose the most different of the three col- 
ours. The third task (visual search) was the most perceptual of the three tasks. This re- 
quired speeded search for target colours within a large array of distractors. 
The reason for varying cognitive load was to find where colour-cognition differences 
between English and Ndonga were located. If similar performance between English and 
Ndonga were found across all three tasks it would suggest that colour cognition was 
constrained by universal perceptual processes and was independent of language. If how- 
ever, differences between the two languages were found on any of the tasks, it would 
support linguistic relativity (see § 1.1.3). The important question is where differences 
between languages have their effect. This information can tell us at what level differ- 
ences between languages are operating, on perception or cognition. If differences can 
only be found on highly cognitively loaded tasks (the colour sorting and the colour triads 
task), it would indicate that differences are not perceptual. It would suggest, instead, 
that differences on the three tasks were merely direct language effects. That is, the result 
of verbal labels of stimuli being compared in making judgements of the tasks and differ- 
ences in colour name structure between languages producing differences in performance. 
Such a finding would be consistent with findings from experiments six and seven (see 
previous chapter), which found that CP in colour discrimination was the result of direct 
labelling. If differences between the languages were found across all three tasks, how- 
ever, it would suggest that there was a genuine difference in the perceptual representa- 
tion of colour between the two groups, not just in colour language. Such a finding 
would be consistent with a perceptual warping account of CP. It would imply that, 
through having different numbers of basic colour terms the English and Ndonga had 
acquired differences in their underlying perceptual representation of colour. 
4.1.1. The populations 
Ndonga is an indigenous language of South-West Africa. It is a member of the Bantu 
central-zone N family and is spoken across regions of southern Angola and northern 
Namibia. Ndonga has a different colour naming structure to English. English speakers 
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use eleven BCTs when naming colours (Davies & Corbett, 1995; Berlin & Kay, 1969). 
Ndonga speakers use only a maximum of eight BCT's. There are no basic terms for or- 
ange, pink or purple in Ndonga; the term for brown is of uncertain basic status and the 
separate green and blue terms are recent borrowings (Davies, 2001, forthcoming paper). 
Thus, Ndonga can be placed at stage VI in the Berlin and Kay hierarchy of colour term 
evolution 
The English sample consisted of adults who were all employees or students at the Uni- 
versity of Surrey. Testing of the English sample took place in a laboratory with colours 
illuminated by a MacBeth lamp (CIE illuminant D651). The Ndonga sample were all 
adult monolinguals; none knew more than a few English words. They were living a tra- 
ditional lifestyle in the northern region of Namibia2. The experimenters testing the 
Ndonga sample were first language speakers of Ndonga. All testing took place in the 
participants' villages. Testing was done in natural daylight but avoiding any direct sun- 
light. The Ndonga sample was not screened for colour vision deficits, but the incidence 
of inherited colour vision deficits in Bantu groups is low (about 2% in males; Davies, et 
al., 1998). Testing found no colour vision problems in the English sample. 
4.1.2. The tasks 
Three tasks were constructed to assess possible effects of language on colour cognition: a 
sorting task, an oddity (triads) task and a search task. In addition to this, a colour nam- 
ing task was included. Summary descriptions of the tasks are given below: 
" Colour sorting task: 42 colour tiles had to be sorted into groups based on simi- 
larity. 
CIE D65 is the standardised illuminant intended to represent average daylight. The light has a colour 
temperature of approximately 6500 K. CIE illuminant D65 is recommended for use in all colorimetric 
calculations in which representative daylight is required. 
'The Ndonga make up the largest division of the Owambo tribes; their language bears strong similarities 
to Kwanyama. See Malan, (1995, p. p. 14-34), for a detailed anthropological description of the social struc- 
ture of the Owambo tribes. 
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" Colour oddity task: the colour least similar to the other two (the odd-one-out) 
had to be selected from a set of three colour tiles (triad). Twelve triads were 
used. 
" Colour search task: involved searching for target colours identical to a standard, 
among distractor colours. Two conditions were used, in which the type of dis- 
tractor was manipulated. In one condition, all distractors were from a different 
English colour category to the target. In the other condition, some distractors 
were from the same English category as the target. 
" Colour naming task: colour tiles used in the sorting task were presented one at a 
time in a random order. For each tile, English and Ndonga respondents were 
asked, "What do you call this? " The purpose of this task was twofold. Firstly, to 
check that the current sample's naming was consistent with previous work; sec- 
ondly, to provide detailed data on this sample's naming of the colour stimuli 
used in the sorting and triads task. All colours used in the oddity task were a 
subset of the colours in the sorting tasks so this naming data could be used for 
both tasks. 
As stated earlier, the specific tasks were chosen because they vary in the relative percep- 
tual and cognitive load. Therefore, the tasks varied in their likely vulnerability to top- 
down and bottom-up influences, and in the usefulness of naming strategies. Of the three 
tasks, the sorting task is the most vulnerable to top-down influence and use of naming 
strategies. It would be difficult to perform the sorting task on a purely perceptual basis. 
Stimuli were approximately evenly distributed in perceptual colour space. There were, 
therefore, no obvious perceptual discontinuities to use as a basis for determining divi- 
sions between particular groups of colours. Furthermore, the number of colour groups 
to form in the task is not constrained by the instructions or stimuli. There is a necessary 
trade-off in the task between minimising the number of groups produced while main- 
taining an acceptable level of infra-group similarity. As the size of the groups increase, 
infra-group similarity will decrease. Some extrinsic basis for determining the number of 
groups must be found. One possible extrinsic source would be to group stimuli accord- 
ing to their names, or at least to use naming to resolve competing influences from two 
or more groups. 
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Alternatively, it could be that language has altered perception so that the colour percept 
is itself categorical. Discontinuities in the colour percept would provide perceptual divi- 
sions between the stimuli that could determine group formation. It would, in turn, in- 
fluence the decision about the number of groups to form. Competing influences be- 
tween groups would be reduced because there would be pre-existing discontinuities in 
perceptual space. Language could also influence sorting through prototypes. Groups 
could be formed by identifying the most prototypical stimuli in the set of stimuli to use 
as an anchor point. Colours could then be allocated in the same group as the prototype 
on the basis of some criterion. Language could increase the perceptual salience of proto- 
typical colours where basic terms for those colours exist. Colours perceptually similar to 
the prototype within the criterion would be allocated to the same group as the proto- 
type; colours that are not would be placed in a different group. Colours that are percep- 
tually at different sides of the prototype could be allocated to the same group without 
the loss of infra-group similarity. The only important similarity would be between the 
prototype and the other colours in the same group. If the English and Ndonga employ a 
naming strategy on the task, or if colour perception itself was different between the lan- 
guages, differences should be found on the task. If, however, the task is performed on a 
purely perceptual basis, without recourse to the names of the stimuli, and if colour lan- 
guage had not influenced perception, colour sorting for English and Ndonga should be 
very similar. 
The oddity (triads) task should involve similar abilities to the sorting task in requiring 
judgments of relative similarity between colours3. Like the sorting task, the oddity task 
is also vulnerable to naming strategies, but to a lesser extent. There are two reasons for 
this. Firstly, there are considerably fewer stimulus comparisons to contend with: three 
pair-wise judgements, compared to 861 possible pair-wise judgements for the sorting 
task. Secondly, only a single decision is required from one of three possible choices com- 
One other possible method of extracting judgements of colour difference is to use an analogue scale. The 
triads task gives a nominal measure of colour difference. Responses on the task do not indicate how dif- 
ferent the chosen colour is perceived in relation to other colours in the triad. An analogue scale would give 
an ordinal measure of colour difference and therefore more information per participant. However, it was 
considered that there might be more 
difficulty in carrying out a task that requires an arbitrary response 
with the Ndonga sample. 
The analogue scale also requires each participant to make three judgements for 
each triad, compared to one 
for the oddity task, and therefore takes longer to perform. 
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pared to the large number of possible solutions on the sorting task. Therefore, cognitive 
load is likely to be lower and the perceptual load higher, for the oddity task compared to 
the sorting task. It is conceivable, however, that a naming strategy could be used even 
on this task. Perceptual distances between stimuli in the given triads are similar, making 
it difficult to determine the odd-one-out on the basis of perceptual isolation alone. 
Names for the colours could therefore sometimes be useful in resolving the choice. 
If a naming strategy were being employed, having a different name for one of the tiles in 
the triad would increase the likelihood of that tile being chosen as the odd-one-out. This 
would mean that where patterns of tile naming between two languages on a triad differ, 
the nominally isolated tile in ones own language (the tile with a different name from the 
other two) should be more frequently chosen as the odd-one-out. For instance, given a 
triad of tiles ABC, in one language, tiles B and C have the same name, tile A has a dif- 
ferent name. In a second language tiles A and B have the same name, tile Ca different 
name. If a naming strategy was being used, speakers of the first language should more 
frequently choose tile A, the second tile C. The same would be expected if language had 
affected perception to stretch perceived distances between colours with different 
names. The nominally isolated tile in a language would appear perceptually more distant 
within the triad compared to a language where a different tile or no tile in the triad was 
nominally isolated. Therefore, if perceptual warping has occurred, differences would be 
found between languages regardless of whether a naming strategy is employed or not. 
The search task is probably the most perceptual of the three tasks. Unlike the sorting 
and triads task, the task has lower executive demands, merely requiring detection of 
identity. The task is time pressured and a large number of stimuli are presented. A nam- 
ing strategy in itself is unlikely to be helpful. Naming each individual stimulus in order 
to determine if it is the same category as the target is unlikely to facilitate performance, 
but rather to impede it. Therefore, on the basis of colour language alone, differences 
among languages should not occur. However, if language had influenced underlying col- 
our perception by changing perceived distances between colours with different names 
compared to colours with the same name, certain differences in visual search should be 
found. In a condition where a target was in a different category to distractors (one the 
basis of name) in one language but not another, targets should appear more discrimi- 
nable from distractors for the former language. Target search times should also be corre- 
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spondingly lower for the former language. However, in a condition where distractors 
that are same category targets for one of the languages are introduced, the advantage in 
visual search for that language should be reduced. If differences between English and 
Ndonga in visual search were found consistent with this prediction, it would indicate 
that language does influence perception. If no differences were found in visual search, it 
would suggest colour perception is not influenced by language and that any differences 
between languages on colour cognition tasks are only direct language effects. 
The English and Ndonga samples participated in all three of the colour cognition tasks 
and also the colour-naming task. Tasks were always presented in the following order: 
search task, oddity task, sorting task, naming task. 
4.2. Experiment Eight 
Colour-Sorting Task 
4.2.1. Introduction 
This task requires 42 colours to be sorted into groups on the basis of similarity. The 
number of groups is not specified in the instructions. This makes for a large number of 
possible solutions and strategies. Because the task involves classifying colours, it is po- 
tentially influenced by colour category structure. One way that the task could be per- 
formed is by sorting colours into groups according to category. The simplest way in 
which this could occur is through a direct naming strategy: colours with the same name 
could be sorted into groups on the basis of sharing the same name. If a naming strategy 
was used, the differences in colour language between English and Ndonga should have 
implications for the sorting solutions produced. English has more basic colour terms 
than the Ndonga. This should mean that English speakers divide stimuli into more 
groups than the Ndonga. Furthermore, it means that differences should be found 
in the 
regularity of the groups. Berlin and Kay's eleven basic categories divide perceptual col- 
our space irregularly: certain basic categories, such as blue and purple, are relatively 
large; others, such as red and orange, occupy only small areas of perceptual space. In 
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having names for all eleven of Berlin and Kay's basic categories, English colour catego- 
ries exhibit this irregularity. Ndonga does not name a number of Berlin and Kay's basic 
categories and its categories are both larger and more regular in size. For instance, the 
Ndonga `red' category is larger than the English equivalent by including some pinks and 
oranges. Stimuli in the current experiment constitute an even sampling of an area of 
perceptual colour space. Therefore, if a naming strategy is being used, the English should 
sort the colours into groups of more irregular size than the Ndonga. Also for the Eng- 
lish, boundaries between colour categories are better defined than in Ndonga. There is 
more consistency between respondents in deciding where category boundaries he. If a 
naming strategy is used, then the English should be more consistent with each other 
than the Ndonga. Furthermore, for both languages, colours having the same name 
should tend to be put in the same group more than colours with different names, inde- 
pendently of any perceptual similarities. The names of the stimuli in a language should 
therefore predict the sorting solutions for that language group. 
It is possible that a naming strategy is not used and that colour sorting is done purely on 
the basis of perceptual similarities. Against this is the problem of deciding on the percep- 
tual discontinuities between stimuli that form an approximately even spread of percep- 
tual space. Whatever sorting solution is produced, some stimuli inside one group will 
tend to be more similar to some stimuli in other groups than to some stimuli in their 
own group. This problem will increase the larger the groups are made. If language has 
affected perception by stretching relative differences across name boundaries, it would 
simplify the task of sorting by perceptual similarity. If this were the case, the same pre- 
dictions would be made for English and Ndonga as if a naming strategy were used. 
Compared to the Ndonga, the English should produce a greater number of groups, more 
irregular groups and be more consistent in the groups they produce. However, if the task 
is performed on a perceptual basis, and language has not affected perception in any way, 
English and Ndonga should not be found to differ significantly on the task. Colour 
naming should then not predict sorting above that predicted by perceptual similarities 
between stimuli. 
Studies comparing colour sorting across languages have found conflicting results. One 
early use of this method was by Vygotski. The study was performed in the former USSR 
in the 1930s and is reported in Luria (1976). Vygotski compared Russian peasants 
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against a control group of farm administrators in colour sorting, using pieces of coloured 
wool as stimuli. He reports that the peasants displayed unusual performance on the task 
in relation to the control group. Some peasants claimed the task was not possible be- 
cause the colours were simply `not the same'. Others attempted the task but often 
sorted the colours in ways orthogonal to the farm administrators, e. g. grouping by 
brightness rather than hue. Vygotski claimed the difficulty the peasants displayed on the 
sorting task was a result of their lack of abstract colour terms. He found that the terms 
the peasants used to name the colours were names for concrete objects. However, the 
account in Luria (1976) presents no quantitative data and gives only subjective impres- 
sion of performances of the two groups tested. 
Wattenwyl and Zollinger (1978) give a more recent account of colour sorting across 
languages and do present quantative analysis of their data. They gave speakers of 
Quechia (a native language of Honduras), a sorting task in which they were instructed 
to sort chromatic Munsell chips on the basis of similarity. They claim that the sorting 
into groups was performed on the basis of perceptual similarity, not language. Seventy 
percent of the Quechia form separate blue and green groups, despite their colour lan- 
guage only having a single blue-green term. Furthermore, despite the Quechia having 
only three chromatic colour names, they tended on average to produce five to seven 
groups from the stimuli. Wattenwyl and Zollinger argue that if language had affected 
performance, the number of groups produced by each language should equal the number 
of terms in the language. Wattenwyl and Zollinger's analysis suggests that no overriding 
language effects were present in the way that the Quechia performed the task. How- 
ever, Wattenwyl and Zollinger's colour sort task involved only twenty colours drawn 
from a broad colour region. Therefore, this may have rendered the task insensitive to 
language effects. It may be that language is only required when difficult perceptual deci- 
sions are required not when stimuli are widely spaced apart. 
Contrary to Wattenwyl and Zollinger, a series of recent comparisons on colour sorting 
between language groups by Davies and Corbett did find evidence consistent with lan- 
guage affecting colour naming (Davies & Corbett, 1997,1998; 
Davies, 1998). They 
compare sorting of 65 colours sampled evenly 
from across perceptual colour space by 
speakers of three 
languages: English, Russian and Setswana (the last of these is a native 
language of Botswana and a Bantu language like Ndonga). They compared the perform- 
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ance of the languages in a free sort task, in which the number of groups required is left 
unspecified by the experimenter (Davies & Corbett, 1997), and a forced sorting task in 
which the number of groups was specified (Davies & Corbett, 1998; Davies, 1998). On 
both tasks the authors found differences between the languages on colour sorting that 
could be interpreted as being consistent with language affecting colour cognition. 
The comparison of interest in Davies and Corbett for the current study was between 
English and Setswana. Like Ndonga, Setswana has fewer BCTs than English. In the 
free-sort task, Davis and Corbett found that Botswanans produced a large number of 
small groups in their sorts. This was more on average than the English, despite the fewer 
number of colour terms in the Setswana language. Davies and Corbett still argue that 
this effect can be interpreted in terms of being an effect of colour language. In possess- 
ing fewer colour terms, there is less pressure to influence grouping perceptually different 
tiles together. Therefore, solutions should have smaller, and therefore more numerous, 
groups. Also consistent with colour language affecting sorting was the finding that Eng- 
lish speakers produced more unequal sized groups and showed more consistency in their 
sorting solutions than the Botswanans. The strongest evidence given by Davies and Cor- 
bett in favour of language affecting sorting was the relationship between tile naming and 
sorting within each language. No English speakers in the sample placed blue and green 
tiles in the same group while a number of the Botswanans did do this. This effect is con- 
sistent with the fact that, unlike English, Setswana has a single colour term for blue and 
green. 
The current experiment compares English and Ndonga speakers in colour sorting. In or- 
der to maximise the likelihood of finding differences between the languages, stimuli 
were sampled principally from the colour-region where the naming structure of the two 
languages differ most. The simplest way in which sorting can be compared is to look at 
differences in group structure. That is, the relative size and number of the groups made. 
More detailed analysis of colour sorting can be performed by looking at the allocation of 
particular tiles to groups. The set of stimuli used contains tiles that are both good and 
poor examples of particular basic colour categories. For the purpose of analysis, colour 
tiles that are perceptually closest to the universal focals (Rosch, 1972) are considered 
the best examples of the basic colour categories in the set. One way of examining the 
allocation of particular tiles to groups is to analyse the groups produced in terms of the 
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focal tiles they contain. If language affects sorting, because English and Ndonga have 
different colour language (Ndonga lacking separate terms for orange, pink or purple), 
the English should be more likely to form separate groups for focal colours than 
Ndonga. The groups that are produced should also be more defined. The allocation of 
particular tiles to groups can also be examined in terms of the names of stimuli. If lan- 
guage affects sorting, tiles with the same name in one language, but not another, should 
be more frequently grouped together in the former language than the latter. There 
should be an overall relationship between naming and sorting for each language group 
above that predicted by perceptual similarities alone. 
Predictions 
If language affects colour cognition, either through a direct naming strategy or indirectly 
through perception, there should be differences in the English and Ndonga sorting solu- 
tions. These differences should be consistent with predictions P1-P4. If the task is per- 
formed on a perceptual basis and language has not influenced perception, none of the 
below hypotheses should be supported. 
P1 Number of groups. English has a greater number of BCTs to describe the stimuli than 
Ndonga. If language influences sorting, the English should form more groups 
from the 42 stimuli than the Ndonga. 
P2 Size of groups: English categories divide perceptual colour space more unevenly than 
Ndonga categories. If language influences sorting, the groups produced by the 
English should also be more uneven than the Ndonga groups. 
P3 Inter participant consistency: English colour categories are better defined than Ndonga 
categories. There is greater agreement in the location of boundaries between 
categories. The English should therefore be more consistent across participants 
than the Ndonga in their sorting solutions. 
P4 Allocation of particular tiles: A relationship should be found between tile naming and 
tile sorting within each language. Each language should sort tiles according to 
the structure of their colour terms. Because Ndonga doesn't have basic terms for 
orange, pink and purple, this means that they should be less likely to form sepa- 
rate groups for these colours than English. For both English and Ndonga, within 
each language, tiles having the same name in the language should be placed in the 
same group more frequently than tiles having different names. 
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4.2.2. Method 
Participants 
Twenty English speakers (10 male, 10 female) mean age 30, and thirty-nine Ndonga 
speakers (14 male, 25 female) mean age 28 took part in the experiment. 
Stimuli 
A set of 42 coloured tiles, obtained from the Color-Aid© Company. Colours differed in 
lightness saturation and hue. They were selected from the region of colour space where 
English and Ndonga naming structure was most different. All the colours in the sample 
were red, pink, yellow, orange, purple or blue in hue for English speakers. Colours were 
illuminated as specified in § 4.1.1. A two-dimensional plot of the 42 tiles in the 
CIELUV perceptual space is shown in fig. 4.1. Tiles are shown only in terms of their 
position on the chromatic axis in this space (u* and v*) but not the lightness axis (L*). 
Table 4.1. gives the Color-Aid4 codes and dominant name in both languages. Naming 
data came from the colour naming task (see §4.1.2. ). Tiles that have less than 50% 
agreement in naming are indicated as ND (No dominant term) and the most frequent of 
these terms is given. It can be seen that English uses six basic terms in naming the 42 
colours: yellow, orange, red, pink, purple and blue. Ndonga uses only three basic terms 
(English glosses given in brackets): oshishunga (yellow), oshitiligani (red) and oshimbulu 
(blue). All other terms have less than a 50 percent frequency of use on any particular tile. 
The difference in colour naming structure between the two languages is obvious. Tiles 
named orange by English speakers tend to be named using the term for either red or yellow 
in Ndonga. Tiles named pink for English speakers tend to be given the term for red in 
Ndonga. Tiles named purple for English speakers tend to be given a non-BCT in Ndonga. 
4 The Color-Aid system is based on the Oswald colour solid (see Hunt, 1987). 
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Fig. 4.1. Plot of 42 tiles in CIELUV space. Table 4.1. give corresponding Color-Aid 
code to tile number. Symbols indicate dominant basic colour term used by English 
speakers: yellow, square; orange, diamond; red, cross; pink, triangle; purple, star; Blue, circle. 
Tiles not given a dominant basic term in English are indicated by an `X'. 
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Fig. 4.2. Plot of 42 tiles in CIELUV space. Table 4.1. give corresponding Color-Aid 
code to tile number. Symbols indicate dominant basic colour term used by Ndonga 
speakers: oshishunga, square; oshitiligani, cross; oshimbulu, circle. Tiles not given a dominant 
basic term in Ndonga are indicated by an `X'. 
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Table 4.1. Tile numbers with Color-Aid code and dominant term given English and 
Ndonga from naming data. Universal focal tiles are shown in bold. ND = no dominant 
term (most frequent term is given in brackets). 
Tile Color-Aid Dominant name 
number code 
. MwW. _ . __ __ w .. -. 
English Ndonya 
1 Yw -Hue Yellow Oshishungamm 
2 Y-Hue Yellow Oshishunga 
3 Y-T2 Yellow Oshishunga 
4 Yw-T2 Yellow Oshishunga 
5 YO-T2 Yellow Oshishunga 
6 YO-Hue Orange Oshishunga 
7 O-T2 Orange Oshishunga 
8 O-Hue Orange ND (Oshitiligani) 
9 RO-T4 ND (Peach) ND (Oshishunga) 
10 RO-T2 Orange Oshitiligani 
11 Rw-T4 Pink ND Oshryokahi 
12 RO-Hue Orange ND (Oshishunga) 
13 Rw-T2 Pink Oshitiligani 
14 RW-T1 ND (Red) Oshitiligani 
15 Rw-Hue Red Oshitiligani 
16 R-T4 Pink ND (Oshiyokahi) 
17 R-T3 Pink Oshitiligani 
18 R-T1 Pink Oshitiligani 
19 R-T2 Pink ND (Oshitiligani) 
20 R-Hue Red Oshitiligani 
21 Rc-T4 Pink ND (Oshiyokahi) 
22 Rc-T2 Pink ND (Oshitiligani) 
23 Rc-T1 Pink ND (Oshiyokahi) 
24 Rc-Hue Pink Oshitiligani 
25 M-T4 Pink ND (Oshiyokahi) 
26 M-Hue Purple ND (Oshitiligani) 
27 RV-Hue Purple ND (Oshihuli) 
28 B-T4 Blue Oshimbulau 
29 RV-T4 ND (Purple) ND (Oshiyokahi) 
30 M-T2 Pink ND (Oshiyokahi) 
31 V-Hue Purple ND (Oshimbulau) 
32 V-T4 Purple ND (Oshiyokahi) 
33 RV-T2 Purple ND (Oshiyokahi) 
34 BV-T4 ND (Purple) ND (Oshimbulau) 
35 BV-Hue Purple ND (Oshiyokahi) 
36 Bw-T4 Blue Oshimbulau 
37 V-T2 Purple ND (Oshiyokahi) 
38 B-T2 Blue Oshimbulau 
39 B-Hue Blue Oshimbualu 
40 Bev-Hue Blue Oshimbulau 
41 BV-T2 ND (Purple) ND (Oshimbulau) 
42 BKV-T2 Blue ND (Oshimbulau) 
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Procedure 
All colour tiles were laid in front of the participant on a neutral-coloured flat surface. 
Instructions were given in the participant's own language to sort the colours into groups 
so that the colours within each group look similar to each other `just as members of a 
family look similar to each other'. They were told that any number of groups could be 
formed and that the groups need not be of equal size and could contain as little as a sin- 
gle tile. No time limit was imposed on the task. 
4.2.3. Results 
Number and relative size of groups 
The mean number of groups produced by the English was 7.30 (2.92) and for the 
Ndonga, the mean was 6.49 (1.73). A t-test showed that this was not a significant dif- 
ference (t[57] =1.35, p>0.05). Variation in the relative size of the groups for English 
and Ndonga was measured by computing the standard deviation of group sizes in the 
sorting solution of each participant. The mean standard deviation of group-size was 2.35 
(1.17) for the English sample and 2.00 (0.86) for the Ndonga sample. This difference 
was also non-significant (t[57] = 1.29, p>0.05). Therefore neither prediction P1 nor 
prediction P2 was given support. The English and Ndonga produced on average, about 
the same number of groups and the regularity in group-size was also about the same. 
Similarity matrices 
A series of similarity matrices for the tiles were produced: sorting, nominal and perceptual 
similarity. By comparing the similarity matrices it was possible to look at relationships 
between different tile-pairs among the three measures of similarity. By calculating the 
standard deviation of the sorting matrices it was possible to find the across-participant 
consistency in tile sorting. Each matrix consisted of the lower half of the full 42x42 cell 
matrix, equalling 861 cells: (422 = 2) - 42. Individual cells in the matrix corresponded 
to a particular tile-pair. 
Sorting matrices 
In the tile-sorting matrices, values in each cell were the number of people in each lan- 
guage group that placed particular tile-pairs in the same group. 
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Nominal matrices 
In the nominal matrices, each cell entry was the frequency that a particular tile-pair was 
given the same name in a language. The naming data came from the naming task de- 
scribed in the introduction to this chapter. This data therefore included non-basic as 
well as basic names for the stimuli. It also included a number of `don't know' responses 
for some tiles. These were made by both languages, but mostly by the Ndonga. A scoring 
system had to be developed in order to accommodate for these `don't know' responses. 
Different scoring procedures were tried to deal with this, but the particular scoring sys- 
tem used was found to make little difference. The selected scoring system used for the 
English and Ndonga matrices is as follows. For each participant, a score of zero was al- 
located when different names were given to a tile-pair (e. g. [red] - [orange]). A score of 
one was allocated if neither tile in a pair was named ([don't know] - [don't know]); a 
score of one was also allocated if only one of the tiles in a tile-pair was named (e. g. 
[don't know] - [red]). A score of two was allocated if both tiles in a tile pair were given 
the same name (e. g. [red] - [red]). Implicit in this scoring system is the assumption that 
nominally distinct tiles are linguistically more dissimilar than unnamed tiles. This is un- 
tested and is based only on intuition. For each language, a cell in each nominal matrix 
for a particular tile pair represented the sum of the scores across participants. 
Perceptual matrix 
In the perceptual matrix, each cell entry was the perceptual distance between a particu- 
lar tile-pair in the CIELUV perceptual space. This was done by computing the Euclid- 
ean distance between the tile-pair on the three CIELUV coordinates. These distances 
are given by the formula: 
(L'*1 
- 
L! 2)2 + (u*1 - u*2)2 
+ (1l*1 - v*2) 
2 11/2 
where i and 2 are the values from the respective tiles of a particular tile-pair. In this 
metric, therefore, perceptually similar tile-pairs had lower values in the cell entries than 
more perceptually dissimilar tile-pairs. The range of perceptual distances between tile- 
pairs varied from 8.70 to 200.27 in CIELUV. 
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Consistency in sorting 
A measure of intra-language consistency, i. e. the consistency in tile-sorting among par- 
ticipants in the same language group, was produced. This was done by separately calcu- 
lating the standard deviation of the English and Ndonga tile-sorting similarity matrices 
(sdm). Greater consistency produces smaller sdm in a matrix. It was found that sd,,, was 
almost the same for both languages: 23.20 for English and 23.59 for Ndonga. However, 
sdm is also affected by factors unrelated to consistency such as the average number and 
size of groups. The fact that the latter did not significantly differ between the languages 
suggests, in contrast to prediction P3, that infra-language consistency in sorting was ap- 
proximately the same for both English and Ndonga. 
Analysis of tile structure 
Si<e of groups containing focal tile 
English and Ndonga did not differ significantly in the number of groups produced or in 
the regularity of the groups. However, it is possible that there were differences between 
the languages in the allocation of individual tiles to particular groups. This possibility 
was tested by looking at the relative size of the various clusters containing focal tiles 
(the universal focal colours). These are given in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Mean number of other tiles placed in same group as universal focal tiles (s. d. ). 
Universal tile English Ndonga 
Yellow 
Orange 
Red 
Pink 
Purple 
Blue 
5.55 7.56 
(1.82) (2.12) 
4.90 7.77 
(2.05) (3.58) 
5.75 7.56 
(2.00) (3.79) 
6.80 7.41 
(2.86) (2.86) 
8.00 7.36 
(3.96) (2.69) 
7.95 7.03 
(3.72) (2.01) 
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Compared to the Ndonga, the English included significantly fewer tiles in the same 
group as the yellow (t[57] = 3.80, p< 0.01)5 and orange (t[57] = 3.31, p<0.01) focal 
tiles. For the red focal tile, this effect approached significance (t[57] = 2.0, p=0.051). 
No significant difference in group-size was found for the number of tiles in the same 
group as focal pink, purple or blue. The fact the English produced smaller yellow, or- 
ange and red groups, is consistent with the notion that these categories are smaller for 
the English than the Ndonga. For the Ndonga, both yellow and red include part of the 
orange category. 
Overlap between groups containing focal tiles 
Further analysis looked at the overlap between groups containing focal tiles within each 
language. If the English, consistent with having separate yellow and orange and separate 
yellow and red categories, were also more likely to produce separate groups for these 
colours, overlap between these groups should be lower for the Ndonga. Overlap be- 
tween groups was calculated for each language. For each of the six universal focal tiles, 
the frequency with which each of the 42 tiles were put in the same group as the focal 
was calculated across participants. For a tile, overlap between groups was the lower of 
the two frequencies with which a tile was placed in the same group as a focal. For in- 
stance, if tile 6 (YO-hue) was placed in the same group as a focal yellow (Yw-hue) by 7 
participants, placed in the same group as focal orange (O-hue) by 4 participants, the 
overlap between the yellow and orange groups for that tile would be 4. The total over- 
lap between two groups was the sum of these lower frequency scores across all 42 tiles. 
This score was normalised by dividing it by the number of participants in the language to 
give a group overlap index (GOI). The higher the score on this index, the greater the 
overlap between groups. The GOI for English and Ndonga between yellow-orange, red- 
orange, red-pink, red-purple and blue-purple focal groups are given in table 4.3. 
All probabilities are two-tailed, unless otherwise stated. 
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Table 4.3. Group overlap index. 
Groups English Ndonga 
Yellow-Orange 0.95 3.00 
Red-Orange 2.55 4.97 
Red-Pink 2.05 2.44 
Red-Purple 1.55 0.72 
Blue-Purple 4.50 2.13 
As can be seen from the above table, overlap between groups was higher for Ndonga 
compared to English for yellow-orange, red-orange and red-pink. This suggests that the 
English overall produced more well-defined groups with less tile overlap across partici- 
pants between these groups. However, overlap for English was higher for red-purple 
and blue-purple for the English compared to the Ndonga. 
Cluster analysis of groups 
A further way to examine the structure of tiles in the groups is to produce averages of 
the groups for English and Ndonga. This was done by hierarchical cluster analysis per- 
formed separately on the English and Ndonga tile-sorting similarity matrices. For a 
specified number of groups, cluster analysis shows the average group membership of 
each of the 42 tiles. Cluster analyses for groups of two up to six are reported. Plots of 
the cluster solutions are given for each language (see fig. 4.2). Names are given to indi- 
vidual clusters on the basis of the universal focal tiles contained within them. Universal 
focal tiles are indicated by being shaded in grey on the plots. The same symbols have 
been used across plots to aid comparisons between solutions. 
Although the lightness axis (L*) is not shown, cluster plots indicate that both language 
samples tended to partition the colours into discrete non-overlapping groups. Despite 
the Ndonga having no pink, orange or purple in their language, they formed similar clus- 
ters to the English. At the two-cluster level, however, the solutions look very different. 
Here the Ndonga have a separate blue cluster from the main tile cluster, the English a 
separate yellow cluster. At the six-cluster level, the solutions tend to look more similar. 
Here, both languages produce separate blue and purple clusters and separate red and pink 
clusters. For both languages, focal orange and red are in the same cluster and separate 
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from the focal yellow. Furthermore, both languages tend to produce a `residual' cluster of 
pale orange tiles that contains no focal tile. However, at most levels, English and 
Ndonga cluster solutions are not the same. The size of the red, yellow and blue clusters 
tends to be greater for the Ndonga compared to the English. This is consistent with the 
fact that these language categories are also larger for Ndonga than English speakers. The 
emergence of separate focal clusters, for the Ndonga at least, is consistent with the hier- 
archy of category decomposition proposed by Kay and McDaniel (1976). The only in- 
consistency is that focal red and orange remain in the same cluster. For Ndonga, the ini- 
tial split is between warm (yellow-red-orange pink) and cool (blue purple) colours. In further 
splits, primary categories (yellow, blue) emerge before derived categories (pink, orange, pur- 
ple). 
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Fig 4.2. Plots of cluster solutions for English (left) and Ndonga (right). Continued over. 
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Fig. 4.2. (Cont. ) Plots of cluster solutions for English (left) and Ndonga (right). 
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Associations between clusters 
A formal test of the relationship between the clusters was performed by calculating the 
statistical association between the various cluster solutions. Between-language associa- 
tions at each cluster level should be smaller than the within-language associations at ad- 
jacent cluster levels if the solutions were significantly different. The within-language 
comparisons make a good control because they are constrained by the fact that these 
solutions must always be different because the group sizes differ. Associations were cal- 
culated using Cramer's v. These are reported in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4. Cramer's v test of association between cluster solutions within and between 
language groups for English and Ndonga. 
Cluster size English 
_ýý. . _. ... . 
English by Ndonga Ndonga 
2 . ý.. wvo. ý ý. _ý. ., ý. ý. .v=0.46, 
(p < 0.01) 
2 by 3 v =1.00* v=1.00*, 
(p < 0.000001) (p < 0.000001) 
3 v =1.00, 
(p < 0.000001) 
3 by 4 v=1.00* v=1.00*, 
(p < 0.000001) (p < 0.000001) 
4 v=0.82, 
(p < 0.000001) 
4 by 5 v=1.00*, v=1.00*, 
(p < 0.000001) (p < 0.000001) 
5 v=0.76, 
(p < 0.000001) 
5 by 6 v=1.00*, v=1.00*, 
(p < 0.000001) (p < 0.000001) 
6 v=0.82, 
(p < 0.000001) 
All Cramer's v values are given to 2 d. p. All values of v were slightly lower than one. 
As can be seen from this table, intra-language cluster comparisons all approach one in 
their association. The cross-language comparisons are, at most levels, lower than this C). C1 
suggesting that there were significant 
differences in the English and Ndonga solutions. 
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Grouping of focal tiles 
A further comparison of differences in tile structure between English and Ndonga was 
made by looking at the sorting of the focal tiles alone. This was done by comparing the 
percentage of participants who placed certain focal tiles in the same groups for English 
and Ndonga. These percentages are given in table 4.5. below. 
Table 4.5. Percentage of participants placing universal focal tiles in the same group. 
Focal tiles English Ndonga 
Yellow-Orange 0 15.4 
Red-Orange 35 41.0 
Red-Pink 5 10.3 
Red-Purple 10 0 
Blue-Purple 
: Yý 
40 
WýykAN8 
12.8 
lÄa/NAftNHA'6FkYSITYKbýfSABýS¢k 
The overall pattern of results is similar to that in table 4.3. for the group overlap index. 
While no individual in the English sample placed focal yellow and orange in the same 
groups, over 15% of the Ndonga sample did so. The percentage of focal tiles being 
placed in the same group was also higher in Ndonga for red-orange and red pink. However, 
this percentage was higher for the English compared to the Ndonga for red purple and 
blue purple focal tiles. It suggests, consistent with the English having separate terms for 
yellow, orange and red, the English tend to form separate groups for the best examples of 
these colours. However, inconsistent with English having separate terms for red, blue 
and purple, unlike the Ndonga, the English put these best examples into different groups 
less frequently than the Ndonga. 
Cross vs. within-category sorting 
A further analysis was performed comparing sorting of not just focal tiles, but also all 
tiles with the same dominant name as the focal tile. If language is influencing sorting, it 
should affect the allocation of particular tile-pairs into same or different groups on the 
basis of name. Where a separate term does not exist in Ndonga, tiles with different 
names in English should be placed together less frequently by English speakers than by 
Ndonga speakers. Tiles given the same basic name in English should be grouped together 
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more frequently by English than Ndonga speakers. Comparisons were made between 
English and Ndonga on within-category and cross-category sorting. Within-category 
sorting was the relative frequencies of grouping tiles together that have the same domi- 
nant name in English. Cross-category sorting was the relative frequency of grouping to- 
gether tiles with different dominant names. 
It is important to note that in every case, what is defined as cross and within category 
comes only from English naming. The Ndonga naming data demonstrates that in the 
sample of tiles given, naming boundaries between Ndonga categories are less precise, 
with inter-nominal regions between categories where no dominant term is consistently 
used. 
Within-category sorting scores for English and Ndonga were calculated by summing 
across the relevant cells of the similarity matrices for each language then expressing this 
as a proportion of the maximum possible score for the particular subset of tiles. Scores 
were produced for yellow (Y), red (R), orange (0), blue (B), pink (Pk), and purple (P). 
These are given in table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. Mean within-category sorting scores (s. d. ) for English and Ndonga. 
YR0B Pk P 
English 0.89 0.85 0.41 0.86 0.38 0.50 
(0.24) (0.37) (0.22) (0.23) (0.16) (0.25) 
Ndonga 0.84 0.87 0.42 0.92 0.38 0.52 
(0.20) (0.34) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.24) 
Cross-category sorting scores for English and Ndonga were calculated only for adjacent 
categories in English: yellow-orange (Y-O), red-orange (R-O), red pink (R-Pk), red purple (R- 
P) pink purple (Pk-P), and blue purple (B-P). As with the within-category sorting scores, 
cross-category scores were produced by summing across the relevant cells in the English 
and Ndonga similarity matrices. These scores were expressed as proportions of the 
maximum possible score for the particular number of tiles. These scores are given in ta- 
ble 4.7. 
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Table 4.7. Mean cross-category sorting scores (s. d. ) for English and Ndonga. 
Y-O R-O R-Pk R-P B-P 
English 0.24 0.19 0.06 0.19 
(0.15) (0.25) (0.11) (0.15) (0.27) 
Ndonga 0.45 0.17 0.30 0.08 0.09 
(0.26) (0.17) (0.22) (0.10) (0.17) 
Two-way ANOVA's were performed on the sorting scores to test if the English, relative 
to the Ndonga, more frequently grouped tiles together that were from the same English 
category and less frequently grouped tiles together that were in different English catego- 
ries. Separate analyses were performed for particular subsets of tiles, each subset con- 
tained tiles from two adjacent categories, e. g. yellow and orange. In order to perform this 
analysis, a single score was produced for each participant representing within-category 
sorting for that subset of tiles. This was done by calculating the average of the two 
within-category sorting scores in the analysis, e. g. analysis of yellow-orange compared the 
cross-category sorting score (Y-O) with the average within-category sorting scores for 
yellow and orange (Y+O). ANOVA was then performed on these scores. In each ANOVA, 
the two factors were language (English, Ndonga), and sort-type (cross-category, within- 
category), in every case language was an independent factor and sort-type a related fac- 
tor. 
The comparisons were as follows: 
Y+O x Y-O 
R+O x R-O 
R+Pk x R-Pk 
R+P x R-P 
B+P x B-P 
Each comparison includes a primary category and an adjacent derived category. Because 
Ndonga does not have derived terms orange, pink and purple, this analysis tests if the 
Ndonga, more frequently than the English, placed instances from English derived cate- 
gories in the same groups as instances of adjacent primary categories. The results of these 
comparisons are given in table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8. Results of ANOVA comparisons between language and sort-type. 
Language 
, asmasýmxsa. ýawý.. ý+ýaaaa ý rwv:. r sraaraoanaaaappva a. ý; KSaa 
Sort-type Language X 
Sort-type 
F(1,57) = 10.74, F(1,57) = 120.52, F(1,57) = 29.96, 
Y+OxY-O p <0.01 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 
F(1,57) = 0.44, F(1,57) = 139.85, F(1,57) = 1.26, 
R+O x R-O p>0.05 p<0.0001 p>0.05 
F(1,57) = 0.83, F(1,57) = 120.57, F(1,57) = 0.98, 
R+Pk x R-Pk p> 0.05 p< 0.0001 p> 0.05 
F(1,57) = 0.14 F(1,57) = 478.53 F(1,57) = 0.07, 
R+P x R-P p>0.05 p<0.0001 p>0.05 
F(1,57) = 0.60, F(1,57) = 249.28, F(1,57) = 3.87, 
B+P x B-P 
.. ýr? H`k'e'ýA 
p> 0.05 
ý. ': WWý. 'wý: YYnRWYM4NN': a`l`Mhýc': iFýý&ý.. MiW3XMY5Ye'. KÖI%nY%. ý'nJ: 9%fMý 
p> 0.0001 
evw. v.: ? i? b'a": 4>YN. N9ä53ß5'N6)Y. ýc9f ,... 9flY9 
P=0.054 
hhWAH§s? Yn'! G? 5Ja9. k"3bRR%P9: tHLSXS>': '. . FAb 
In every case there was an overall effect of sort-type. There was a highly significantly 
tendency to place tiles into different groups when tiles had different dominant names in 
English compared to when they had the same name. A significant interaction of this ef- 
fect with language was only found for yellow-orange (although a non-significant pattern 
of results consistent with language affecting sorting was found for red-pink). The Eng- 
lish placed tiles dominantly named yellow or orange in English in the same group less 
frequently than the Ndonga. This result supports the data from the average size of 
groups (table 4.2. ), the index of group overlap (table 4.3. ) and the cluster analysis plots 
(fig 4.2. ), all which suggested that yellow and orange were more likely to be separated in 
different groups in English compared to Ndonga. There were no other significant effects 
consistent with language differences. 
Relationship between sorting and naming matrices 
The above analysis of cross vs. within-category sorting provides a relatively coarse meas- 
ure of language influence. No account is taken of the magnitude of the difference in 
naming between tile-pairs. All tiles with the same dominant name in English are treated 
as equivalent. Tiles with no dominant name are ignored. The next analysis 
looks at the 
relationship between names on all tiles including basic and non-basic names 
including 
both English and Ndonga naming. This is done by statistically comparing the relation- 
ship between the 
lower-half naming and sorting matrices in each language. 
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The correlation between the English and Ndonga sorting matrices themselves was highly 
significant: r= . 
86 (p < 0.0001). This showed that there was considerable similarity in 
the English and Ndonga sorting solutions but also indicated that there were differences. 
In order to look at the influence of naming on sorting, the naming matrices were used as 
predictor variables in a multiple regression analysis of the sorting matrices in each lan- 
guage. It was considered that the most important influence of sorting for both languages 
would be the perceptual similarity of the tiles in CIELUV although that there would be 
a relationship with naming within each language. In order to look at the relationship 
between sorting and naming independently of perceptual similarities between the tiles 
this factor must be partialled out. A plot of the relationship between each of the English 
and Ndonga sorting matrices with the perceptual matrix found the relationship for both 
to be non-linear. A reciprocal loglo transformation of the perceptual matrix was there- 
fore performed. The transformed matrix showed a better linear fit with the sorting ma- 
trices of both languages'. The regression analyses below used the transformed perceptual 
similarity matrix. 
A step-vise multiple regression analysis was performed. As stated above, it was assumed 
that perceptual similarity would be the most important predictor of sorting. This vari- 
able was therefore always forced into the equation at the first step. The sorting matrix 
from each language was used as the dependent variable (DV). The analysis was therefore 
repeated, first with the English tile-sorting matrix, and secondly with the Ndonga sort- 
ing matrix as the DV. English and Ndonga nominal similarity matrices were both en- 
tered in the regression equation after the perceptual similarity matrices. The reason for 
entering both nominal matrices was to provide a control. If language was influencing 
sorting, the same-language nominal matrix should be a better predictor of the sorting 
matrix than the cross-language nominal matrix. 
a) English sorting matrix 
With the English tile-sorting matrix as the DV, the regression went through three steps. 
A was significantly different from zero at the end of all steps in the analysis. At step 
6 An exponential transformation of the perceptual matrix (e< ), as recommended by Cohen and Nosofsky 
(2000) for judgements involving colour difference, was also performed. The improvement in linear fit for 
this transformation was less than for the reciprocal loglo transformation. 
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three, R= . 91, (F[3,857] = 1356.49, p < 0.0001). R2 increased by 0.13 between step 1 
and 2 and increased by 0.001 between step 2 and 3. In step two the English nominal 
matrix was included to the regression equation as a significant predictor; in step three 
the Ndonga nominal matrix was added as a significant predictor. The beta values (13) of 
each of the predictors at the final step were as follows: for the perceptual matrix ß= 
0.41, (t = 16.02, p<0.0001); for the English nominal matrix ß=0.52, (t = 23.63, p< 
0.0001); for the Ndonga nominal matrix (3 = 0.06, (t = 2.38, p<0.05). 
b) Ndonga sorting matrix 
With the Ndonga sorting, the regression also went through three steps; R was signifi- 
cantly different from zero at the end of all steps in the analysis. At step three, R= . 
91, 
F[3,857] = 1296.00, p<0.0001. R2 increased by 0.149 between step 1 and 2 and in- 
creased 0.046 between step 2 and 3. In step two, the Ndonga nominal matrix was added 
as a significant predictor. In step three, the English nominal matrix was added. At the 
final step, the beta values were: for the perceptual matrix ß=0.14, (t =5.58, p< 
0.0001); for the Ndonga nominal matrix (3 = 0.52, (t = 21.27, p<0.0001); for the 
English nominal matrix ß=0.33, (t = 14.7, p<0.0001). 
Therefore, for both English and Ndonga sorting matrices, the intra-language nominal 
matrix was a better predictor of tile sorting frequency than the cross-language predictor. 
This suggests that there was a direct association between language and performance on 
the colour-sorting task. However, the cross language predictor was significant for both 
English and Ndonga sorting. For English sorting, the Ndonga nominal predictor was 
only just significant. For Ndonga sorting the English nominal predictor was still ac- 
counting for a sizable proportion of the variance. 
4.2.4. Discussion 
In terms of the overall structure of the sorting solutions between the languages there 
does not seem to be any differences between the English and Ndonga solutions. No sig- 
nificant differences were found in the average number of groups produced, the variation 
in either group-size or in the intra-language consistency in sorting. Therefore, support 
was not found for predictions P1, P2 or P3. It suggests that language 
differences be- 
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tween English and Ndonga were not affecting the task at the level of the overall struc- 
ture of tile sorting solutions. This result is in contrast to the findings reported by Davies 
and Corbett (1997) who did find differences between English and Setswana speakers on 
all of these measures. This difference may be explained by the fact that Ndonga has 
more BCTs than Setswana and is therefore closer to English in its colour language. 
However, the sort task in the current experiment used different stimuli to those used by 
Davies and Corbett. Their stimuli had an approximately even sampling across colour- 
space while the present experiment had stimuli that, while approximately evenly sam- 
pled, were drawn only from the yellow-to-blue region without any achromatic stimuli. It 
is possible that this also contributed in some way to the lack of structural differences 
among the solutions of the two languages. 
Support was found for the prediction that there would be differences between the lan- 
guages in the allocation of particular tiles into groups (P4). Measures of the size of the 
groups for the different categories, as defined by the inclusion of focal tiles, and in 
measures of the overlap between groups for different categories indicated that the Eng- 
lish tended to form separate yellow-orange and red-orange and red pink clusters more than 
the Ndonga. Further analysis indicated that for yellow-orange at least, the English were 
significantly less likely to place such tiles in the same group than the Ndonga. Plots of 
the average groups derived from cluster analysis showed overall similarities and signifi- 
cant differences in the average sorting solutions of the two groups. The six-cluster solu- 
tion was of particular interest. English uses six basic terms to name the colours present 
in the set. If naming was strongly influencing sorting, the cluster solutions should reflect 
this. The focal colours of each category are, in most cases, in separate groups for English 
and Ndonga speakers in the cluster solutions. Blue is separated from purple, red from pink 
andyellow from orange. The only exception is both focal red and orange appearing in the 
same average group for English speakers. Two factors may have overridden the nominal 
distinctiveness of these two focal tiles for the English. Firstly, focal red and orange are 
the perceptually closest of the focal tiles in the set. Secondly, focal red is the perceptually 
smallest colour category; fewer tiles were given the dominant name "red" than any of 
the other BCT's in the sample. The Ndonga solution is similar to the English solution 
except in the allocation of a few tiles. Like the English, the Ndonga tended to put focal 
red and orange in the same group and separate other focal colours into different groups. 
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The correlation between the matrices of the sorting solutions, like the cluster analysis, 
indicates overall similarity in English and Ndonga sorting but leaves open the possibility 
of language effects. The regression analyses performed on the two sorting solutions 
showed that for the English tile sorting, English nominal similarity was a more signifi- 
cant nominal predictor than Ndonga nominal similarity. Although Ndonga nominal 
similarity was a significant predictor of English tile sorting in the regression equation, its 
contribution was only marginally significant. For Ndonga tile sorting, Ndonga nominal 
similarity was found to be the most significant nominal predictor, but English nominal 
similarity also contributed highly significantly as a predictor. This relationship between 
English naming and Ndonga sorting may suggest that the Universal English colour cate- 
gories that the Ndonga have no name for may still be nascent. The fact that English 
naming correlates highly with both languages sorting solution suggests that there may be 
universal influences on categorisation. This can be taken as support of Berlin and Kay 
and Rosch. Colour categories may exist as perceptual structures even when they are not 
named in a language. 
However, the differences in English and Ndonga tile structure and greater association of 
the infra-language associations than the cross-language correlations between naming and 
colour sorting support prediction P4. The tendency of colours to share the same name 
seemed to influence tile sorting of colours above that predicted by CIELUV distances 
alone. Analysis suggested that the main difference between the English and Ndonga so- 
lutions was in the yellow and orange region. Consistent with English having different 
names for these colours, English speakers were more likely to sort these colours into 
separate groups than the Ndonga. The reason for the association with language is un- 
clear. The effects are equally consistent with an interpretation that perceptual space is 
`stretched' across colour-name boundaries with language affecting behaviour directly 
through the strategic use of labelling to guide similarity judgements. The final sorting 
solutions on this task are probably an outcome of decisions based on a weighted combi- 
nation of perceptual, cognitive as well as linguistic factors. 
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4.3. Experiment Nine 
Colour Oddity (Triads) Task 
4.3.1. Introduction 
This second experiment tests if language affects the perceived similarity of colour using a 
different type of task: an oddity (or triads) task. In this task, three colours are presented 
and the task is to decide which of the colours appears most different to the other two. 
Kay and Kempton (1984) used a triads task to compare perceived similarity of colours 
between English speakers and speakers of Tamauhara, an indigenous language of Mexico 
with a single term for blue and green. When, for the English, two colours were in one 
category (e. g. blue) and the other colour in a different category (e. g. green), English 
speakers tended to choose the colour with the different name as being the most differ- 
ent colour in the triad. For the Tamauhara, all colours had the same name. Consistent 
with language affecting colour cognition, the Tamauhara did not show a tendency to 
choose the colour with the different English name. Instead the Tamauhara chose either 
of the two colours outermost in hue with equal frequency. This difference in the fre- 
quency of triad choices was consistent with perceptual distance across the blue-green 
boundary being larger for the English speakers than for the Tamauhara. However, the 
study had only a small sample of participants and no control task was given. That is, 
there were no triads where the same choice of `most different' tile would be expected 
from both languages. 
In a second experiment, performed on only English speakers, Kay and 
Kempton (1984, 
experiment two) tested if the tendency of English speakers to 
`stretch' subjective 
judgements across the blue-green boundary was due to them employing an unconscious 
naming strategy. They used two methods to reduce any tendency to use verbal 
labels on 
the task. Firstly, they restricted viewing of the tiles in the triad. This was done 
by plac- 
ing the colours in a container with a sliding top that only allowed viewing of the tile 
intermediate in hue together with one other tile (either of the two tiles outermost in 
hue). Secondly, they gave instructions designed to bias participant's labelling of the 
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boundary colour. In experiment one, participants were asked to decide which colour 
was the "most different" in hue. In experiment two they were asked to compare the 
colour intermediate in hue, with each of the other two colours and decide whether the 
"difference in greenness" for one of the colours was greater than the "difference in blue- 
ness" for the other. Kay and Kempton claim that one cannot can the colour intermedi- 
ate in hue either green or blue with these instructions. S/he must call this tile both green 
and blue in order to compare differences in greenness and blueness with the other tiles. 
Therefore, a naming strategy should not be used. 
With this manipulation of the method, the apparent increased perceptual distances 
across the boundary naming for the English was eliminated. This, Kay and Kempton 
claim, demonstrates that the difference in judgements between English and Tamauhara 
was through language directly affecting behaviour. They claim that there was no differ- 
ence in the actual perception of colour between English and Tamauhara speakers. How- 
ever, Kay and Kempton's procedure in this second experiment is confusing. It is not 
clear why, as well as giving instructions to bias participant against using a labelling strat- 
egy, the viewing of the tiles in the triad were also restricted. This manipulation alone 
would be likely to increase any tendency to use naming strategies by increasing the 
memory load on the task. 
Davies, et al. (1998) also found differences in triads judgements consistent with differ- 
ences in colour language, between English and Setswana speakers. The colours used on 
each triad tended to be much more perceptually distant than those used by Kay and 
Kempton. It was found that nominal similarity between colours within a language was 
related to the frequency of colour choices on each triad. The more nominally isolated a 
colour (the least frequently it was given the same name as other tiles) in a triad, the 
more likely speakers of that language were to choose that colour as 'most different'. 
More importantly, Davies et al. also showed that in situations where English and 
Setswana languages made the same prediction about the most isolated colour, choices of 
the two languages were the most similar. When the languages conflicted, speakers 
tended to follow the prediction of their own language. 
The current experiment uses the triads task with English and Ndonga, using colours 
where, on the basis of colour language English and Ndonga vary. If language has influ- 
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enced perception, there should be a relationship between tile naming and tile choices on 
a triads task. When, a tile has a different name to other tiles in the triad, this should in- 
crease the tendency of that tile being chosen. Each language group should tend to 
choose the tile that is most nominally isolated (least frequently given the same name as 
the other tiles) in a triad. When for a triad, the most nominally isolated tile is the same 
(or congruent) in both languages, the frequency of choice of that tile should be about 
the same for both language groups. However, for incongruent triads, where the nomi- 
nally isolated tile differs between groups, the frequency of choices between languages 
should also differ significantly. Speakers should be more consistent with the nominal 
prediction of their own language than another language. 
Language could affect performance on this task either directly or indirectly. It could be 
affecting performance on the task directly through a naming strategy: the names of the 
three stimuli in a triad are compared. If one of the stimuli had a different name, this tile 
would be chosen as the most different. Language could also be influencing performance 
indirectly through a warping of perceptual space across colour name boundaries. If this 
were the case, then the relative perceptual distances for the language group would dif- 
fer, perhaps sufficiently to produce different choices. 
One way of determining whether differences between languages on this task are direct 
language effects or are genuinely perceptual is to manipulate memory load. This can be 
done, as in Kay and Kempton's study, by reducing the number of the tiles in the triad 
that can be viewed at once. When all three tiles in the triad can be seen at the same 
time, comparisons could be made purely perceptually. On the other hand, if viewing is 
restricted to just one or two colours at a time, this increases the memory load. In turn, 
this is likely to induce a direct naming strategy. However, if a naming strategy was used 
even when all tiles can be seen simultaneously, this manipulation should 
have little ef- 
fect. If a naming strategy was not used when all tiles can be seen simultaneously, the tile 
choices between languages for incongruent triads should differ most with the number of 
viewable tiles restricted compared to when all tiles can be seen at once. 
The current experiment compares triad judgements of English and Ndonga using a sub- 
set of the stimuli in the sorting task. 
The colours were chosen so that some triads would 
cross naming boundaries 
for English, but not Ndonga. Comparisons are made between 
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triads where the nominally isolated tile is the same in English and Ndonga (congruent), 
with triads where the nominally isolated tile differs in English and Ndonga (incongru- 
ent). Average perceptual distances between colours within each triad were smaller than 
the perceptual differences on the Davies et al. task and closer to the average distances of 
stimuli in the Kay and Kempton task. In addition, the number of tiles observable at a 
time was manipulated to try to vary the inducement to use a `labelling strategy'. 
Predictions 
The following predictions test whether English and Ndonga differ in judgements of 
subjective colour difference between colours where their colour language also differs. 
The predictions are made on the basis of an assumption that English and Ndonga do dif- 
fer in such judgements. If triad judgements are made on a purely perceptual basis and 
colour perception itself is the same for English and Ndonga, none of the following hy- 
potheses should be supported. Differences in the frequency of triad choices between 
English and Ndonga should be small and insignificant. However, if language does affect 
triad judgements, either through a direct language effect or through warping of percep- 
tual space, predictions P1 and P2 should be supported. Prediction P1 makes a general 
prediction that a relationship should be found between triad choice and naming within 
each language. Prediction P2 concerns differences in the frequency of choices between 
triads where English and Ndonga nominal predictions agree and where they conflict. An 
additional prediction (P3) concerns whether differences in choices between English and 
Ndonga are actually perceptual. If differences between languages are always because a 
direct language strategy is being used in making triad judgements then prediction P3 
should not be supported. Differences in triad choice between languages will be inde- 
pendent of this manipulation. Having to hold the stimuli in memory will not increase 
the likelihood of a labelling strategy if one is already being used. However, if differences 
between languages on triad choice are in part perceptual, differences between languages (D C) 
should be found in all viewing conditions but may increase, as the number of tiles that 
can be seen together is restricted. 
P1 Triad choice-naming associations: if language affects triad judgements, there should be a 
significant association between colour naming and triad choice for each language 
above that predicted by perceptual differences between colours. Cross-language 
associations between colour naming and triad choices should be lower than in- 
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tra-language associations. That is, English naming should predict English triad 
choices better than Ndonga choices. Ndonga naming should predict Ndonga 
triad choices better than English naming. 
P2 Congruent and incongruent triads: if language affects triad judgements, on triads where 
the nominal isolation measures of English and Ndonga predict the same tile as 
`most different' (congruent triads), similar proportions of English and Ndonga 
speakers should choose this tile. On triads were English and Ndonga nominal 
isolation measures conflict (incongruent triads), English speakers should more 
frequently choose the English nominal prediction than the Ndonga. The Ndonga 
should more frequently choose the most nominally isolated tile in Ndonga. 
P3 Viewing-condition: If triad judgements are always made on the basis of perceptual dif- 
ferences and if colour perception is the same for English and Ndonga then there 
should be no effect of viewing condition on triad choice. If differences in triad 
choice between languages are direct language effects, differences should be stable 
across viewing-conditions. A manipulation promoting verbal labelling should not 
influence triad choice if verbal labels are already being used. However, if differ- 
ences in triad choice between languages are, in part, the result of perceptual dif- 
ferences, with restricted viewing, this should make the use of verbal labels more 
likely. Therefore, on triads where the most nominally isolated colour differs be- 
tween languages (incongruent triads), differences in triad choice between lan- 
guages should be increased. On triads where the most nominally isolated tile is 
the same (congruent triads), differences in triad choice should be maintained. 
Overall, for both languages, the relationship between colour naming and triad 
choice should increase. 
4.3.2. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-five adult English speakers (23 male; 12 female), mean age 28 and, 
40 adult 
Ndonga speakers (14 male; 26 female) also mean age 28, took part in the experiment. 
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Stimuli and apparatus 
Twelve experimental triads (T1-T12) and one practise triad were used. Each triad was 
made of a circular disk of white card 150 mm in diameter. Three coloured tiles (A, B 
and C), made from Color-Aid© paper, were fixed on the triad card at an equal distance 
apart, each 10 mm from the edge of the disk. The three tiles were therefore positioned 
as three points of an equilateral triangle on the disk. Each tile was 10 mm2. Tiles were 
illuminated as described in § 4.1.1. The choice of colours used reflected the differences 
in colour naming structure between English and Ndonga. The colours of each of the 
twelve experimental triads are plotted as they appear in CIELUV space in fig. 4.3. 
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Fig. 4.3. Plot of twelve triads in CIELUV. The most perceptually isolated tile is indi- 
cated as a square (Cont. over). 
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each triad is indicated as a square. 
168 
50 70 90 110 130 
u* 
50 70 90 110 130 
u* 
T11 
The most frequent name given in English and Ndonga, together with the frequency of 
use of that name for each tile in each of the twelve triads, is given in table 4.9. A meas- 
ure of perceptual isolation and nominal isolation for English and Ndonga was produced 
for each of tile in each triad. Values give the relative isolation of individual tiles in the 
triads on these measures. The construction of these measures is given below. 
Perceptual isolation 
The perceptual isolation measure was computed from the perceptual distances between 
the tiles in CIELUV space. This was produced by computing the Euclidean distance be- 
tween each of the three tile-pairs in the triad (see § 4.2.3. ), then normalising each score 
within the triad. This perceptual isolation measure gave the relative proportion of the 
total perceptual difference in the triad that a particular tile contributed to within that 
triad. For instance, in a triad ABC, the proportion of overlap for tile A would be: 
[(DistA-B) + Dist/-C) / ((DistA-B) + (Dist, A-C) + (Dist. B-6)] 
where Dist. is the Euclidean distance in CIELW space between the tile-pair. On the per- 
ceptual isolation measure, the most isolated tile has the highest score of the three tiles 
within a triad, i. e. the tile perceptually most distant from the other tiles in the triad. 
Nominal isolation 
The nominal isolation (overlap) measure was produced separately for English and 
Ndonga. Computation of this was similar to that described for the perceptual overlap 
measure. The relative score for each tile was computed by, first, calculating the naming 
overlap between each tiles-pair in the same manner done for the sorting task (see § 
4.2.3. ). The naming data was from the naming task (see introduction to this chapter). 
The overlap measure therefore included basic as well as non-basic terms. Scores were 
normalised within each triad to give the relative proportion of overlap that each tile 
contributed to overall nominal overlap in the triad. The equation for this normalisation 
was the same as for perceptual isolation. The normalised perceptual and nominal isola- 
tion scores for each tile of the twelve triads are given in table 4.10. On the nominal iso- 
lation measure, the most isolated tile in the triad has the lowest score of the three tiles. 
It is the tile least frequently given the same name as the other tiles in the triad. English 
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and Ndonga nominal predictions are the same on triads T1-T4 (congruent triads). The 
predictions conflict on triads T5-T12 (incongruent triads). 
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Table. 4.9. Most frequent term in English and Ndonga given for each tile on the triads. 
English Ndonga 
Triad Color-Aid code Dominant Frequency Dominant Frequency 
Num. name (%) name (%) 
T1 A RW-Hue Red 60.0 Oshitiligane 82.5 
B RO-Hue Orange 85.0 Oshishunga 45.0 
C 0-Hue Orange 100.0 Oshitiligane 45.0 
T2 A RO-Hue Orange 85.0 Oshishunga 45.0 
B 0-Hue Orange 100.0 Oshitiligane 45.0 
C YO-Hue Orange 60.0 Oshishunga 87.5. 
T3 A YO-Hue Orange 60.0 Oshishunga 87.5 
B Yw-Hue Yellow 90.0 Oshishunga 95.0 
C Y-Hue Yellow 100.0 Oshishunga 100.0 
T4 A R-Hue Red 70.0 Oshitiligane 77.5 
B RW-Hue Red 60.0 Oshitiligane 82.5 
C RO-Hue Orange 85.0 Oshishunga 45.0 
T5 A 0-Hue Orange 100.0 Oshitiligane 45.0 
B YO-Hue Orange 60.0 Oshishunga 87.5 
C Yw-Hue Yellow 90.0 Oshishunga 95.0 
T6 A RO-Hue Orange 85.0 Oshishunga 45.0 
B YO-Hue Orange 60.0 Oshishunga 87.5 
C Y-Hue Yellow 100.0 Oshishunga 100.0 
T7 A R-Hue Red 70.0 Oshitiligane 77.5 
B R-T1 Pink 65.0 Oshitiligane 87.5 
C R-T2 Pink 95.0 Oshitiligane 47.5 
T8 A R-T1 Pink 65.0 Oshitiligane 87.5 
B R-T2 Pink 95.0 Oshitiligane 47.5 
C R-T3 Pink 100.0 Oshitiligane 62.5 
T9 A R-Hue Red 70.0 Oshitiligane 
77.5 
B R-T2 Pink 95.0 Oshitiligane 47.5 
C R-T4 Pink 90.0 Oshiyokahi 35.0 
T10 A R-Hue Red 70.0 Oshitiligane 
77.5 
B RW-Hue Red 60.0 Oshitiligane 
82.5 
C R-T1 Pink 65.0 Oshitiligane 
87.5 
T11 A R-Hue Red 70.0 Oshitiligane 
77.5 
B R-T1 Pink 65.0 Oshitiligane 
87.5 
C Rw-T1 Red 45.0 Oshitiligane 
82.5 
T12 A Rc-T1 Pink 75.0 
Oshitiligane 62.5 
B R-T1 Pink 65.0 Oshitiligane 
87.5 
C Rw-T1 Red 45.0 Oshitiligane 
82.5 
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Table 4.10. Perceptual and English and Ndonga nominal isolation scores for the tiles of 
each triad. The most isolated tile on each of the measures is highlighted in bold. 
Triad Color-Aid Perceptual Nominal 
Number code isolation isolation 
eb"b" AF6. 'syTýbb? ISN. K4AE %f 
English Ndonga 
Ti -A RW-Hue 35.5 11.36 31.25 
B RO-Hue 26.0 45.45 33.48 
C O-Hue 38.5 43.18 35.27 
C 
O T2 A RO-Hue 33.5 34.62 36.06 
N B O-Hue 25.5 37.18 34.13 
G C YO-Hue 41.0 28.21 29.81 
R 
U T3 A YO-Hue 41.0 23.53 32.57 
E B Yw-Hue 25.0 39.71 33.49 
N C Y-Hue 34.0 36.76 33.94 
T 
T4 A R-Hue 38.5 39.29 37.50 
B RW-Hue 25.5 42.86 36.74 
C RO-Hue 35.5 17.86 25.76 
T5 A O-Hue 37.0 30.43 22.66 
B YO-Hue 25.0 45.65 38.67 
C Yw-Hue 38.0 23.91 38.67 
T6 A RO-Hue 37.5 29.41 25.00 
B YO-Hue 25.0 50.00 36.46 
C Y-Hue 37.0 20.59 38.54 
T7 A R-Hue 37.5 23.91 34.76 
I B R-T1 26.0 43.48 34.15 
N C R-T2 36.5 32.61 31.10 
C 
0 T8 A R-T1 31.5 28.41 33.14 
N B R-T2 25.5 35.23 31.66 
G C R-T3 43.0 36.36 35.21 
R 
U T9 A R-Hue 33.0 13.04 31.78 
E B R-T2 26.0 43.48 38.37 
N C R-T4 41.0 43.48 29.84 
T 
T10 A R-Hue 26.5 47.22 32.81 
B RW-Hue 41.0 27.78 33.85 
C R-T1 32.5 25.00 33.33 
T11 A R-Hue 28.0 34.62 31.38 
B R-T1 30.5 30.77 35.11 
C Rw-T1 41.0 34.62 33.51 
T12 A Rc-T1 35.0 35.71 31.28 
B R-T1 25.0 37.50 35.03 
C Rw-T1 40.0 26.79 33.69 
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Viewing condition 
The triad cards were fixed onto a hard plastic disk with a fixed metal pin in the centre. 
Each triad card had a small hole in the centre, allowing them to be fixed onto the base. 
One of two arc-shaped plastic lids could be fitted over the triad card and freely rotated. 
Both lids had a hole at the narrow end of the arc to allow them to be attached to the 
pin on the base and small handle attached to the lid allowed easy rotation. Without any 
lid, all three tiles in the triad could be seen together (three tile condition). With the 
smaller of the two lids placed over the triad only two colours could be seen at the same 
time (two-tile condition). With the larger of the two lids, only one colour could be seen 
at the same time (one-tile condition). 
Procedure 
The participant was instructed that they would be presented with a series of disks each 
with three coloured tiles on them. Their task was to decide which tile was `most differ- 
ent' from the other two. The practise triad, consisting of one red and two green tiles, 
was given first to ascertain that the instructions were understood correctly. The twelve 
experimental triads were then given in a random order. Participants made a decision for 
each triad under each of the three viewing-conditions. The order of the viewing- 
conditions was randomised. In the one and two-tile viewing-conditions, the participant 
was allowed to rotate the lid as many times as felt necessary before choosing a tile. In all 
cases, the experimenter recorded the choice made on each triad. 
4.3.3. Results 
Relative proportions (%) of the English and Ndonga who selected each tile in each triad 
are given in table 4.11. These frequencies are given separately for the three, two and 
one-tile viewing-conditions. The first analyses reported below examine the choices of 
the English and Ndonga in the three-tile viewing-condition only. Further analyses, de- 
scribed later in this section, address prediction P3 by looking at the effect of triad choice 
across viewing-condition. 
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Table 4.11. Percentage of tile choices for each triad in the three, two and one tile 
viewing-conditions. The most frequent choice in each language is highlighted in bold. 
English Ndonga 
Triad 
Number 
Color-Aid 
code 
Three 
tile 
Two 
tile 
One 
tile 
Three 
tile 
Two 
Tile 
One 
tile 
T1 A RW-Hue 11.40 37.10 37.10 47.50 27.50 15.00 
B RO-Hue 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 7.50 17.50 
C O-Hue 88.60 62.90 62.90 50.00 65.00 67.50 
T2 A RO-Hue 28.60 20.00 54.30 60.00 57.50 47.50 
B O-Hue 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.50 7.50 
C YO-Hue 71.40 80.00 45.70 40.00 35.00 45.00 
T3 A YO-Hue 94.30 94.30 88.60 82.50 72.50 70.00 
B Yw-Hue 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 12.50 7.5.00 
C Y-Hue 5.70 5.70 11.40 15.00 15.00 22.50 
T4 
T5 
T6 
A R-Hue 
B RW-Hue 
C RO-Hue 
A O-Hue 
B YO-Hue 
C Yw-Hue 
A RO-Hue 
B YO-Hue 
C Y-Hue 
20.00 20.00 28.60 40.00 30.00 22.50 
2.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.50 10.00 
77.10 80.00 71.40 60.00 62.50 67.50 
60.00 60.00 54.30 77.50 62.50 60.00 
0.00 2.90 0.00 0.00 5.00 7.50 
40.00 37.10 45.70 22.50 32.50 32.50 
60.00 77.10 71.40 95.00 75.00 67.50 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 
40.00 22.90 28.60 5.00 15.00 22.50 
T7 A R-Hue 68.60 57.10 77.10 45.00 40.00 47.50 
B R-T1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 12.50 
C R-T2 31.40 42.90 22.90 55.00 50.00 40.00 
T8 A R-T1 60.00 48.60 62.90 35.00 37.50 30.00 
B R-T2 2.90 0.00 0.00 2.50 5.00 10.00 
C R-T3 37.10 51.40 37.10 62.50 57.50 60.00 
T9 A R-Hue 74.30 62.90 65.70 37.50 52.50 27.50 
B R-T2 0.00 0.00 2.90 0.00 0.00 12.50 
C R-T4 25.70 37.10 31.40 62.50 47.50 60.00 
T10 A R-Hue 14.30 11.40 14.30 40.00 27.50 35.00 
B RW-Hue 25.70 57.10 40.00 17.50 20.00 22.50 
C R-T1 60.00 31.40 45.70 42.50 52.50 42.50 
T11 A R-Hue 37.10 20.00 40.00 62.50 57.50 30.00 
B R-T1 0.00 0.00 2.90 2.50 2.50 7.50 
C Rw-T1 62.90 80.00 57.10 35.00 40.00 62.50 
T12 A Rc-T1 48.60 48.60 45.70 67.50 47.50 55.00 
B R-T1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 7.50 
C Rw-T1 51.40 51.40 54.30 32.50 42.50 37.50 
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Three-tile condition 
A significant positive correlation was found between the choices over the 36 tiles for 
English and Ndonga on the three-tile condition: R= . 71, (<0.0001). Despite this, the 
most frequent choice for the two languages in this condition are different on half of the 
twelve triads: T2, T7, T8, T9, T11 and T12. 
Associations between isolation measures and triad choice 
A test of the effect of the different predictors of isolation on triad choice was per- 
formed using stepwise-multiple regression. The perceptual isolation measure and both 
nominal isolation measures derived from English and Ndonga naming of the tiles in the 
triads were used as predictor variables. The analysis was repeated, firstly with the Eng- 
lish triad choices as the DV, secondly with the Ndonga triad choices. The frequency of 
choices of each tile on each triad was the dependent variable. As in the analysis per- 
formed on the sorting task using this multiple regression procedure, the perceptual 
measure was entered into the equation at the first step for both languages. 
For English triad choices, the regression went through two steps. R was significantly 
different from zero at the end of each step in the analysis. After step-two, R= . 74, 
(F[2,33] = 19.69, p<0.0001). On step-two English nominal isolation was added as a 
significant predictor; this improved R2 by . 
06. Ndonga nominal isolation did not signifi- 
cantly improve R2 and remained excluded from the equation at the final step. At the 
final step, for perceptual isolation 1=0.55, (t = 4.10, p<0.001); for English nominal 
isolation ß= -0.29, (t = -2.12, p<0.05). 
For Ndonga triad choices, regression also went through two steps; R was also signifi- 
cantly different from zero at both steps in the analysis. After step-two, R= . 
73, (F[2, 
33] = 19.21, p<0.00001). In step two, Ndonga nominal isolation was added as a sig- 
nificant predictor; this improved R2 by . 
24. English nominal isolation, did not signifi- 
cantly improve R2, and was excluded from the equation at the final step. At the final 
step, for Perceptual isolation (3 = 0.55, (t = 4.24, p<0.0001). For Ndonga nominal 
isolation (3 = -2.87, (t = -2.87, p<0.001). 
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The above analysis shows that there was a significant positive relationship between the 
perceptual measure of isolation and triad choice7. Tiles that were perceptually more dis- 
tant within the triad were more likely to be chosen. For both English and Ndonga, the 
perceptual isolation measure accounted for most variance in triad choice. However, for 
both language groups, the nominal isolation measure derived from the same language 
contributed significantly more to the regression equation than the perceptual isolation 
measure alone. For both the English and Ndonga, the within-language nominal isolation 
measure had a significant negative correlation with triad choice. The tile having the 
smallest naming overlap within the triad was that most likely to be chosen as the most 
different in the triads. Therefore, prediction P1 was supported. There was a significant 
infra-language association between colour naming and triad choice for both English and 
Ndonga. The cross-language nominal isolation measure did not significantly contribute 
to predicting triad choice'. 
Congruent and incongruent triads 
A better test of the association between naming and performance on the triad task is if 
the choices on the triads can be shown to be 'most different' on those triads where Eng- 
lish and Ndonga nominal predictions conflict. Prediction (P2) proposed a further test of 
whether language was affecting performance on the task by comparing triad-choice on 
triads where nominal predictions of Ndonga agree (congruent triads: T1-T4), with triads 
where the nominal predictions conflict (incongruent triads T5-T12). A score was pro- 
duced for each participant (both English and Ndonga) of the proportion of tiles consis- 
tent with the English nominal prediction. Across-participant means of these scores for 
English and Ndonga are given in fig. 4.4. 
7 Data from English and Ndonga children (Boyles, 2001) indicated some differences in the manner in 
which perceptual differences were affecting choice on the triads task, Ndonga children where more likely 
to use lightness and English children, more likely to use hue. These same perceptual predictors, calculated 
from hue, lightness and chroma differences between stimuli individually were calculated here. For the adult 
data correlations of . 66, . 
82 and . 
36 were found with English choices, and . 
54, 
. 
81 and . 
50 for Ndonga 
choices. Therefore for adults, unlike the children, hue, brightness and chroma, were of the same ranked 
importance for English and Ndonga as predictors of triad choice. 
8 This assertion was also supported by an analysis on the relationship between triad choices and English 
and Ndonga nominal predictions using partial correlations with the perceptual 
isolation measure as a sup- 
pressor variable. 
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Fig. 4.4. Across-participant mean proportion of tiles chosen in line with English nomi- 
nal isolation measure (error bars show +/- 1 S. E. ). 
A two-way ANOVA was performed on these scores with language as an independent 
factor (English, Ndonga) and triad-type (congruent, incongruent) as a related factor. 
Both main effects of this analysis were significant: language (F[1,73] = 16.76, p< 
0.0001); the Ndonga sample made proportionately fewer choices in line with the Eng- 
lish nominal predictions than the English sample; triad-type (F[1,73] = 47.95, p< 
0.0001), more tiles were chosen in line with the English nominal prediction for the con- 
gruent, than the incongruent, triads. The language x triad-type interaction was also sig- 
nificant (F[1,73] = 5.88, p<0.05)9; the Ndonga selected proportionally fewer tiles than 
the English sample in line with the English nominal prediction for the incongruent tri- 
9 Because proportional scores can restrict variance, the analysis was repeated with the Arcsin transforma- 
tion of the choice scores for the control and experimental triads. 
This transformation gives value ranging 
between. 00633 and 3.078 for proportions varying between . 
001 and . 
999 and is effective in stabilising 
variance (Winer, 1971). 
The language x triad-type interaction was still significant when performed on 
scores transformed 
in this manner (F[1,73] = 4.19, p < 0.05). 
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ads than for the congruent triads. This same basic result was also found when the triads 
were selected based on the Ndonga nominal predictions. Here, the language x triad-type 
interaction was also significant (F[1,73] = 20.78, p<0.0001). The English select far 
fewer tiles in line with the Ndonga nominal predictions on the incongruent triads than 
the Ndonga. 
Viewing-condition manipulation 
Prediction P3 proposed that when triad viewing is limited so that fewer tiles can be 
seen simultaneously, English and Ndonga should become more differentiated in triad 
choice for incongruent triads and stay the same for congruent triads. Comparison of 
triad-choice correlations between English and Ndonga for congruent and incongruent 
triads indicated a pattern mostly consistent with this prediction. 
For congruent triads: with all three tiles seen, there was a correlation of r= . 80 
between 
English and Ndonga tile choices. For the two and one-tile conditions, correlations be- 
tween English and Ndonga choices increased to r= . 
83 and r= . 
93 respectively. For 
incongruent triads: with all three tiles seen, there was a correlation of r= . 
78 between 
English and Ndonga tile choices; for the two and one-tile conditions, correlations be- 
tween English and Ndonga choices became r= . 
79 and r= . 
73 respectively. Patterns of 
triad-choice for congruent triads, then, tended to become more similar; the pattern for 
incongruent triads became more different between the languages as the number of si- 
multaneously viewable tiles was reduced. 
Furthermore, consistent with prediction P3, for the English, the correlation between 
English nominal isolation and English triad choices increased, as fewer tiles in the triad 
were viewable at the same time. For the three-tile condition this correlation was r=- 
. 
56; for the two-tile condition it was r=- . 
58, and for the one tile r=- . 
64. However, 
this increase was not significant. Also, for the Ndonga, the opposite effect was ob- 
served. The correlation between Ndonga nominal isolation and Ndonga triad choices 
became lower as fewer tiles in the triad were visible. For the three-tile condition the 
correlation was r=- . 
64; for the two-tile condition it was r= . 
56, and for the one tile 
condition, the correlation was - . 
53 (all correlations were significant at less than p= 
0.01). 
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Observation of the raw scores of triad choices suggested that overall, as fewer tiles in 
the triad could be seen together, the principal effect was a reduction in consistency be- 
tween participants in triad choices. If the viewing-condition manipulation had increased 
the tendency to use a verbal strategy, one would expect consistency to also increase. 
Across viewing conditions, the labelling of stimuli should be more reliable than judge- 
ments of perceptual similarity between stimuli. A decrease in consistency across partici- 
pants would suggest that reducing the number of viewable tiles was not inducing a ver- 
bal labelling strategy but instead was producing greater variation in choices. In order to 
test consistency formally, a consistency measure across triads was produced. For each of 
the twelve triads, consistency in triad choice (c) was computed for English and Ndonga. 
[Sabc -s-] 
where sabc is the standard deviation10 in choices across the three tiles of a triad and s, 
is the maximum possible standard deviation for the particular sample size (e. g. with an n 
of 35, s-x is 20.21). From this formula, c could vary between zero and one. That is, 
from maximal inconsistency, when participant choices are split evenly across each tile of 
the triad, to maximal consistency, when every participant in a sample chooses the same 
tile as being 'most different'. Across-triad mean consistency scores for English and 
Ndonga are is given in table 4.9. for congruent triads and table 4.10. for incongruent 
triads. 
Table 4.9. Mean across-triad consistency scores (s. d. ) for congruent triads. 
, ate ... . Viewing-condition 
iNNýn°fýF. -': %I. 6iFf&BW. eYDY9. eNOlnUA¢ANLM' . XY9. RYb. FYA' 
Three-tile Two-tile One-tile Mean 
English ý_ý., ýý.. ý.... ý... 0.760.720.62.. ý., ý...,. ý.... ý... 0.70 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Ndonga 0.57 0.50 0.49 0.52 
(0.12) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
Mean 0.67 0.61 0.56 
(0.13) (0.08) (0.11) 
lo Similar findings were found when the variance (v) of the choices was used rather than the standard 
deviation. 
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Table 4.10. Mean across-triad consistency scores (s. d. ) for incongruent triads 
rmreý<, ýý. wýw ýwrýmv«: rýma ýaý. w? rsýnv. ttr.. cer. -. ar: ýmarss,: ý ý.. aw: a:: w ar. ýsanw. , rraa 
Viewing-condition 
Three-tile Two-tile One-tile Mean 
English ýýý ý 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.53 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) 
Ndonga 0.56 0.45 0.40 0.47 
(0.19) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) 
Mean 0.53 0.50 0.46 
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12) 
It was tested to find if significant differences existed in consistency among viewing con- 
ditions and between the languages. A three-way ANOVA was performed on the consis- 
tency scores with triads as the units of analysis. There were two repeated measures fac- 
tors in this analysis: language (English, Ndonga) and viewing-condition (three-tile, two- 
tile, one-tile. ). There was one independent measures factor: congruency (congruent, in- 
congruent triads). Overall, consistency was significantly reduced by viewing-condition. 
Consistency was significantly lower the fewer the number of viewable tiles (F[2,20] _ 
13.01, p<0.0001). The English were significantly more consistent than the Ndonga in 
triad choice overall (F[1,10] = 25.15, p<0.001). No other effects or interactions were 
significant. 
Therefore, viewing condition manipulation had a highly significant effect on consistency 
for each language. With fewer tiles in the triad seen together, decisions across partici- 
pants were more varied. This suggests that the viewing-condition manipulation was not 
promoting verbal labelling, but was probably just increasing the difficulty of the judge- 
ments resulting in a greater randomness in choices. 
4.3.4. Discussion 
Like the colour sorting task, a significant relationship between language and perform- 
ance was found. Consistent with other studies using this method 
(Davies & Corbett, 
1997; Kay & Kempton, 1984), there was a significant within-language association be- 
180 
tween naming and triad-choice for English and Ndonga. Importantly, cross-language 
naming - triad-choice associations were not significant. Therefore, naming in each lan- 
guage predicted triad choice in the same language, but not the other. Further support for 
the conjecture that language influenced triad-choice was found in the fact that the larg- 
est difference in triad-choice between English and Ndonga speakers was highest on 
those triads where the nominal predictions of the two languages differed. When both 
languages predicted the same tile as `most different', similar proportions of English and 
Ndonga speakers chose that tile. When the predictions of the English and Ndonga lan- 
guage differ, speakers of each language had a significant tenancy to follow the prediction 
of their own language above that of the other language. 
Manipulating the number of visible tiles in the triad affected differences in triad choice 
between English and Ndonga for incongruent tiles. However, the main effect of this 
manipulation was on the consistency between participants in triad choice. This consis- 
tency, overall, was greater for the English than the Ndonga. However, for both lan- 
guages, consistency between participants decreased as fewer tiles in the triad could be 
seen together. This suggests, that reducing the number of viewable tiles did not increase 
the tendency to use verbal labels, but instead made the task more difficult to perform. 
In summary, the triads task, like the sorting task, shows that colour similarity judge- 
ments can differ between languages. Within a language, colours having a different name 
are more likely to be chosen as the most different tile in a triad than colours sharing the 
same name. The triads task is almost certainly less highly cognitively loaded than the 
sorting task. However, although the task invites perceptual comparisons, like the sorting 
task there is nothing to prevent a direct language approach. Therefore it is not possible 
to say that the differences between English and Ndonga were perceptual in origin. The 
next experiment uses a task in which a direct language strategy is much less likely to be 
helpful. Differences between languages on this task can therefore more convincingly at- 
tributed to differences in perception. 
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4.4. Experiment Ten 
Colour Search Task 
4.4.1. Introduction 
The colour sorting and triads task both require subjective colour difference judgements. 
It is possible that, because of this, both tasks actually invite verbal comparisons among 
stimuli. If language is influencing colour perception per se, differences among languages 
should also be found in tasks in which a verbal strategy is unlikely to be helpful. One 
such task is visual search. Experiment three showed that decisions about the presence or 
absence of a colour in a large number of distractors could be made very rapidly (around 
500 ms when targets and distractors were linearly separable). This suggests visual search 
is a very perceptually loaded task. With such short latencies, decisions must be being 
made before verbal labels are likely to be available to influence judgements. Experiment 
three also found that visual search is sensitive to categorical differences between targets 
and distractors. When target colours were in a different category to distractors, decisions 
tended to be faster than when they were in the same category. The fact that perform- 
ance in visual search can be affected by the colour categories of targets and distractors 
has implications for linguistic relativity. Assuming visual search is conducted on a per- 
ceptual basis, if colour language `warps' perception, under certain conditions differences 
should be found between languages on visual search. If differences were found between 
English and Ndonga speakers in visual search, consistent with the differences in colour 
language, it would suggest that this was not the result of verbal strategies. Instead, it 
would imply English and Ndonga differed in the perception of colour as a result of their 
colour language differences. 
There would be difficulties in using in the field the visual search paradigm in experiment 
three. The task requires highly accurate timing in measuring the duration of responses. 
An alternative visual search method was therefore used. This method was taken from 
Neiser (1964). The task involved speeded search for several target colours (colours the 
same as a given standard), among a large set of distractors. Each target was to be marked 
with a pen. The task therefore took much longer to complete than a trial in experiment 
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three. The important variable in the task is search time: the time taken to search through 
all items to find distractors. This duration could easily be measured with a stopwatch. 
Pilot data found that search times generally took around 400 ms an item. Differences in 
time taken to complete the task tend to vary in seconds rather than milliseconds. The 
speed of performance per item suggests that it unlikely that verbal strategies are used. In 
order to further minimise the usefulness of a verbal strategy, the memory load in the 
current experiment was minimised by having the standard colour remain present 
throughout the task. This means that differences between language groups consistent 
with differences in colour language should not be direct language effects. However, the 
possibility of a language strategy cannot be discounted. In a search task in which targets 
have to be found from distractor items in an array, if one had no name for any item in 
the array, all items would have to be considered as potential targets. If, however, one 
had a name for the target colour this could reduce the search to only those items having 
that name. When no distractor has the same name as a target, this labelling strategy 
should be most effective. Therefore, while unlikely, it is possible that verbal labels could 
facilitate visual search. 
If language has changed colour perception by making colours with different names in a 
language appear more different and colours with the same name appear more similar this 
should affect visual search for these colours. When a language can distinguish targets and 
distractors by name, visual search should be facilitated compared to a language where 
targets and distractors are not distinguished by name. In the former language, targets and 
distractors would be in different categories and therefore targets would appear percep- 
tually more isolated from distractors. However, when distractors with the same name as 
targets in a language are introduced, this should hinder visual search for that language. 
Targets would no longer be distinguished from distractors by category. Therefore, if tar- 
gets and distractors fall into different English, but not Ndonga, colour categories, the 
English should be relatively advantaged compared to the Ndonga. Where targets and 
distractors fall into the same English, but not Ndonga, categories, the advantage for the 
English should be reduced. 
In order to test this assertion, two visual search conditions were compared. Targets were 
the same in both conditions (orange). For Ndonga, orange is not a basic category. Or- 
ange hues tend to be given a non-basic term, or the same term for either `red' or `yel- 
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low'. In both conditions, some distractors were red or yellow. For one of the visual 
search conditions (the pure list condition) all distractors were yellow or red. Distractors 
were therefore, for the English, all from different colour categories to the target. For 
the other condition, (the mixed list condition), some distractors were orange and there- 
fore from the same category as targets, for the English, but not the Ndonga. 
Therefore, in the pure list condition, for the English, targets are distinguished from all 
distractors on the basis of category. In the mixed list condition, for the English, targets 
are only distinguished from some of the distractors on the basis of category. If differ- 
ences in English and Ndonga colour cognition are only direct language effects there 
should be no differences in relative performance of English and Ndonga on the two 
conditions. The English may be faster overall than Ndonga (due to a greater familiarity 
in performing speeded cognitive tasks), but any advantage should be the same in both 
conditions. However, if the perception of colours in the orange category is more 
equivalent for the English, compared to the Ndonga, there should be differences in the 
relative performance of English and Ndonga on the two conditions. Compared to the 
Ndonga, performance for the English should be slower in the mixed list condition com- 
pared to the pure list condition. Any reduction in performance in this condition for the 
Ndonga should be less than for the English. 
A schematic view of the two conditions is given in fig. 4.5. In the actual task there were 
more items in the lists: 19 targets and 149 distractors on each list. The standard (the 
colour the same as the targets) is at the top of the list (01). The distractors are in the 
grid below this. The pure list condition is shown on the left. In this grid, there targets 
(01) and two types of dis tractor, yellow (Y) and red (R). The mixed list condition is on 
the right. In this condition, there are also targets the same as in the pure list condition 
(01). Also like the pure list condition, some distractors are yellow (Y), some red (R). 
However, unlike the pure list there are now also some orange distractors (02). 
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Fig. 4.5. Schematic representation of the pure (A) and mixed (B) list. 
Predictions 
The main dependent variable in the task is search-time, the time taken to complete the 
task in each condition. Differences between English and Ndonga found in the previous 
two experiments may be only direct language effects. If this is the case, and colour per- 
ception itself does not differ between English and Ndonga, there should be no differ- 
ences in the relative performance of the two groups. However, if language has affected 
perception then there should be relative differences in performance. A second prediction 
(P2) is made about relative patterns of errors. The orange distractors (02) are same 
category for the English. If colours that are same category for the English are perceived 
as more similar than for the Ndonga, the English should more frequently mistake these 
same-category distractors as targets. 
P1 Search time: If language has affected perception, in the pure list condition, targets 
should be more distinguishable from distractors for the English. In the mixed list 
condition, because some distractors are in the same category as targets (for the 
English), any advantage in performance on the pure list condition over the 
Ndonga should be reduced. For the Ndonga, any loss in performance for the 
mixed list, compared to the pure list should be less. 
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P2 Cross vs. within-category errors: If language has affected perception, in the mixed list 
condition, the relative frequency of orange distractors being erroneously chosen 
as targets should be higher for the English than the Ndonga. 
4.4.2. Method 
Participants 
Eighteen English speakers (11 male, 7 female) mean age 30 and forty Ndonga speakers 
(15 male, 25 female), mean age 29 were used. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli consist of three visual search cards: one practise card and two experimental 
cards. Each card was A4 (210 x 297mm) in size. Colour stimuli were printed on the 
card on a neutral grey background. The standard was at the top of the card for all three 
cards. This standard was a single colour patch 15mm2. The array was below the standard 
and consisted of 168 colour patches (all 15mm2) arranged into a 12 x 14 grid with a1 
mm space separating adjacent patches. On both experimental cards, 19 of the squares 
were targets and 149 were distractors. For both experimental cards, the target- 
'standard' was orange (01). For the practise card it was red. On the practise card, all 
distractors were green. For the experimental cards: on the pure list distractors were one 
of two colours: red (R) or yellow (Y). On the mixed list, distractors were one of three 
colours: red (R), yellow (Y) or orange (02). Perceptual differences between stimuli (in 
CIELUV) in the two conditions are shown in fig 4.6. 
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Fig. 4.6. Location of colours in CIELUV on pure and mixed list conditions. 
Procedure 
Participants were told that the cards would be placed in front of them one at a time; 
they were informed that the first card was for practise purposes to ensure that the in- 
structions were understood correctly. They were told that on each card was a single col- 
our patch at the top, called the standard, and a grid of colours below this and were in- 
formed that the task was to mark with a pen colours in the grid that were physically 
identical to the standard. They were instructed to start the task immediately on presen- 
tation of the card and to mark all the colours that were the same as the standard then 
put the pen on the last colour to finish. Participants were told to perform the task as 
quickly as possible, without compromising accuracy. Search time, time elapsed from 
presentation of the sheet to completion of the task, was recorded by the experimenter. 
A clear acetate sheet was attached on top of the each of the cards before presenting 
them to the participant to allow re-use of the card. The task was performed using the 
illuminates described in § 4.1.1. Participants performed both the pure and mixed-list 
card. Order of presentation of the two experimental cards was randomised. 
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4.4.3. Results 
Search-time 
One English speaker and four Ndonga speakers were removed from the analysis as out- 
liers for having search-times more than two standard deviations from their group mean. 
The means and estimated standard errors in the search-times of the English and Ndonga 
samples are shown in fig. 4.7. 
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Fig. 4.7. Search-time for pure and mixed lists in seconds (+/- 1 S. E. ). 
Analysis of search-times was performed by two-way ANOVA with language (English, 
Ndonga) as an independent factor and list-type (pure, mixed) as a related factor. A main 
effect was found for list-type (F[1,56] = 66.91, p>0.001). The only other significant 
effect was a significant language x list-type interaction (F[1,56] = 6.85, p<0.05). 
Post-hoc protected t-tests between the mean search-times for English and Ndonga on 
each condition were calculated to look at this interaction. Differences between the 
mean English and Ndonga search-times approached significance for both the pure sheet 
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(t[56] = 1.84, p=0.071), and the mixed sheet (t[56] = 1.87, p=0.067). Significant dif- 
ferences were found between the mean search-time for the pure and mixed list sheet for 
the English (t[56] = 7.63, p<0.0001) and for the Ndonga (t[56] = 3.93, p<0.001). 
Difference in mean search-times between the pure and mixed conditions was signifi- 
cantly greater for the English than the Ndonga (456] = 3.70, p < 0.001). 
Accuracy 
A measure of accuracy on the task was computed for each participant on the pure and 
mixed list using A-prime. Few errors were made on the task by either language sample. 
On the pure list, the across-participant mean A' was 0.997 (0.01) for the English sample 
and 0.997 (0.01), for the Ndonga sample. On the mixed list, the across-participant mean 
A' scores was 0.974 (0.02) for the English and 0.99 (0.03) for Ndonga. A two way 
ANOVA with language (English, Ndonga) as an independent factor and list-type (pure, 
mixed) as a related factor was performed on the A' scores. The only significant main ef- 
fect was for list-type (F[1,56] = 21.08, p<0.0001), showing that overall accuracy was 
significantly higher on the pure-list condition. 
Although no language effects were found on the accuracy scores, an ANCOVA was per- 
formed on the search-time scores to test if any effects on search time were the result of 
any speed-accuracy trade off. In this analysis, language (English, Ndonga) as an inde- 
pendent factor and list-type (pure, mixed) as a repeated measures factor with the A' 
score for each participant on each list as a covariate. This analysis increased the signifi- 
cance of the language X list-type interaction for search-time (F[1,55] = 7.37, p<0.01). 
The observed interaction between language and list-type was therefore, not the result of 
a different speed accuracy trade-off between the two language samples. Prediction P1 <D C) 
was therefore supported. 
Pattern of errors 
While the overall number of errors was small, significantly more errors were made on 
the mixed list. Further analysis tested if either language had showed any greater ten- 
dency to incorrectly mark the distractor oranges as targets more than the other distractor 
colours. In order to test this, 
for the mixed list condition the proportion of false alarms 
(FA) made with within-category (02) and with cross-category (R and Y) distractors 
was computed for each participant. The across-participant means of these scores 
for 
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each language are given as percent proportions of the number of within and cross cate- 
gory distractors in table 4.10. 
Table 4.10. Percentage of within and cross-category errors made on the mixed list con- 
dition. 
. ýý: ý. ý : caýýw: ýýaH sýwa:: raa: ýattsaceýxaxaiana: ¢nýax.. ý'ýýnaýaaxaxa+. wýxýaawe+x* ä 
. <x: area 
False alarm type 
Within category Cross category 
English 1.11 0.16 
(3.17) (0.49) 
Ndonga 2.00 0.12 
(4.05) (0.76) 
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A two-way ANOVA was performed on these scores with language (English, Ndonga) as 
an independent factor and error-type (within, cross) as a repeated measures factor. The 
effect of error-type was significant; a significantly greater proportion of within-category, 
in relation to cross-category FA's, were made (F[1,56] = 5.30, p<0.05). There was no 
effect of language and no interaction. Therefore, prediction P2 was not supported. 
There was no significant tendency on the task for either language to make proportion- 
ately more of either type of error. 
4.4.4. Discussion 
The overall performance of the Ndonga on the task was approximately similar to the 
English despite the difference in average education". However, there were significant 
language differences in performance. It was predicted that English speakers would be 
advantaged relative to the Ndonga on the pure-list condition, but that the advantage 
would be reduced on the mixed-list condition (P1). This prediction was supported. The 
difference between the pure and mixed-lists was greater for the English than the 
Ndonga. However, although it was assumed the English would be faster across both 
" Mean years of schooling was less than 10 years for the Ndonga. Most of the English sample had 
schooling beyond secondary 
level. 
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conditions, the English were on average slower than the Ndonga in the mixed list condi- 
tion (although not significantly so). It seems therefore, that the effect of the introduc- 
tion distractors that were in the same category as targets in English was greater for the 
English than the Ndonga. This result is consistent with perceptual warping having oc- 
curred. The effect may be through a combination of both inter-category distinctiveness 
and within-category equivalence for English speakers. If English speakers had come to 
see orange as more perceptually distinct from red and yellow than the Ndonga they should 
have been advantaged on both lists. In both cases, the targets would be more distinct 
from the yellow and red distractors. If English speakers came to perceive colours within 
the orange category as being more perceptually similar, this should disadvantage them on 
the mixed but not the pure list. 
Although, visual search could be performed on a purely perceptual basis, the results are 
also consistent with a direct language explanation. Because the nominal code that can be 
given to targets is more useful for the English than the Ndonga, labelling strategies 
would be more effective for English speakers in identifying targets. However, in the 
mixed list condition, this name code is less useful for the English. While having an orange 
term may have advantaged the English speakers in reducing the number of competitors 
in the array over which to search, it may disadvantage them in that more attention is 
paid to same-name distractors. Against this explanation is the speed of average search 
times, which suggest that decisions about whether individual items were targets or dis- 
tractors were faster than naming processes. 
In summary, consistent with the previous experiments in this chapter, this experiment 
supports linguistic relativity in showing an association between language and colour 
cognition. The experiment further suggested that there could be genuine perceptual dif- 
ferences between English and Ndonga as a result of colour language differences. 
4.5. General Discussion 
The basic prediction made at the beginning of this chapter was that if language affects 
perception, that there should be systematic differences in English and Ndonga colour 
cognition on account of the differences in colour language. In general, all three experi- 
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ments showed that despite the considerable difference in English and Ndonga colour 
language, performance on all three tasks showed substantial similarities. Differences in 
colour language were certainly greater than any differences in colour cognition between 
English and Ndonga, as measured on these tasks. Therefore the general picture was one 
of an overriding universalism in colour cognition. On the sorting task (experiment 
eight), both languages tended to form the same number of groups from the given set of 
tiles. The association between the sorting solutions produced for English and Ndonga 
was highly significant. On the triads task (experiment nine), the proportion of choices 
across the three tiles on each triad was similar for both languages. On the search task 
(experiment ten), English and Ndonga showed comparable performance on both condi- 
tions of the task. 
Despite these overall similarities however, there was strong evidence that the differ- 
ences in colour language had resulted in some differences in performance on all three 
tasks. For the sorting task it was found that colour naming for each language predicted 
the sorting solution for that language. Tiles sharing the same name within a language 
were more frequently placed in the same group by speakers of that language. For the 
triads task, an analogous language effect was found. Within a triad, the nominal similar- 
ity of a tile (the frequency with which a tile was given the same name as other tiles in 
the triad) predicted the frequency with which that tile was chosen within a language. 
More importantly, on triads where English and Ndonga had different nominal predic- 
tions, each language was significantly more likely to follow their own language predic- 
tion. While these two experiments do suggest differences in English and Ndonga colour 
cognition, the effects are compatible with a direct language or a perceptual explanation. 
However, the finding of differences in performance on visual search between English 
and Ndonga is against the former interpretation. The speed with which the visual search 
task was conducted by both languages suggests that neither language was using a label- 
ling strategy. Yet, despite this, differences consistent with differences in colour language 
were found between English and Ndonga. When targets were in a different category to 
all distractors for the English, English and Ndonga performed the task in about the same 
time. However, when some distractors were in the same category as the targets for the 
English, the English were more affected than the Ndonga. Search times for the English 
in this condition were significantly longer than for the Ndonga. Further evidence against 
a direct language explanation comes from participant reports from all the tasks. If nam- 
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ing strategies are being used on these tasks participants were not aware of it. They tend 
to claim they are performing the tasks only on a perceptual basis. 
Therefore, while the previous chapter found evidence suggesting that categorical percep- 
tion is a direct language effect the evidence from this chapter is consistent with a per- 
ceptual account of CP. It suggest that there may be some small differences in the percep- 
tion of colour between English and Ndonga as a result of differences in colour language. 
However, it must be conceded that since the evidence from this chapter is all correla- 
tion it is not possible to directly attribute differences in performance to language. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
General Discussion 
5.1. Issues 
The experiments in this thesis have employed several different methods looking at the 
properties of colour categories. The results of these experiments have contributed some 
understanding to the nature of colour categorisation. The separate issues involved are 
given below under sub-headings. 
5.1.1. Independence of category codes 
Experiments one and two suggested that physical and categorical aspects of colour are 
represented as separate codes. This shows comparisons with research on the visual proc- 
essing of letters (Proctor, 1981; Posner et al., 1969); it supports the notion of dual-codes 
operating in colour judgements. The main evidence of the separate coding of physical 
and category aspects of colour is the effect of delay on particular pair-types. For in- 
stance, in experiment one, with simultaneous presentation of pairs, category-identity 
decisions were more rapid for physically identical pairs compared to physically different 
same pairs. With a 5000 ms inter-stimulus delay, this advantage was gone. It suggests 
that there is a shift from using the physical code to the category code as a basis for 
making colour judgements. In support of this, the influence of category codes on judge- 
ments of physically identical pairs in both experiment one and two, was found to in- 
crease significantly with delay. That is, as delay increased, decisions about the category 
and physical identity of colours near the category boundary became increasingly slow 
relative to decisions about category and physical identity of colours away from the 
boundary. Evidence in both experiments implied that physical and category codes influ- 
ence judgements in parallel, supporting Bornstein and Korda (1984). For both experi- 
ments one and two, performance differences were found for stimulus pairs differing in 
perceptual distance and pairs differing in their position within a category. 
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5.1.2. Is categorical perception actually perceptual? 
Tasks investigating colour CP tend to use a delayed discrimination task (e. g. Bornsten & 
Korda, Boynton et al., 1987); a tradition probably stemming from the use of this method 
in phoneme CP research where the nature of the stimuli precludes simultaneous presen- 
tations. However experiments six and seven, consistent with Roberson and Davidoff 
(2000), both indicated that colour CP was due to verbal labelling of the memory 
stimulus. Verbal interference on CP was seemingly independent of the particular dis- 
crimination task used, occurring for both the 2AFC and same-different judgement task. 
This may suggest that CP is actually a phenomenon of memory rather than of perception 
and suggests that the term categorical perception may actually be a misnomer. It is pos- 
sible however, that the type of tasks given lend themselves to participants employing 
labelling strategies, therefore it may be that discrimination made on these tasks is in 
some way different to tasks without a memory component. The evidence from experi- 
ments one to three supports this assertion. However, experiments one and two did not 
support Bornstein and Korda's claim that physical and category codes were available 
early in visual processing. With simultaneous presentations, for neither experiment one 
or two, judgements that could be made on the basis of the physical code didn't show 
any influence of category codes. That is, there was no significant performance advantage 
for decisions about colour pairs away from the category boundary compared to pairs 
adjacent to the boundary. The results were consistent with a model of stimulus coding 
proposed by Wood (1974,1975). Wood argues that physical and category codes do oc- 
cur in parallel but that an initial stage involves only the physical code. Experiment three, 
however, showed that category codes influence visual search; these results suggested 
that this influence occurred relatively early in visual processing. When targets were in a 
different colour category to distractors, visual search was facilitated, compared to when 
targets and distractors were in the same category. The rapidity in which decisions were 
made in the former of these conditions implied that category codes of the stimuli were 
available very early in visual processing or that perceptual space had been stretched 
across category boundaries.. 
In order to investigate categorical perception one may need to concentrate more on purely 
perceptual tasks where stimulus labelling is unlikely to be a beneficial strategy, such as 
visual search. For discrimination tasks, this would mean using tasks where stimuli do 
not need to be retained in memory. If reliable CP effects cannot be demonstrated in 
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such perceptual tasks it would force the conclusion that CP, at least for colour, is a 
high-level activity associated with strategic verbal labelling of stimuli (Goldstone, Lippa 
& Shiffrin, 2000). It would be evidence against the possibility that CP arises from ac- 
quired changes in perceptual coding (Harnad, 1987). 
5.1.3. Colour categorisation: top-down or bottom up? 
Related to the above question for colour is the question of where colour categorisation 
occurs, i. e. whether it is a top-down activity, driven by learned high-level concepts or 
whether colour is categorised early in perceptual processing? Goldstone (Goldstone & 
Barsalou, 1998; Goldstone et al., 2000) has argued that it is a misconception to assume 
perceptual and conceptual activity are distinct, given the top-down effects of categorisa- 
tion on perception and the grounding of high-level concepts in perception. The ques- 
tion, then, is better phrased as of where to place colour categorisation on such a contin- 
uum. This is unlikely to be answered by a single experiment. 
What is indicated by experiments in the current thesis is that categorisation processes 
may differ across different sorts of colour judgement tasks. Deciding the category- 
identity of colours seemed to involve different categorisation processes to CP in colour 
discrimination. Verbal interference had a selective effect on CP for discrimination 
judgements but had no selective effect on judgements of category-identity. It may be 
that in certain tasks such as judging category-identity, colour category information is di- 
rectly accessed from a perceptually represented code. In other tasks, such as discritnina- 
tion judgements, there may be a reliance on verbal labels. In category-identity judge- 
ments, explicit comparisons of category codes are required. In discrimination judge- 
ments, comparisons of category codes may be implicit. This distinction between implicit 
and explicit categorisation might explain why different types of category codes seem to 
be involved in CP and judging category-identity. This does not necessarily mean that 
category-identity judgements will always involve perceptual codes; or that CP always 
involves verbal labelling. It is possible that with large inter-stimulus intervals, category 
identity judgements become more reliant on the availability of verbal codes as percep- 
tual category codes are lost. Equally, it is possible that CP resulting from perceptual 
category codes will occur for discriminations where inter-stimulus intervals are small. 
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Although in experiment two, CP was not found under conditions of simultaneous pres- 
entation, it might be that with more difficult discriminations, perceptually coded CP is 
found. The fact category membership of targets and distractors in visual search can af- 
fect decisions about the presence of targets in an array implies perceptual category codes 
are involved. In visual search, category codes seem to be available in a time frame that 
makes them unlikely to be the result of stimulus labelling. It may be that when targets 
are uniquely defined by category, i. e. all distractors are from different categories to tar- 
gets, that searches can be conducted by attending principally to category codes. Deci- 
sions in visual search would then be analogous to category-identity judgements. The 
presence of a target could be decided by performing a category-identity comparison be- 
tween all elements in the visual search array and the memory representation of the tar- 
get. 
5.1.4. Linguistic relativity and colour cognition. 
Directly relevant to the issue of colour categorisation as a top-down or bottom-up ac- 
tivity is the question of the effect of language on perception. That is, whether learning 
to categorise colour in a language merely involves associating names with universal per- 
ceptual structures or actually involves the creation of new perceptual structures, or 
some other modification of perceptual space. Evidence has suggested physiological un- 
derpinnings for colour categories (DeValois & DeValois, 1969). However, failures to 
find convincing relationships between physiological measures of cell activity and colour 
categories weakens the position that colour categories are universal perceptual struc- 
tures. Contrary to Rosch (1977), growing evidence supports linguistic relativity. Differ- 
ences in colour language are related to differences in non-linguistic cognition (e. g. Da- 
vies and Corbett, 1997; Roberson, Davies and Davidoff, 2001). The three experiments 
in chapter four gave some further support to linguistic relativity. Consistent with colour 
language differences between English and Ndonga, differences were found in the per- 
formance on all three tasks. Differences in colour sorting and colour triad performance 
were found together with associations between this performance and colour language. A 
linguistic measure of colour difference based on colour naming of the stimuli in English 
and Ndonga indicated that for both tasks, within-language colour naming predicted per- 
formance significantly better than cross-language naming. Most importantly, differences 
consistent with colour language differences between English and Ndonga were found in 
visual search. English speakers were faster than Ndonga at finding specified targets 
in an 
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array when that target was uniquely defined by its category membership (for the Eng- 
lish). When same-category distractors (for the English) were present in the array, the 
advantage for the English was lost. 
The fact that language effects were found in all three of the tasks on which English and 
Ndonga were compared including visual search, the most perceptually loaded of the 
tasks, suggests that the difference in colour cognition may be perceptual. That is that 
language differences have resulted in perceptual differences in colour representation. 
However, this is unresolved. It could be that the association between language and per- 
formance were all the result of participants making nominal comparisons between stim- 
uli. If the differences between the groups were only due to such direct effects of lan- 
guage, it would suggest that linguistic relativism is saying only something trivial about 
colour cognition and categorisation. That is, that possessing labels distinguishing colours 
can sometimes be useful in making perceptual decisions. However, if the differences be- 
tween languages can be shown to be perceptual, it would indicate that there was plas- 
ticity in colour vision. In order to show that differences between languages were low- 
level, it would be necessary to show that language differences in colour perception were 
stable across different types of colour judgement. Experiment nine tested this by com- 
paring triad judgements in three conditions that varied the perceptual load by altering 
the number of colours in the triad that were simultaneously viewable. However, the 
main effect of this manipulation was to increase the randomness of judgements across 
participants. The stability of differences in colour judgements between languages could 
be tested more effectively by directly comparing languages on different types of judge- 
ment tasks that used the same stimuli. For instance, comparisons could be made be- 
tween discrimination, oddity judgements, and pair-wise subjective similarity ratings on 
the same set of three colours. 
5.2. Suggested further research 
5.2.1. Category judgements 
Important in categorisation is our ability to determine if colours are from the same or 
different categories. Category identity is one of the most basic types of category judge- 
ment and such judgements are probably 
involved in more complex colour judgements, 
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e. g. colour sorting. Experiment four found no laterality in making these judgements. 
Experiment five found neither verbal or visual interference tasks had a selective effect 
on making these judgements. Therefore, it suggests that such judgements are not being 
made on the basis of verbal codes but probably on the basis of a perceptual code. The 
visual interference in experiment five, however, did not seem to affect this code. How- 
ever, the visual interference stimuli were achromatic. It would be interesting to look at 
category identity judgements performed with visual interference involving colour stimuli 
e. g. a colour discrimination or search task. If selective interference were found from 
these tasks, it would support the notion of perceptual category codes. 
5.2.2. Visual search 
Several important manipulations could be performed on the visual search task in ex- 
periment three that could increase understanding of the effects observed. Most impor- 
tant is to attempt to replicate the effect of comparing cross and within category condi- 
tions in visual search using stimuli from different categories. This would indicate if the 
effect was definitely due to the category membership of targets and distractors and not 
due to irregularities in the CIE system between the colour regions compared. It would 
be interesting to compare situations where one distractor is in the same category as tar- 
gets compared to when neither distractor is in the same category as the target. The for- 
mer condition may produce shorter decision times than when the target and distractors 
are all in the same category but should not produce pop-out. The condition would still 
require an active search for targets since they are not wholly defined by category. There- 
fore, the number of distractors should significantly influence decision time. Another 
possible manipulation would be to introduce some form of verbal interference with the 
visual search task. It is unlikely that the advantage for the cross category condition is 
due to verbal labelling. However, if verbal interference affected the advantage for the 
cross-category condition in visual search it would strengthen the claim that the advan- 
tage is due to perceptual category codes. 
5.2.3. Other perceptual categories 
The question can be asked of how general the findings are to other forms of perceptual 
categories. There is a large body of research on phoneme categorisation. Several parallels 
between colour categories and phoneme categories have been found (Bornstein & 
Korda, 1984) 1985; Bornstein, 1987), and Roberson and Davidoff (2000) have shown 
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the same effect of verbal interference on colour and facial expression CP. It may be that 
some of the findings from this thesis are generic across perceptual categories. It would 
be interesting if other kinds of CP in delayed discrimination were affected in the same 
way by the verbal interference tasks used experiments five to seven, e. g. musical inter- 
vals (Siegal & Siegal, 1977), and learned CP in similarity judgements (Livingstone, An- 
drews, & Harnad, 1998). 
5.2.4. Category learning 
All the experiments in this thesis have used existing colour categories and have not 
looked at how colour categories are learned. An important question is to the extent to 
which trained colour categories, (i. e. colour categorisations acquired through massed 
practice, see Goldstone, 1994; Ozgen, 2000) have the same properties of naturally oc- 
curring colour categories. While it has been shown that CP can be acquired as a result of 
training, the test phase for both Goldstone (1994) and Özgen (2000), involved partici- 
pants making discriminations of sequentially presented stimulus pairs. It would be inter- 
esting if trained categorisations could bring about improvements in visual search. It 
would further be interesting to look at the possibility of whether category learning could 
bring about long-term changes in perception (e. g. 3 months post-training). Current re- 
search on category learning has tended to look at changes in perceptual judgements ei- 
ther immediately or 24 hours post training. If category training could be shown to facili- 
tate visual search of the trained-stimuli and if long term changes in any perceptual 
judgement could be observed it would indicate plasticity in colour perception. It would 
suggest that in learning colour categories either artificially or through language involve 
enduring changes in the perceptual representation of colour. 
5.2.5. Linguistic relativity 
Experiment ten provided an interesting result in showing differences between two lan- 
guages in visual search associated with differences in colour language. It would be useful 
to find if different search functions would be obtained between languages where targets 
and distractors fall into different categories for one language but not 
for another. If dif- 
ferences between groups differing in colour language are low-level, manipulating the 
number of distractors has a lesser effect for languages where targets and 
distractors are 
given different names - targets should `pop-out' 
from distractors. For languages where 
targets and distractors are not distinguished in the language, the effect of increasing the 
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number of distractors should be greater. However, the `acid test' of linguistic relativity 
in colour perception would be if language differences could be shown to produce differ- 
ences in threshold sensitivity to wavelength change. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Perceptually `uniform' colour spaces 
This appendix gives an outline of the basis of two perceptually `uniform' colour systems; 
both systems are the result of extensive psychophysical research on colour difference and 
are commonly used in colour research. Detailed descriptions of both these systems, in- 
cluding formulas for conversion, are given in Hunt (1987) and Travis (1991). It must be 
stated that while so called perceptually uniform scales purport to give an objective de- 
scription of perceivable colour distances they do so without accounting for possible 
cross-cultural variation, the `standard observers' used in developing these systems have 
tended to be American or European. 
The Munsell system 
The Munsell colour system was developed by Albert Munsell in 1905. The system gives 
printable colours. The system is often visually represented as an irregular 3-dimentional 
solid with the vertical plane representing value (lightness); the horizontal plane giving 
chroma (saturation), and hue being determined by the horizontal angle. Munsell colours 
are described by a standard code: a hue letter (R, RY, Y, YG, G, BG, B, PB or P) fol- 
lowed by a number denoting the brightness then saturation. For each hue letter there are 
10 hue unitsl (e. g. R 2.5 5/8). Adjacent pairs are considered to be perceptually equidis- 
tant from each other. The system was developed by getting observers comparing differ- 
ences between pairs of colours against a grey scale. Some modification has been made to 
the spacing since the original system was developed in order to resolve some of the ir- 
regularities. Indow (1988) using the method of triads to determine colour difference 
found the spacing in the system to be regular but with some irregularities in the blue- 
purple region. The system has the advantage of describing colour in tangible dimensions. 
However, there is no simple system for equating colour difference across the different 
axes. The system can only describe coloured surfaces and does not apply to coloured 
' The `Mansell Book of Color' only shows colour samples for 2.5 units intervals. 
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lights. The system is also only standardised with respect to adjacent colours in the sys- 
tem. Therefore Munsell is likely to be less precise when dealing with large colour differ- 
ences. 
The CIE (1976) L* u* v* (CIELUV) system 
The CIE (Commission Internationale de 1'Eclairage) L* u* v* system (and the earlier L' 
u' v' system) is a transformation of the CIE Y xy chromaticity space. It was shown that 
for a standard observer the Yx 
_y 
space was perceptually uneven. (MacAdam, 1974) 
showed that ellipses drawn on the space to indicate discriminability showed that this 
was relatively poor in the green region (low x, high y) and relatively good in the red re- 
gion (high x, low y). Any colour difference (of a reflective surface or lights) can be de- 
scribed by converting measurements into L* u* v*. However, the dimensions of u* and 
v* don't map easily onto perceptible dimensions and lines along a constant dimension do 
not always equal equivalent hues. The Bezold-Brücke effect show that, for impure col- 
ours, changes in luminance also involves shifts in perceived hue. Therefore colours of 
equivalent u* and v* may not have the same colour quality at all lightness levels. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Stimuli used for rhyming task 
Below are the word-pairs used for the rhyming task in experiments five to seven. Some 
of these pairs were taken from Rack (1985) and Brown (1987). Table 1 gives the word- 
pairs for the experimental trials and table 2 gives the word-pairs for the practice trials. 
Table A. 1. Word-pairs for Experimental trials 
akk .:: pNfký 
Rhyming pairs 
ý\S: ýM"k "W m :. 'SYd ¢o. PgTa t. ' .. . 
Y. Fa.: Y2ttlwYAPT? idx"sYR:; a . s%sA. 
f&A's. KfliAY.; 
Non-rhyming pairs 
Nigh Why Nigh Light 
Browse Cows Browse West 
Plough Now Plough Grind 
Flout Drought Flout Lapse 
Torque Fork Torque Tripe 
Chord Broad Chord Bread 
Theme Seem Theme Moose 
Quay See Quay Haste 
Aisle Pile Aisle Lose 
Page Gauge Page Due 
Dough Low Dough Law 
Brooch Coach Brooch Laugh 
Shoot Chute Shoot Hood 
Yacht Plot Yacht Melt 
Isle Mile Isle Nose 
Craft Draught Craft Front 
Say Neigh Say Prise 
Lute Hoot Lute Shoe 
Tall Crawl Tall Shall 
Farm - Calm 
Farm Strum 
Lord Reward Lord Bird 
Tough Stuff Tough Although 
Shoot Fruit Shoot Fool 
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Table 1 (cont. ) 
Rhyming pairs Non-rhyming pairs 
e Bull Wool Bull Mail 
Break Rake Break Note 
Castle Hassle Castle Mole 
Clear Beer Clear Supper 
Flower Sour Flower Winner 
Home Comb Home Bare 
Horse Course Horse Purse 
Limb Brim Limb Dome 
Proof Sleuth Proof Look 
Quest Zest Quest Quiet 
Trial Pile Trial Toll 
Wood Could Wood Toad 
Answer Cancer Answer Awkward 
Table A. 2. Word-pairs for Practice trials 
Rhyming pairs Non-rhyming pairs 
Rate ý Wait Rate Pirate 
Please Sneeze Please Lean 
Afraid Shade Afraid Said 
Surprise Size Surprise Promise 
Speak Seek Speak Make 
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